Copyright © 2010 The Internet Society & W3C® (MIT, ERCIM, Keio), All Rights Reserved. W3C liability, trademark and document use rules apply.
This document specifies XML digital signature processing rules and syntax. XML Signatures provide integrity, message authentication, and/or signer authentication services for data of any type, whether located within the XML that includes the signature or elsewhere.
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C technical reports index at http://www.w3.org/TR/.
At the time of this publication, the most recent W3C Recommendation of XML Signature 1 is the 10 June 2008 XML Signature (Second Edition) Recommendation. Please review differences between the previous and this Working Draft, and differences between the previous XML Signature Recommendation and this Working Draft; a detailed explanation of changes is also available.
Conformance-affecting changes against this previous recommendation mainly affect the set of mandatory to implement cryptographic algorithms, including Elliptic Curve DSA (and mark-up for corresponding key material), and additional hash algorithms.
This Last Call Working Draft includes the ECDSAwithSHA256
signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256 prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS-186-3] (and using the SHA-256 hash algorithm), as a mandatory to implement algorithm. The Working Group may request transition to Candidate Recommendation with this feature marked as "at risk". If issues about deployment of this feature are raised during Candidate Recommendation, the group may elect to make this feature optional.
The Working Group is, in parallel to this work, developing requirements and designs for a more radically different version 2 of XML Signature.
This document was developed by the XML Security Working Group. The Working Group expects to advance this Working Draft to Recommendation Status.
This document was published by the XML Security Working Group as a Last Call Working Draft. This document is intended to become a W3C Recommendation. If you wish to make comments regarding this document, please send them to public-xmlsec@w3.org (subscribe, archives). The Last Call period ends 18 March 2010. All feedback is welcome.
Publication as a Working Draft does not imply endorsement by the W3C Membership. This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as other than work in progress.
This is a Last Call Working Draft and thus the Working Group has determined that this document has satisfied the relevant technical requirements and is sufficiently stable to advance through the Technical Recommendation process.
This document was produced by a group operating under the 5 February 2004 W3C Patent Policy. W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in connection with the deliverables of the group; that page also includes instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has actual knowledge of a patent which the individual believes contains Essential Claim(s) must disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy.
ds:CryptoBinary
Simple TypeSignature
elementSignatureValue
ElementSignedInfo
ElementKeyInfo
ElementObject
Element
This document specifies XML syntax and processing rules for creating and representing digital signatures. XML Signatures can be applied to any digital content (data object), including XML. An XML Signature may be applied to the content of one or more resources. Enveloped or enveloping signatures are over data within the same XML document as the signature; detached signatures are over data external to the signature element. More specifically, this specification defines an XML signature element type and an XML signature application; conformance requirements for each are specified by way of schema definitions and prose respectively. This specification also includes other useful types that identify methods for referencing collections of resources, algorithms, and keying and management information.
The XML Signature is a method of associating a key with referenced data (octets); it does not normatively specify how keys are associated with persons or institutions, nor the meaning of the data being referenced and signed. Consequently, while this specification is an important component of secure XML applications, it itself is not sufficient to address all application security/trust concerns, particularly with respect to using signed XML (or other data formats) as a basis of human-to-human communication and agreement. Such an application must specify additional key, algorithm, processing and rendering requirements. For further information, please see Security Considerations (section 8).
For readability, brevity, and historic reasons this document uses the term "signature" to generally refer to digital authentication values of all types. Obviously, the term is also strictly used to refer to authentication values that are based on public keys and that provide signer authentication. When specifically discussing authentication values based on symmetric secret key codes we use the terms authenticators or authentication codes. (See Check the Security Model, section 8.2.)
This specification provides a normative XML Schema [XMLSCHEMA-1], [XMLSCHEMA-2]. The full normative grammar is defined by the XSD schema and the normative text in this specification. The standalone XSD schema file is authoritative in case there is any disagreement between it and the XSD schema portions in this specification.
The key words "must", "must not", "required", "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "recommended", "may", and "optional" in this specification are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
"They must only be used where it is actually required for interoperation or to limit behavior which has potential for causing harm (e.g., limiting retransmissions)"
Consequently, we use these capitalized key words to unambiguously specify requirements over protocol and application features and behavior that affect the interoperability and security of implementations. These key words are not used (capitalized) to describe XML grammar; schema definitions unambiguously describe such requirements and we wish to reserve the prominence of these terms for the natural language descriptions of protocols and features. For instance, an XML attribute might be described as being "optional." Compliance with the Namespaces in XML specification [XML-NAMES] is described as "required."
The design philosophy and requirements of this specification are addressed in the original XML-Signature Requirements document [XMLDSIG-REQUIREMENTS] and the XML Security 1.1 Requirements document [XMLSEC11-REQS].
This specification makes use of XML namespaces, and uses Uniform Resource Identifiers [URI] to identify resources, algorithms, and semantics.
Implementations of this specification must use the following XML namespace URIs:
URI | namespace prefix | XML internal entity |
---|---|---|
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig# | default namespace,
ds: , dsig: | <!ENTITY dsig "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> |
http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11# | dsig11: | <!ENTITY dsig11 "http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#"> |
While implementations must support XML and XML namespaces, and while use of the above namespace URIs is required, the namespace prefixes and entity declarations given are merely editorial conventions used in this document. Their use by implementations is optional.
These namespace URIs are also used as the prefix for algorithm identifiers that are under control of this specification. For resources not under the control of this specification, we use the designated Uniform Resource Names [URN], [RFC3406] or Uniform Resource Identifiers [URI] defined by the relevant normative external specification.
For instance:
SignatureProperties
is identified and defined by the disg:
namespacehttp://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#SignatureProperties
ECKeyValue
is identified and defined by the
dsig11:
namespacehttp://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#ECKeyValue
http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116
The http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
(dsig:
) namespace was
introduced in the first edition of this specification. This version does not coin any new
elements or algorithm identifiers in that namespace; instead, the
http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#
(dsig11:
)
namespace
is used.
No provision is made for an explicit version number in this syntax. If a future version of this specification requires explicit versioning of the document format, a different namespace will be used.
The contributions of the members of the XML Signature Working Group to the first edition specification are gratefully acknowledged: Mark Bartel, Adobe, was Accelio (Author); John Boyer, IBM (Author); Mariano P. Consens, University of Waterloo; John Cowan, Reuters Health; Donald Eastlake 3rd, Motorola (Chair, Author/Editor); Barb Fox, Microsoft (Author); Christian Geuer-Pollmann, University Siegen; Tom Gindin, IBM; Phillip Hallam-Baker, VeriSign Inc; Richard Himes, US Courts; Merlin Hughes, Baltimore; Gregor Karlinger, IAIK TU Graz; Brian LaMacchia, Microsoft (Author); Peter Lipp, IAIK TU Graz; Joseph Reagle, NYU, was W3C (Chair, Author/Editor); Ed Simon, XMLsec (Author); David Solo, Citigroup (Author/Editor); Petteri Stenius, Capslock; Raghavan Srinivas, Sun; Kent Tamura, IBM; Winchel Todd Vincent III, GSU; Carl Wallace, Corsec Security, Inc.; Greg Whitehead, Signio Inc.
As are the first edition Last Call comments from the following:
The following members of the XML Security Specification Maintenance Working Group contributed to the second edition: Juan Carlos Cruellas, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya; Pratik Datta, Oracle Corporation; Phillip Hallam-Baker, VeriSign, Inc.; Frederick Hirsch, Nokia, (Chair, Editor); Konrad Lanz, Applied Information processing and Kommunications (IAIK); Hal Lockhart, BEA Systems, Inc.; Robert Miller, MITRE Corporation; Sean Mullan, Sun Microsystems, Inc.; Bruce Rich, IBM Corporation; Thomas Roessler, W3C/ERCIM, (Staff contact, Editor); Ed Simon, W3C Invited Expert; Greg Whitehead, HP.
Contributions for version 1.1 were received from the members of the XML Security Working Group: Scott Cantor, Juan Carlos Cruellas, Pratik Datta, Gerald Edgar, Ken Graf, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Brad Hill, Frederick Hirsch (Chair, Editor), Brian LaMacchia, Konrad Lanz, Hal Lockhart, Cynthia Martin, Rob Miller, Sean Mullan, Shivaram Mysore, Magnus Nyström, Bruce Rich, Thomas Roessler (Staff contact, Editor), Ed Simon, Chris Solc, John Wray, Kelvin Yiu (Editor).
The Working Group thanks Makoto Murata for assistance with the RELAX NG schemas.
This section provides an overview and examples of XML digital signature syntax. The specific processing is given in Processing Rules (section 3). The formal syntax is found in Core Signature Syntax (section 4) and Additional Signature Syntax (section 5).
In this section, an informal representation and examples are used to describe the structure of the XML signature syntax. This representation and examples may omit attributes, details and potential features that are fully explained later.
XML Signatures are applied to arbitrary digital content (data objects)
via an indirection. Data objects are digested, the resulting value is placed
in an element (with other information) and that element is then digested and
cryptographically signed. XML digital signatures are represented by the
Signature
element which has the following structure (where "?" denotes
zero or one occurrence; "+" denotes one or more occurrences; and "*" denotes
zero or more occurrences):
<Signature ID?> <SignedInfo> <CanonicalizationMethod/> <SignatureMethod/> (<Reference URI? > (<Transforms>)? <DigestMethod> <DigestValue> </Reference>)+ </SignedInfo> <SignatureValue> (<KeyInfo>)? (<Object ID?>)* </Signature>
Signatures are related to data objects via URIs [URI]. Within an XML document, signatures are
related to local data objects via fragment identifiers. Such local data can be
included within an enveloping signature or can enclose an enveloped signature. Detached signatures are over external
network resources or local data objects that reside within the same XML
document as sibling elements; in this case, the signature is neither
enveloping (signature is parent) nor enveloped (signature is child). Since a
Signature
element (and its Id
attribute value/name) may co-exist or be
combined with other elements (and their IDs) within a single XML document,
care should be taken in choosing names such that there are no subsequent
collisions that violate the
ID uniqueness validity constraint [XML10].
Signature
,
SignedInfo
, Methods
, and
Reference
s)The following example is a detached signature of the content of the HTML4 in XML specification.
[s01] <Signature Id="MyFirstSignature" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> [s02] <SignedInfo> [s03] <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11"/> [s04] <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/> [s05] <Reference URI="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xhtml1-20000126/"> [s06] <Transforms> [s07] <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11"/> [s08] </Transforms> [s09] <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> [s10] <DigestValue>dGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSBzaWduYXR1cmUK...</DigestValue> [s11] </Reference> [s12] </SignedInfo> [s13] <SignatureValue>...</SignatureValue> [s14] <KeyInfo> [s15a] <KeyValue> [s15b] <DSAKeyValue> [s15c] <P>...</P><Q>...</Q><G>...</G><Y>...</Y> [s15d] </DSAKeyValue> [s15e] </KeyValue> [s16] </KeyInfo> [s17] </Signature>
[s02-12]
The required SignedInfo
element is the information that is actually signed. Core validation of
SignedInfo
consists of two mandatory processes: validation of the signature over
SignedInfo
and validation of each
Reference
digest within
SignedInfo
. Note that
the algorithms used in calculating the
SignatureValue
are also included in the signed information while
the SignatureValue
element is outside SignedInfo
.
[s03]
The CanonicalizationMethod
is the algorithm
that is used to canonicalize the
SignedInfo
element before it is digested as part of the signature
operation.
Note that this example is not in canonical form. (None of the examples in this
specification are in canonical form.)
[s04]
The SignatureMethod
is the algorithm that
is used to convert the canonicalized
SignedInfo
into the SignatureValue
. It is a
combination of a digest algorithm and a key dependent algorithm and possibly
other algorithms such as padding, for example RSA-SHA1. The algorithm names
are signed to resist attacks based on substituting a weaker algorithm. To
promote application interoperability we specify a set of signature algorithms
that must be implemented, though their use is at the discretion of the
signature creator. We specify additional algorithms as recommended or optional
for implementation; the design also permits arbitrary user specified
algorithms.
[s05-11]
Each Reference
element includes the
digest method and resulting digest value calculated over the identified data
object. It also may include transformations that produced the input to the
digest operation. A data object is signed by computing its digest value and a
signature over that value. The signature is later checked via
reference and signature validation.
[s14-16]
KeyInfo
indicates the key to be used to
validate the signature. Possible forms for identification include
certificates, key names, and key agreement algorithms and information -- we
define only a few.
KeyInfo
is optional for two reasons. First, the signer may not
wish to reveal key information to all document processing parties. Second, the
information may be known within the application's context and need not be
represented explicitly. Since KeyInfo
is outside of
SignedInfo
, if the signer wishes to bind the keying information to the
signature, a Reference
can easily identify and include the
KeyInfo
as part of the signature.
Use of KeyInfo
is optional, however note that senders and receivers
must agree on how it will be used through a mechanism out of scope for
this specification.
Reference
[s05] <Reference URI="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xhtml1-20000126/"> [s06] <Transforms> [s07] <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11"/> [s08] </Transforms> [s09] <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> [s10] <DigestValue>dGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSBzaWduYXR1cmUK...</DigestValue> [s11] </Reference>
[s05]
The optional URI
attribute of
Reference
identifies the data object to be signed. This attribute
may be omitted on at most one
Reference
in a Signature
. (This limitation is
imposed in order to ensure that references and objects may be matched
unambiguously.)
[s05-08]
This identification, along with the transforms, is a
description provided by the signer on how they obtained the signed data object
in the form it was digested (i.e. the digested content). The verifier may
obtain the digested content in another method so long as the digest verifies.
In particular, the verifier may obtain the content from a different location
such as a local store than that specified in the
URI
.
[s06-08] Transforms
is an optional ordered list of processing
steps that were applied to the resource's content before it was digested.
Transforms can include operations such as canonicalization, encoding/decoding
(including compression/inflation), XSLT, XPath, XML schema validation, or
XInclude. XPath transforms permit the signer to derive an XML document that
omits portions of the source document. Consequently those excluded portions
can change without affecting signature validity. For example, if the resource
being signed encloses the signature itself, such a transform must be used to
exclude the signature value from its own computation. If no
Transforms
element is present, the resource's content is digested
directly. While the Working Group has specified mandatory (and optional)
canonicalization and decoding algorithms, user specified transforms are
permitted.
[s09-10] DigestMethod
is the algorithm applied to the data
after Transforms
is applied (if specified) to yield the
DigestValue
. The signing of the
DigestValue
is what binds the content of a resource to
the signer's
key.
Object
and SignatureProperty
)This specification does not address mechanisms for making statements or
assertions. Instead, this document defines what it means for something to be
signed by an XML Signature (integrity,
message authentication, and/or signer
authentication). Applications that wish to represent other semantics must
rely upon other technologies, such as [XML10], [RDF-PRIMER]. For
instance, an application might use a
foo:assuredby
attribute within its own markup to reference a
Signature
element. Consequently, it's the application that must
understand and know how to make trust decisions given the validity of the
signature and the meaning of
assuredby
syntax. We also define a
SignatureProperties
element type for the inclusion of assertions
about the signature itself (e.g., signature semantics, the time of signing or
the serial number of hardware used in cryptographic processes). Such
assertions may be signed by including a Reference
for the
SignatureProperties
in SignedInfo
. While the signing
application should be very careful about what it signs (it should understand
what is in the
SignatureProperty
) a receiving application has no obligation to
understand that semantic (though its parent trust engine may wish to). Any
content about the signature generation may be located within the
SignatureProperty
element. The mandatory Target
attribute
references the
Signature
element to which the property applies.
Consider the preceding example with an additional reference to a local
Object
that includes a
SignatureProperty
element. (Such a signature would not only be detached [p02]
but enveloping [p03]
.)
[ ] <Signature Id="MySecondSignature" ...> [p01] <SignedInfo> [ ] ... [p02] <Reference URI="http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-stylesheet/"> [ ] ... [p03] <Reference URI="#AMadeUpTimeStamp" [p04] Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#SignatureProperties"> [p05] <Transforms> [p06] <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11"/> [p07] </Transforms> [p08] <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> [p09] <DigestValue>dGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSBzaWduYXR1cmUK...</DigestValue> [p10] </Reference> [p11] </SignedInfo> [p12] ... [p13] <Object> [p14] <SignatureProperties> [p15] <SignatureProperty Id="AMadeUpTimeStamp" Target="#MySecondSignature"> [p16] <timestamp xmlns="http://www.ietf.org/rfcXXXX.txt"> [p17] <date>19990914</date> [p18] <time>14:34:34:34</time> [p19] </timestamp> [p20] </SignatureProperty> [p21] </SignatureProperties> [p22] </Object> [p23]</Signature>
[p04]
The optional Type
attribute of
Reference
provides information about the resource identified by
the URI
. In particular, it can indicate that it is an
Object
,
SignatureProperty
, or Manifest
element. This can be
used by applications to initiate special processing of some Reference
elements. References to an XML data element within an Object
element should identify the actual element pointed to. Where the element
content is not XML (perhaps it is binary or encoded data) the reference should
identify the Object
and the
Reference
Type
, if given, should indicate
Object
. Note that Type
is advisory and no action based on
it or checking of its correctness is required by core behavior.
[p13]
Object
is an optional element for including
data objects within the signature element or elsewhere. The Object
can be optionally typed and/or encoded.
[p14-21]
Signature properties, such as time of signing, can be
optionally signed by identifying them from within a Reference
.
(These properties are traditionally called signature "attributes" although
that term has no relationship to the XML term "attribute".)
Object
and Manifest
)The Manifest
element is provided to meet additional
requirements not directly addressed by the mandatory parts of this
specification. Two requirements and the way the
Manifest
satisfies them follow.
First, applications frequently need to efficiently sign multiple data
objects even where the signature operation itself is an expensive public key
signature. This requirement can be met by including multiple Reference
elements within
SignedInfo
since the inclusion of each digest secures the data
digested. However, some applications may not want the core validation behavior associated with this approach because it
requires every Reference
within
SignedInfo
to undergo reference validation -- the DigestValue
elements are checked. These applications may wish to reserve reference
validation decision logic to themselves. For example, an application might
receive a signature valid
SignedInfo
element that includes three
Reference
elements. If a single
Reference
fails (the identified data object when digested does
not yield the specified DigestValue
) the signature would fail core validation. However, the application may wish
to treat the signature over the two valid
Reference
elements as valid or take different actions depending
on which fails. To accomplish this,
SignedInfo
would reference a Manifest
element that contains one or more Reference
elements (with the
same structure as those in SignedInfo
). Then, reference
validation of the Manifest
is under application control.
Second, consider an application where many signatures (using different
keys) are applied to a large number of documents. An inefficient solution is
to have a separate signature (per key) repeatedly applied to a large
SignedInfo
element (with many Reference
s); this is
wasteful and redundant. A more efficient solution is to include many
references in a single Manifest
that is then referenced from
multiple Signature
elements.
The example below includes a Reference
that signs a
Manifest
found within the Object
element.
[ ] ... [m01] <Reference URI="#MyFirstManifest" [m02] Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#Manifest"> [m03] <Transforms> [m04] <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/xml-c14n11"/> [m05] </Transforms> [m06] <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> [m07] <DigestValue>dGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSBzaWduYXR1cmUK...=</DigestValue> [m08] </Reference> [ ] ... [m09] <Object> [m10] <Manifest Id="MyFirstManifest"> [m11] <Reference> [m12] ... [m13] </Reference> [m14] <Reference> [m15] ... [m16] </Reference> [m17] </Manifest> [m18] </Object>
The sections below describe the operations to be performed as part of signature generation and validation.
The required steps include the generation of
Reference
elements and the
SignatureValue
over SignedInfo
.
For each data object being signed:
Transforms
, as determined by the application, to
the data object.Reference
element, including the (optional)
identification of the data object, any (optional) transform elements, the
digest algorithm and the
DigestValue
. (Note, it is the canonical form of these
references that are signed in 3.1.2 and validated in 3.2.1 .)
Transform
elements is a node-set. We RECOMMEND that, when generating
signatures, signature applications do not rely on this default behavior, but
explicitly identify the transformation that is applied to perform this
mapping. In cases in which inclusive canonicalization is desired, we RECOMMEND
that Canonical XML 1.1 [XML-C14N11] be used.
SignedInfo
element with
SignatureMethod
,
CanonicalizationMethod
and
Reference
(s).SignatureValue
over SignedInfo
based on algorithms
specified in SignedInfo
.Signature
element that includes
SignedInfo
, Object
(s) (if desired, encoding may be
different than that used for signing),
KeyInfo
(if required), and
SignatureValue
.
Note, if the Signature
includes same-document references,
[XML10] or [XMLSCHEMA-1] ,[XMLSCHEMA-2]
validation of the document might introduce changes that break the
signature. Consequently, applications should be careful to
consistently
process the document or refrain from using external
contributions (e.g.,
defaults and entities).
The required steps of core validation include (1) reference validation, the verification of the digest contained in
each Reference
in
SignedInfo
, and (2) the cryptographic signature validation of the signature calculated over
SignedInfo
.
Note, there may be valid signatures that some signature applications are unable to validate. Reasons for this include failure to implement optional parts of this specification, inability or unwillingness to execute specified algorithms, or inability or unwillingness to dereference specified URIs (some URI schemes may cause undesirable side effects), etc.
Comparison of each value in reference and signature validation is over the numeric (e.g., integer) or decoded octet sequence of the value. Different implementations may produce different encoded digest and signature values when processing the same resources because of variances in their encoding, such as accidental white space. But if one uses numeric or octet comparison (choose one) on both the stated and computed values these problems are eliminated.
SignedInfo
element based on the
CanonicalizationMethod
in
SignedInfo
.Reference
in SignedInfo
:
URI
and execute Transforms
provided by the signer in the Reference
element, or it may obtain the content through other means such as a
local cache.)DigestMethod
specified in its
Reference
specification.DigestValue
in the SignedInfo
Reference
; if there is any mismatch, validation fails.Note, SignedInfo
is canonicalized in step 1. The application
must ensure that the CanonicalizationMethod has no dangerous side effects,
such as rewriting URIs, (see
CanonicalizationMethod
Note (section 4.4.1)) and that it
Sees What is Signed, which is the canonical form.
Note, After a Signature
element has been created in
Signature
Generation for a signature with a same document reference, an
implementation can serialize the XML content with variations in that
serialization. This means that Reference Validation needs to
canonicalize the XML document before digesting in step 1 to avoid
issues related to variations in serialization.
KeyInfo
or from an external source.SignatureMethod
using the
CanonicalizationMethod
and use the result (and previously
obtained KeyInfo
) to confirm the
SignatureValue
over the SignedInfo
element.Note, KeyInfo
(or some transformed version thereof) may be signed
via a Reference
element. Transformation and validation of this
reference (3.2.1) is orthogonal to Signature Validation which uses the
KeyInfo
as parsed.
Additionally, the SignatureMethod
URI may have been altered by
the canonicalization of SignedInfo
(e.g., absolutization of relative URIs) and it is the canonical form that must
be used. However, the required canonicalization [XML-C14N]
of this specification does not change URIs.
The general structure of an XML signature is described in Signature Overview (section 2). This section provides detailed syntax of the core signature features. Features described in this section are mandatory to implement unless otherwise indicated. The syntax is defined via an [XMLSCHEMA-1][XMLSCHEMA-2] with the following XML preamble, declaration, and internal entity.
Schema Definition: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <!DOCTYPE schema PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XMLSchema 200102//EN" "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema.dtd" [ <!ATTLIST schema xmlns:ds CDATA #FIXED "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <!ENTITY dsig 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'> <!ENTITY % p ''> <!ENTITY % s ''> ]> <schema xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" version="0.1" elementFormDefault="qualified">
Additional markup defined in version 1.1 of this specification uses the dsig11:
namespace. The syntax is defined in an XML schema with the following preamble:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <!DOCTYPE schema PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XMLSchema 200102//EN" "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema.dtd" [ <!ENTITY dsig 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'> <!ENTITY dsig11 'http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#'> <!ENTITY % p ''> <!ENTITY % s ''> ]> <schema xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:dsig11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" version="0.1" elementFormDefault="qualified">
ds:CryptoBinary
Simple TypeThis specification defines the ds:CryptoBinary
simple type for representing arbitrary-length integers (e.g. "bignums") in XML
as octet strings. The integer value is first converted to a "big endian"
bitstring. The bitstring is then padded with leading zero bits so that the
total number of bits == 0 mod 8 (so that there are an integral number of
octets). If the bitstring contains entire leading octets that are zero, these
are removed (so the high-order octet is always non-zero). This octet string is
then base64 [RFC2045] encoded. (The
conversion from integer to octet string is equivalent to IEEE 1363's
I2OSP
[IEEE1363]
with minimal length).
This type is used by "bignum" values such as
RSAKeyValue
and DSAKeyValue
. If a value can be of
type base64Binary
or
ds:CryptoBinary
they are defined as base64Binary
. For example, if the signature algorithm
is RSA or DSA then
SignatureValue
represents a bignum and could be
ds:CryptoBinary
. However, if HMAC-SHA1 is the signature algorithm
then SignatureValue
could have leading zero octets that must be
preserved. Thus
SignatureValue
is generically defined as of type
base64Binary
.
Schema Definition: <simpleType name="CryptoBinary"> <restriction base="base64Binary"> </restriction> </simpleType>
Signature
elementThe Signature
element is the root element of an XML
Signature.
Implementation must generate
laxly
schema valid
[XMLSCHEMA-1][XMLSCHEMA-2]
Signature
elements as specified by
the following schema:
Schema Definition: <element name="Signature" type="ds:SignatureType"/> <complexType name="SignatureType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:SignedInfo"/> <element ref="ds:SignatureValue"/> <element ref="ds:KeyInfo" minOccurs="0"/> <element ref="ds:Object" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </complexType>
SignatureValue
ElementThe SignatureValue
element contains the actual value of the
digital signature; it is always encoded using base64 [RFC2045].
Schema Definition: <element name="SignatureValue" type="ds:SignatureValueType"/> <complexType name="SignatureValueType"> <simpleContent> <extension base="base64Binary"> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </extension> </simpleContent> </complexType>
SignedInfo
ElementThe structure of SignedInfo
includes the canonicalization
algorithm, a signature algorithm, and one or more references. The
SignedInfo
element may contain an optional ID attribute that will allow
it to be referenced by other signatures and objects.
SignedInfo
does not include explicit signature or digest
properties (such as calculation time, cryptographic device serial number,
etc.). If an application needs to associate properties with the signature or
digest, it may include such information in a SignatureProperties
element within an Object
element.
Schema Definition: <element name="SignedInfo" type="ds:SignedInfoType"/> <complexType name="SignedInfoType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:CanonicalizationMethod"/> <element ref="ds:SignatureMethod"/> <element ref="ds:Reference" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </complexType>
CanonicalizationMethod
ElementCanonicalizationMethod
is a required element that specifies
the canonicalization algorithm applied to the
SignedInfo
element prior to performing signature calculations.
This element uses the general structure for algorithms described in Algorithm Identifiers and Implementation Requirements
(section 6.1). Implementations must support the required canonicalization algorithms.
Alternatives to the required canonicalization algorithms (section 6.5), such as Canonical XML with Comments (section 6.5.1) or a minimal canonicalization (such as CRLF and charset normalization) , may be explicitly specified but are not required. Consequently, their use may not interoperate with other applications that do not support the specified algorithm (see XML Canonicalization and Syntax Constraint Considerations, section 7). Security issues may also arise in the treatment of entity processing and comments if non-XML aware canonicalization algorithms are not properly constrained (see section 8.1.2: Only What is "Seen" Should be Signed).
The way in which the SignedInfo
element is presented to the
canonicalization method is dependent on that method. The following applies to
algorithms which process XML as nodes or characters:
SignedInfo
and currently indicating the
SignedInfo
, its descendants, and the attribute and namespace
nodes of SignedInfo
and its descendant elements.SignedInfo
element, from the first
character to the last
character of the XML representation, inclusive. This includes the entire
text of the start and end tags of the SignedInfo
element as well as all
descendant markup and character data (i.e., the text) between those tags. Use of text based canonicalization of
SignedInfo
is not recommended.We recommend applications that implement a text-based instead of XML-based canonicalization -- such as resource constrained apps -- generate canonicalized XML as their output serialization so as to mitigate interoperability and security concerns. For instance, such an implementation should (at least) generate standalone XML instances [XML10].
Note: The signature
application must exercise great care in accepting and executing an arbitrary
CanonicalizationMethod
. For example, the canonicalization method could
rewrite the URIs of the Reference
s being validated. Or, the
method could massively transform SignedInfo
so that validation
would always succeed (i.e., converting it to a trivial signature with a known
key over trivial data). Since
CanonicalizationMethod
is inside
SignedInfo
, in the resulting canonical form it could erase itself
from SignedInfo
or modify the
SignedInfo
element so that it appears that a different
canonicalization function was used! Thus a
Signature
which appears to authenticate the desired data with the
desired key, DigestMethod
, and
SignatureMethod
, can be meaningless if a capricious
CanonicalizationMethod
is used.
Schema Definition: <element name="CanonicalizationMethod" type="ds:CanonicalizationMethodType"/> <complexType name="CanonicalizationMethodType" mixed="true"> <sequence> <any namespace="##any" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <!-- (0,unbounded) elements from (1,1) namespace --> </sequence> <attribute name="Algorithm" type="anyURI" use="required"/> </complexType>
SignatureMethod
ElementSignatureMethod
is a required element that specifies the
algorithm used for signature generation and validation. This algorithm
identifies all cryptographic functions involved in the signature operation
(e.g. hashing, public key algorithms, MACs, padding, etc.). This element uses
the general structure here for algorithms described in section 6.1: Algorithm Identifiers and Implementation
Requirements. While there is a single identifier, that identifier may
specify a format containing multiple distinct signature values.
Schema Definition: <element name="SignatureMethod" type="ds:SignatureMethodType"/> <complexType name="SignatureMethodType" mixed="true"> <sequence> <element name="HMACOutputLength" minOccurs="0" type="ds:HMACOutputLengthType"/> <any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <!-- (0,unbounded) elements from (1,1) external namespace --> </sequence> <attribute name="Algorithm" type="anyURI" use="required"/> </complexType>
The ds:HMACOutputLength
parameter is used for HMAC [HMAC] algorithms. The
parameter specifies a truncation length in bits. If this parameter is trusted without further
verification, then this can lead to a security bypass
[CVE-2009-0217].
Signatures must be deemed invalid if the truncation length is below
the larger of (a) half the underlying hash algorithm's output length,
and (b) 80 bits.
Note that some implementations are known to not
accept truncation lengths that are lower than the underlying hash algorithm's output length.
Reference
ElementReference
is an element that may occur one or more times. It
specifies a digest algorithm and digest value, and optionally an identifier of
the object being signed, the type of the object, and/or a list of transforms
to be applied prior to digesting. The identification (URI) and transforms
describe how the digested content (i.e., the input to the digest method) was
created. The Type
attribute facilitates the processing of
referenced data. For example, while this specification makes no requirements
over external data, an application may wish to signal that the referent is a
Manifest
. An optional ID attribute permits a
Reference
to be referenced from elsewhere.
Schema Definition: <element name="Reference" type="ds:ReferenceType"/> <complexType name="ReferenceType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:Transforms" minOccurs="0"/> <element ref="ds:DigestMethod"/> <element ref="ds:DigestValue"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> <attribute name="URI" type="anyURI" use="optional"/> <attribute name="Type" type="anyURI" use="optional"/> </complexType>
URI
AttributeThe URI
attribute identifies a data object using a
URI-Reference [URI].
The mapping from this attribute's value to a URI reference must be performed as specified in section 3.2.17 of [XMLSCHEMA-2]. Additionally: Some existing implementations are known to verify the value of the URI attribute against the grammar in [URI]. It is therefore safest to perform any necessary escaping while generating the URI attribute.
We RECOMMEND XML Signature applications be able to dereference URIs in the HTTP scheme. Dereferencing a URI in the HTTP scheme must comply with the Status Code Definitions of [HTTP11] (e.g., 302, 305 and 307 redirects are followed to obtain the entity-body of a 200 status code response). Applications should also be cognizant of the fact that protocol parameter and state information, (such as HTTP cookies, HTML device profiles or content negotiation), may affect the content yielded by dereferencing a URI.
If a resource is identified by more than one URI, the most specific should be used (e.g. http://www.w3.org/2000/06/interop-pressrelease.html.en instead of http://www.w3.org/2000/06/interop-pressrelease). (See the Reference Validation section (section 3.2.1) for further information on reference processing.)
If the URI
attribute is omitted altogether, the receiving
application is expected to know the identity of the object. For example, a
lightweight data protocol might omit this attribute given the identity of the
object is part of the application context. This attribute may be omitted from
at most one Reference
in any particular
SignedInfo
, or Manifest
.
The optional Type attribute contains information about the type of object
being signed after all ds:Reference
transforms have been applied. This is represented as a URI. For example:
Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#Object"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#Manifest"
The Type
attribute applies to the item being pointed
at, not its contents.
For example, a reference that results in the digesting of an Object
element containing a
SignatureProperties
element is still of type
#Object
. The Type
attribute is advisory. No validation of the
type information is required by this specification.
Note: XPath is recommended. Signature applications need not conform to [XPATH] specification in order to conform to this specification. However, the XPath data model, definitions (e.g., node-sets) and syntax is used within this document in order to describe functionality for those that want to process XML-as-XML (instead of octets) as part of signature generation. For those that want to use these features, a conformant [XPATH] implementation is one way to implement these features, but it is not required. Such applications could use a sufficiently functional replacement to a node-set and implement only those XPath expression behaviors required by this specification. However, for simplicity we generally will use XPath terminology without including this qualification on every point. Requirements over "XPath node-sets" can include a node-set functional equivalent. Requirements over XPath processing can include application behaviors that are equivalent to the corresponding XPath behavior.
The data-type of the result of URI dereferencing or subsequent Transforms is either an octet stream or an XPath node-set.
The Transforms
specified in this document are defined with
respect to the input they require. The following is the default signature
application behavior:
Users may specify alternative transforms that override these defaults in
transitions between transforms that expect different inputs. The final octet
stream contains the data octets being secured. The digest algorithm specified
by
DigestMethod
is then applied to these data octets, resulting in
the DigestValue
.
Note: The Reference Generation Model (section 3.1.1) includes further restrictions on the reliance upon defined default transformations when applications generate signatures.
In this specification, a 'same-document' reference is defined as a URI-Reference that consists of a hash sign ('#') followed by a fragment or alternatively consists of an empty URI [URI].
Unless the URI-Reference is such a 'same-document' reference , the result of dereferencing the URI-Reference must be an octet stream. In particular, an XML document identified by URI is not parsed by the signature application unless the URI is a same-document reference or unless a transform that requires XML parsing is applied. (See Transforms (section 4.4.3.4).)
When a fragment is preceded by an absolute or relative URI in the
URI-Reference, the meaning of the fragment is defined by the resource's MIME
type [RFC2045]. Even for XML documents, URI dereferencing (including the fragment
processing) might be done for the signature application by a proxy. Therefore,
reference validation might fail if fragment processing is not performed in a
standard way (as defined in the following section for same-document
references). Consequently, we RECOMMEND in this case that the
URI
attribute not include fragment identifiers and that
such processing be specified as an
additional XPath Transform
or XPath Filter 2 Transform [XMLDSIG-XPATH-FILTER2].
When a fragment is not preceded by a URI in the URI-Reference, XML
Signature applications must support the null URI and shortname XPointer [XPTR-FRAMEWORK]. We RECOMMEND support for the same-document
XPointers '#xpointer(/)
' and '#xpointer(id('ID'))
'
if the application also intends to support any canonicalization that preserves comments. (Otherwise
URI="#foo"
will automatically remove comments before the
canonicalization can even be invoked due to the processing defined in Same-Document URI-References (section 4.4.3.3).) All other support
for XPointers is optional, especially all support for shortname and other
XPointers in external resources since the application may not have control
over how the fragment is generated (leading to interoperability problems and
validation failures).
'#xpointer(/)
' must be interpreted to identify the
root node [XPATH]
of the document that contains the URI
attribute.
'#xpointer(id('ID'))
' must be interpreted
to identify
the element node identified by '#element(ID)
'
[XPTR-ELEMENT] when evaluated with
respect to the document that contains the
URI
attribute.
The original edition of this specification [XMLDSIG-CORE]
referenced the XPointer
Candidate Recommendation [XPTR-XPOINTER-CR2001]
and some implementations support it optionally.
That Candidate Recommendation has been superseded by the
[XPTR-FRAMEWORK], [XPTR-XMLNS] and [XPTR-ELEMENT] Recommendations,
and -- at the time of this edition -- the
[XPTR-XPOINTER]
Working Draft. Therefore, the use of
the
xpointer()
scheme [XPTR-XPOINTER] beyond the usage
discussed in this section is discouraged.
The following examples demonstrate what the URI attribute identifies and how it is dereferenced:
URI="http://example.com/bar.xml"
URI="http://example.com/bar.xml#chapter1"
URI=""
URI="#chapter1"
Dereferencing a same-document reference must result in an XPath node-set
suitable for use by Canonical XML [XML-C14N]. Specifically, dereferencing a null
URI (URI=""
) must result in an XPath node-set that includes every
non-comment node of the XML document containing the URI
attribute. In a fragment URI, the characters after the number sign ('#')
character conform to the XPointer syntax [XPTR-FRAMEWORK]. When processing an XPointer, the application
must behave as if the XPointer was evaluated with respect to the XML document
containing the URI
attribute . The application must behave as if the result of XPointer
processing [XPTR-FRAMEWORK] were a node-set derived from the resultant
subresource as follows:
The second to last replacement is necessary because XPointer typically indicates a subtree of an XML document's parse tree using just the element node at the root of the subtree, whereas Canonical XML treats a node-set as a set of nodes in which absence of descendant nodes results in absence of their representative text from the canonical form.
The last step is performed for null URIs and shortname XPointers . It is
necessary because when [XML-C14N] or [XML-C14N11] is passed a
node-set, it processes the node-set as is:
with or without comments. Only when it is called with an octet stream does it
invoke its own XPath expressions (default or without comments). Therefore to
retain the default behavior of stripping comments when passed a node-set, they
are removed in the last step if the URI is not a scheme-based XPointer. To
retain comments while selecting an element by an identifier ID, use
the following scheme-based XPointer:
URI='#xpointer(id('ID'))'
. To retain comments while
selecting the entire document, use the following scheme-based XPointer:
URI='#xpointer(/)'
.
The interpretation of these XPointers is defined in The Reference Processing Model (section 4.4.3.2).
Transforms
ElementThe optional Transforms
element contains an ordered list of
Transform
elements; these describe how the signer obtained the data
object that was digested. The output of each Transform
serves as
input to the next
Transform
. The input to the first
Transform
is the result of dereferencing the
URI
attribute of the Reference
element. The output
from the last Transform
is the input for the DigestMethod
algorithm. When transforms are applied the signer is not signing the native
(original) document but the resulting (transformed) document. (See Only What is Signed is Secure
(section 8.1.1).)
Each Transform
consists of an
Algorithm
attribute and content parameters, if any, appropriate
for the given algorithm. The Algorithm
attribute value specifies the name of the algorithm to be performed, and the
Transform
content provides additional data to govern the algorithm's
processing of the transform input. (See
Algorithm Identifiers and Implementation Requirements (section 6.1).)
As described in The Reference Processing Model (section 4.4.3.2), some transforms take an XPath node-set as input, while others require an octet stream. If the actual input matches the input needs of the transform, then the transform operates on the unaltered input. If the transform input requirement differs from the format of the actual input, then the input must be converted.
Some Transform
s may require explicit MIME type, charset (IANA
registered "character set"), or other such information
concerning the data
they are receiving from an earlier Transform
or the source data,
although no
Transform
algorithm specified in this document needs such
explicit information. Such data characteristics are provided as parameters to
the Transform
algorithm and should be described in the
specification for the algorithm.
Examples of transforms include but are not limited to base64
decoding [RFC2045],
canonicalization [XML-C14N], XPath filtering [XPATH], and XSLT [XSLT]. The generic definition of the
Transform
element also allows application-specific transform
algorithms. For example, the transform could be a decompression routine given
by a Java class appearing as a base64 encoded parameter to a Java
Transform
algorithm. However, applications should refrain from using
application-specific transforms if they wish their signatures to be verifiable
outside of their application domain. Transform Algorithms
(section 6.6) defines the list of standard transformations.
Schema Definition: <element name="Transforms" type="ds:TransformsType"/> <complexType name="TransformsType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:Transform" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> </complexType> <element name="Transform" type="ds:TransformType"/> <complexType name="TransformType" mixed="true"> <choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> <!-- (1,1) elements from (0,unbounded) namespaces --> <element name="XPath" type="string"/> </choice> <attribute name="Algorithm" type="anyURI" use="required"/> </complexType>
DigestMethod
ElementDigestMethod
is a required element that identifies the digest
algorithm to be applied to the signed object. This element uses the general
structure here for algorithms specified in Algorithm Identifiers and Implementation Requirements
(section 6.1).
If the result of the URI dereference and application of Transforms is an XPath node-set (or sufficiently functional replacement implemented by the application) then it must be converted as described in the Reference Processing Model (section 4.4.3.2). If the result of URI dereference and application of transforms is an octet stream, then no conversion occurs (comments might be present if the Canonical XML with Comments was specified in the Transforms). The digest algorithm is applied to the data octets of the resulting octet stream.
Schema Definition: <element name="DigestMethod" type="ds:DigestMethodType"/> <complexType name="DigestMethodType" mixed="true"> <sequence> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Algorithm" type="anyURI" use="required"/> </complexType>
DigestValue
ElementDigestValue is an element that contains the encoded value of the digest. The digest is always encoded using base64 [RFC2045].
Schema Definition: <element name="DigestValue" type="ds:DigestValueType"/> <simpleType name="DigestValueType"> <restriction base="base64Binary"/> </simpleType>
KeyInfo
ElementKeyInfo
is an optional element that enables the recipient(s)
to obtain the key needed to validate the signature. KeyInfo
may contain keys, names, certificates and other public key management
information, such as in-band key distribution or key agreement data. This
specification defines a few simple types but applications may extend those
types or all together replace them with their own key identification and
exchange semantics using the XML namespace facility [XML-NAMES].
However, questions of trust of such key information (e.g., its authenticity or
strength) are out of scope of this specification and left to the application.
If KeyInfo
is omitted, the recipient is expected to be able to
identify the key based on application context. Multiple declarations within
KeyInfo
refer to the same key. While applications may define and use
any mechanism they choose through inclusion of elements from a different
namespace, compliant versions must implement KeyValue
(section 4.5.2) and
should implement RetrievalMethod
(section 4.5.3).
The schema specification of many of
KeyInfo
's children (e.g., PGPData
,
SPKIData
, X509Data
) permit their content to be
extended/complemented with elements from another namespace. This may be done
only if it is safe to ignore these extension elements while claiming support
for the types defined in this specification. Otherwise, external elements,
including
alternative structures to those defined by this specification, must
be a child of KeyInfo
. For example, should a complete XML-PGP
standard be defined, its root element must be a child of KeyInfo
.
(Of course, new structures from external namespaces can incorporate elements
from the dsig:
namespace via features of the type definition
language. For instance, they can create a schema that permits, includes,
imports, or derives new types based on dsig:
elements.)
The following list summarizes the KeyInfo
types that are
allocated an identifier in the dsig:
namespace; these can be used within the
RetrievalMethod
Type
attribute to describe a remote
KeyInfo
structure.
The following list summarizes the additional KeyInfo
types that are allocated an identifier in the dsig11:
namespace.
In addition to the types above for which we define an XML structure, we specify one additional type to indicate a binary (ASN.1 DER) X.509 Certificate.
Schema Definition: <element name="KeyInfo" type="ds:KeyInfoType"/> <complexType name="KeyInfoType" mixed="true"> <choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <element ref="ds:KeyName"/> <element ref="ds:KeyValue"/> <element ref="ds:RetrievalMethod"/> <element ref="ds:X509Data"/> <element ref="ds:PGPData"/> <element ref="ds:SPKIData"/> <element ref="ds:MgmtData"/> <!-- <element ref="dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValue"/> --> <!-- DEREncodedKeyValue (XMLDsig 1.1) will use the any element --> <any processContents="lax" namespace="##other"/> <!-- (1,1) elements from (0,unbounded) namespaces --> </choice> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </complexType>
KeyName
ElementThe KeyName
element contains a string value (in which white
space is significant) which may be used by the signer to communicate a key
identifier to the recipient. Typically,
KeyName
contains an identifier related to the key pair used to
sign the message, but it may contain other protocol-related information that
indirectly identifies a key pair. (Common uses of KeyName
include
simple string names for keys, a key index, a distinguished name (DN), an email
address, etc.)
Schema Definition: <element name="KeyName" type="string"/>
KeyValue
ElementThe KeyValue
element contains a single public key that may be
useful in validating the signature. Structured formats for defining DSA
(required), RSA (required) and ECDSA (required) public keys are defined in Signature Algorithms (section 6.4). The
KeyValue
element may include externally defined public keys
values represented as PCDATA or element types from an external namespace.
Schema Definition: <element name="KeyValue" type="ds:KeyValueType"/> <complexType name="KeyValueType" mixed="true"> <choice> <element ref="ds:DSAKeyValue"/> <element ref="ds:RSAKeyValue"/> <!-- <element ref="dsig11:ECKeyValue"/> --> <!-- ECC keys (XMLDsig 1.1) will use the any element --> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> </choice> </complexType>
DSAKeyValue
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#DSAKeyValue"
(this can be used within a RetrievalMethod
or Reference
element to identify the referent's type)DSA keys and the DSA signature algorithm are specified in [FIPS-186-3]. DSA public key values can have the following fields:
P
Q
G
Y
J
seed
pgenCounter
Parameter J is available for inclusion solely for efficiency as it is
calculatable from P and Q. Parameters seed and pgenCounter are used in the DSA
prime number generation algorithm specified in [FIPS-186-3]. As such, they are
optional but must either both be present or both be absent. This prime
generation algorithm is designed to provide assurance that a weak prime is not
being used and it yields a P and Q value. Parameters P, Q, and G can be public
and common to a group of users. They might be known from application context.
As such, they are optional but P and Q must either both appear or both be
absent. If all of
P
, Q
, seed
, and
pgenCounter
are present, implementations are not required to
check if they are consistent and are free to use either P
and
Q
or seed
and
pgenCounter
. All parameters are encoded as base64
[RFC2045]
values.
Arbitrary-length integers (e.g. "bignums" such as RSA moduli) are
represented in XML as octet strings as defined by the
ds:CryptoBinary
type.
Schema Definition:
<element name="DSAKeyValue" type="ds:DSAKeyValueType"/>
<complexType name="DSAKeyValueType">
<sequence>
<sequence minOccurs="0">
<element name="P" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
<element name="Q" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</sequence>
<element name="G" type="ds:CryptoBinary" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="Y" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
<element name="J" type="ds:CryptoBinary" minOccurs="0"/>
<sequence minOccurs="0">
<element name="Seed" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
<element name="PgenCounter" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</sequence>
</sequence>
</complexType>
RSAKeyValue
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#RSAKeyValue"
(this can be used within a RetrievalMethod
or Reference
element to identify the referent's type)RSA key values have two fields: Modulus and Exponent.
<RSAKeyValue> <Modulus>xA7SEU+e0yQH5rm9kbCDN9o3aPIo7HbP7tX6WOocLZAtNfyxSZDU16ksL6W jubafOqNEpcwR3RdFsT7bCqnXPBe5ELh5u4VEy19MzxkXRgrMvavzyBpVRgBUwUlV 5foK5hhmbktQhyNdy/6LpQRhDUDsTvK+g9Ucj47es9AQJ3U= </Modulus> <Exponent>AQAB</Exponent> </RSAKeyValue>
Arbitrary-length integers (e.g. "bignums" such as RSA moduli) are
represented in XML as octet strings as defined by the
ds:CryptoBinary
type.
Schema Definition:
<element name="RSAKeyValue" type="ds:RSAKeyValueType"/>
<complexType name="RSAKeyValueType">
<sequence>
<element name="Modulus" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
<element name="Exponent" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
ECKeyValue
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#ECKeyValue"
(this can be used within a RetrievalMethod
or Reference
element to identify the referent's type)The ECPublicKey element is defined in the http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11# namespace.
EC public key values consists of two sub components: Domain parameters and PublicKey.
<ECKeyValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#"> <NamedCurve URI="urn:oid:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7" /> <PublicKey> vWccUP6Jp3pcaMCGIcAh3YOev4gaa2ukOANC7Ufg Cf8KDO7AtTOsGJK7/TA8IC3vZoCy9I5oPjRhyTBulBnj7Y </PublicKey> </ECKeyValue>
Note - A line break has been added to the PublicKey
content to preserve printed page width.
Domain parameters can be encoded explicitly using the ECParameters element
or by reference using the NamedCurve element. A named curve is specified
through the URN
attribute. For named curves that are identified by
OIDs, such as those defined in [RFC3279][RFC4055],
and [SECG1], the OID should be encoded
according to [URN-OID]. Conformant
applications must support the NamedCurve element and the 256-bit prime field
curve as identified by the OID 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
.
The PublicKey element contains a Base64 encoding of a binary representation of the x and y coordinates of the point. Its value is computed as follows:
Schema Definition:
<!-- targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" -->
<element name="ECKeyValue" type="dsig11:ECKeyValueType"/>
<complexType name="ECKeyValueType">
<sequence>
<choice>
<element name="ECParameters" type="dsig11:ECParametersType"/>
<element name="NamedCurve" type="dsig11:NamedCurveType"/>
</choice>
<element name="PublicKey" type="dsig11:ECPointType"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/>
</complexType>
<complexType name="NamedCurveType">
<attribute name="URI" type="anyURI" use="required"/>
</complexType>
<simpleType name="ECPointType">
<restriction base="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</simpleType>
The ECParameters element consists of the following subelements. Note these definitions are based on the those described in [RFC3279].
Schema Definition:
<!-- targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" -->
<complexType name="ECParametersType">
<sequence>
<element name="FieldID" type="dsig11:FieldIDType"/>
<element name="Curve" type="dsig11:CurveType"/>
<element name="Base" type="dsig11:ECPointType"/>
<element name="Order" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
<element name="CoFactor" type="integer" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="ValidationData" type="dsig11:ECValidationDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="FieldIDType">
<choice>
<element ref="dsig11:Prime"/>
<element ref="dsig11:TnB"/>
<element ref="dsig11:PnB"/>
<element ref="dsig11:GnB"/>
<any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
<complexType name="CurveType">
<sequence>
<element name="A" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
<element name="B" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="ECValidationDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="seed" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="hashAlgorithm" type="anyURI" use="required"/>
</complexType>
Prime fields are described by a single subelement P, which represents the field size in bits. It is encoded as a positiveInteger.
Schema Definition:
<!-- targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" -->
<element name="Prime" type="dsig11:PrimeFieldParamsType"/>
<complexType name="PrimeFieldParamsType">
<sequence>
<element name="P" type="ds:CryptoBinary"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
Structures are defined for three types of characteristic two fields: gaussian normal basis, pentanomial basis and trinomial basis.
Schema Definition:
<!-- targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" -->
<element name="GnB" type="dsig11:CharTwoFieldParamsType"/>
<complexType name="CharTwoFieldParamsType">
<sequence>
<element name="M" type="positiveInteger"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<element name="TnB" type="dsig11:TnBFieldParamsType"/>
<complexType name="TnBFieldParamsType">
<complexContent>
<extension base="dsig11:CharTwoFieldParamsType">
<sequence>
<element name="K" type="positiveInteger"/>
</sequence>
</extension>
</complexContent>
</complexType>
<element name="PnB" type="dsig11:PnBFieldParamsType"/>
<complexType name="PnBFieldParamsType">
<complexContent>
<extension base="dsig11:CharTwoFieldParamsType">
<sequence>
<element name="K1" type="positiveInteger"/>
<element name="K2" type="positiveInteger"/>
<element name="K3" type="positiveInteger"/>
</sequence>
</extension>
</complexContent>
</complexType>
Implementations that need to support the [RFC4050] format for ECDSA keys can avoid known interoperability problems with that specification by adhering to the following profile:
ECDSAKeyValue
element against the [RFC4050]
schema. XML schema validators may not support integer types with decimal data
exceeding 18 decimal digits.
[XMLSCHEMA-1][XMLSCHEMA-2].NamedCurve
element.urn:oid:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
.The following is an example of a ECDSAKeyValue
element that meets the
profile described in this section.
<ECDSAKeyValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#"> <DomainParameters> <NamedCurve URN="urn:oid:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7" /> </DomainParameters> <PublicKey> <X Value="5851106065380174439324917904648283332 0204931884267326155134056258624064349885"> <Y Value="1024033521368277752409102672177795083 59028642524881540878079119895764161434936"> </PublicKey> </ECDSAKeyValue>
Note - A line break has been added to the X
and Y
Value
attribute values to preserve
printed page width.
RetrievalMethod
ElementA RetrievalMethod
element within
KeyInfo
is used to convey a reference to
KeyInfo
information that is stored at another location. For
example, several signatures in a document might use a key verified by an
X.509v3 certificate chain appearing once in the document or remotely outside
the document; each signature's
KeyInfo
can reference this chain using a single
RetrievalMethod
element instead of including the entire chain
with a sequence of X509Certificate
elements.
RetrievalMethod
uses the same syntax and dereferencing
behavior as Reference
's URI (section 4.4.3.1) and
The Reference Processing
Model (section 4.4.3.2) except that there are
no DigestMethod
or DigestValue
child elements and presence of the URI
attribute is
mandatory.
Type
is an optional identifier for the type of data retrieved
after all transforms have been applied. The result of dereferencing a
RetrievalMethod
Reference
for all KeyInfo
types defined by this
specification (section 4.5) with a corresponding XML structure is an XML
element or document with that element as the root. The
rawX509Certificate
KeyInfo
(for which there is no XML structure) returns a binary X509
certificate.
Note that when referencing one of the
defined KeyInfo
types within the same document, or some remote documents, at
least one Transform
is required to turn an ID-based
reference to a KeyInfo
element into a child element located inside it. This is due to the lack of
an XML ID attribute on the defined KeyInfo
types.
Schema Definition <element name="RetrievalMethod" type="ds:RetrievalMethodType"/> <complexType name="RetrievalMethodType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:Transforms" minOccurs="0"/> </sequence> <attribute name="URI" type="anyURI"/> <attribute name="Type" type="anyURI" use="optional"/> </complexType>
Note: The schema for the URI
attribute of RetrievalMethod erroneously omitted the attribute:
use="required"
. However, this error only results in a
more lax schema
which permits all valid RetrievalMethod
elements. Because the existing schema
is embedded in many applications, which may include the schema in their
signatures, the schema has not been corrected to be more restrictive.
X509Data
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#X509Data
"RetrievalMethod
or
Reference
element to identify the referent's type)An X509Data
element within KeyInfo
contains one or more identifiers of keys or X509 certificates (or
certificates' identifiers or a revocation list). The content of
X509Data
is:
X509IssuerSerial
element, which contains an X.509
issuer distinguished name/serial number pair. The distinguished name
should be represented as a string that complies with section 3 of
RFC4514 [LDAP-DN], to be generated according to the
Distinguished Name Encoding Rules
section below,X509SubjectName
element, which contains an X.509
subject distinguished name that should be represented as a string that
complies with section 3 of RFC4514 [LDAP-DN], to be generated according to the
Distinguished Name Encoding Rules
section below,X509SKI
element, which contains the base64 encoded
plain (i.e. non-DER-encoded) value of a X509 V.3 SubjectKeyIdentifier
extension,X509Certificate
element, which contains a
base64-encoded [X509V3] certificate, andX509CRL
element, which contains a base64-encoded
certificate revocation list (CRL) [X509V3].dsig11:OCSPResponse
element contains a base64-encoded OCSP response in
DER encoding. [OCSP].Any X509IssuerSerial
, X509SKI
, and
X509SubjectName
elements that appear must refer to the
certificate or certificates containing the validation key. All such elements
that refer to a particular individual certificate must be grouped inside a
single X509Data
element and if the certificate to which they refer appears, it must also be in
that X509Data
element.
Any X509IssuerSerial
, X509SKI
, and
X509SubjectName
elements that relate to the same key but
different certificates must be grouped within a single
KeyInfo
but may occur in multiple
X509Data
elements.
All certificates appearing in an X509Data
element must relate
to the validation key by either containing it or being part of a certification
chain that terminates in a certificate containing the validation key.
No ordering is implied by the above constraints. The comments in the following instance demonstrate these constraints:
<KeyInfo>
<X509Data> <!-- two pointers to certificate-A -->
<X509IssuerSerial>
<X509IssuerName>CN=TAMURA Kent, OU=TRL, O=IBM,
L=Yamato-shi, ST=Kanagawa, C=JP</X509IssuerName>
<X509SerialNumber>12345678</X509SerialNumber>
</X509IssuerSerial>
<X509SKI>31d97bd7</X509SKI>
</X509Data>
<X509Data><!-- single pointer to certificate-B -->
<X509SubjectName>Subject of Certificate B</X509SubjectName>
</X509Data>
<X509Data> <!-- certificate chain -->
<!--Signer cert, issuer CN=arbolCA,OU=FVT,O=IBM,C=US, serial 4-->
<X509Certificate>MIICXTCCA..</X509Certificate>
<!-- Intermediate cert subject CN=arbolCA,OU=FVT,O=IBM,C=US
issuer CN=tootiseCA,OU=FVT,O=Bridgepoint,C=US -->
<X509Certificate>MIICPzCCA...</X509Certificate>
<!-- Root cert subject CN=tootiseCA,OU=FVT,O=Bridgepoint,C=US -->
<X509Certificate>MIICSTCCA...</X509Certificate>
</X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
Note, there is no direct provision for a PKCS#7 encoded "bag" of
certificates or CRLs. However, a set of certificates and CRLs can occur within
an X509Data
element and multiple
X509Data
elements can occur in a
KeyInfo
. Whenever multiple certificates occur in an
X509Data
element, at least one such certificate must contain the
public key which verifies the signature.
While in principle many certificate encodings are possible, it is recommended
that certificates appearing in an
X509Certificate
element be limited to an encoding of BER or its DER
subset, allowing that within the certificate other content may be present. The
use of other encodings may lead to interoperability issues. In any case, XML
Signature implementations should not alter or re-encode certificates, as doing
so could invalidate their signatures.
Deployments that expect to make use of
the X509IssuerSerial
element should
be aware that many Certificate Authorities issue certificates with large,
random serial numbers. Such deployments should avoid schema-validating the
X509IssuerSerial
element as XML Schema validators may not
support integer types
with decimal data exceeding 18 decimal digits [XML-schema].
To encode a distinguished name (X509IssuerSerial
,X509SubjectName
,
and
KeyName
if appropriate), the encoding rules in section 2 of RFC
4514 [LDAP-DN] should be applied, except that the character escaping
rules in section 2.4 of RFC 4514 [LDAP-DN] may be augmented as follows:
Since an XML document logically consists of characters, not octets, the resulting Unicode string is finally encoded according to the character encoding used for producing the physical representation of the XML document.
Schema Definition <element name="X509Data" type="ds:X509DataType"/> <complexType name="X509DataType"> <sequence maxOccurs="unbounded"> <choice> <element name="X509IssuerSerial" type="ds:X509IssuerSerialType"/> <element name="X509SKI" type="base64Binary"/> <element name="X509SubjectName" type="string"/> <element name="X509Certificate" type="base64Binary"/> <element name="X509CRL" type="base64Binary"/> <!-- <element ref="dsig11:OCSPResponse"/> --> <!-- OCSPResponse elements (XMLDsig 1.1) will use the any element --> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> </choice> </sequence> </complexType> <complexType name="X509IssuerSerialType"> <sequence> <element name="X509IssuerName" type="string"/> <element name="X509SerialNumber" type="integer"/> </sequence> </complexType> <!-- Note, this schema permitsX509Data
to be empty; this is precluded by the text inKeyInfo
Element (section 4.5) which states that at least one element from the dsig namespace should be present in the PGP, SPKI, and X509 structures. This is easily expressed for the other key types, but not for X509Data because of its rich structure. -->
<!-- targetNameSpace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" --> <element name="OCSPResponse" type="base64Binary" />
PGPData
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#PGPData
"RetrievalMethod
or
Reference
element to identify the referent's type)The PGPData
element within KeyInfo
is used to convey information related to PGP public key pairs and signatures
on such keys. The PGPKeyID
's value is a base64Binary sequence
containing a standard PGP public key identifier as defined in [PGP] section 11.2]. The PGPKeyPacket
contains a base64-encoded Key Material Packet as defined in [PGP]
section 5.5]. These children element types can be complemented/extended by
siblings from an external namespace within PGPData
, or
PGPData
can be replaced all together with an alternative PGP XML
structure as a child of KeyInfo
.
PGPData
must contain one PGPKeyID
and/or one PGPKeyPacket
and 0 or more elements from an external
namespace.
Schema Definition: <element name="PGPData" type="ds:PGPDataType"/> <complexType name="PGPDataType"> <choice> <sequence> <element name="PGPKeyID" type="base64Binary"/> <element name="PGPKeyPacket" type="base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> <sequence> <element name="PGPKeyPacket" type="base64Binary"/> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> </choice> </complexType>
SPKIData
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#SPKIData
"RetrievalMethod
or
Reference
element to identify the referent's type)The SPKIData
element within KeyInfo
is used to convey information related to SPKI public key pairs, certificates
and other SPKI data. SPKISexp
is the base64 encoding of a SPKI
canonical S-expression.
SPKIData
must have at least one
SPKISexp
; SPKISexp
can be complemented/extended by
siblings from an external namespace within SPKIData
, or
SPKIData
can be entirely replaced with an alternative SPKI XML
structure as a child of KeyInfo
.
Schema Definition: <element name="SPKIData" type="ds:SPKIDataType"/> <complexType name="SPKIDataType"> <sequence maxOccurs="unbounded"> <element name="SPKISexp" type="base64Binary"/> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"/> </sequence> </complexType>
MgmtData
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#MgmtData
"RetrievalMethod
or
Reference
element to identify the referent's type)MgmtData
element within KeyInfo
is a
string value used to convey
in-band key distribution or agreement data. However, use of this
element is not recommended and should not be used. Section 4.5.8
describes new KeyInfo
types for conveying key information.
Schema Definition: <element name="MgmtData" type="string"/>
EncryptedKey
and Agreement
Elements<xenc:EncryptedKey>
and <xenc:Agreement>
elements defined in
[XMLENC-CORE1] as children of ds:KeyInfo
can be used
to convey in-band
key agreement information, or encrypted key material.
DEREncodedKeyValue
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#DEREncodedKeyValue"
(this can be used within a RetrievalMethod
or Reference
element to identify the referent's type)
The public key algorithm and value are DER-encoded in accordance with the value that would be used in the Subject Public Key Info field of an X.509 certificate, per section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]. The DER-encoded value is then base64-encoded.
For the key value types supported in this specification, refer to the following for normative references on the format of Subject Public Key Info and the relevant OID values that identify the key/algorithm type:
Specifications that define additional key types should provide such a normative reference for their own key types where possible.
Schema Definition: <!-- targetNamespace="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#" --> <element name="DEREncodedKeyValue" type="dsig11:DEREncodedKeyValueType"/> <complexType name="DEREncodedKeyValueType"> <simpleContent> <extension base="base64Binary"> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </extension> </simpleContent> </complexType>
Historical note: The DEREncodedKeyValue
element was added
to XML Signature 1.1 in order to support certain interoperability
scenarios where at least one of signer and/or verifier are not able to
serialize keys in the XML formats described in Section 4.5.2
above. The KeyValue
element is to be used for
"bare" XML key
representations (not XML wrappings around other binary encodings like
ASN.1 DER); for this reason the DEREncodedKeyValue
element is not a
child of KeyValue
.
The DEREncodedKeyValue
element is also not a child of the
X509Data
element, as the keys represented
by DEREncodedKeyValue
may
not have X.509 certificates associated with them (a requirement for
X509Data
).
Object
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#Object"
(this can be used within a
Reference
element to identify the referent's type)Object
is an optional element that may occur one or more
times. When present, this element may contain any data. The Object
element may include optional MIME type, ID, and encoding attributes.
The Object
's Encoding
attributed may be used to
provide a URI that identifies the method by which the object is encoded (e.g.,
a binary file).
The MimeType
attribute is an optional attribute which
describes the data within the Object
(independent of its encoding). This is a string with values defined
by [RFC2045].
For example, if the Object
contains base64 encoded
PNG, the
Encoding
may be specified as 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#base64'
and the
MimeType
as 'image/png'. This attribute is purely advisory; no
validation of the MimeType
information is required by this
specification. Applications which require normative type and encoding
information for signature validation should specify Transforms
with well defined resulting types and/or
encodings.
The Object
's Id
is commonly referenced from a
Reference
in
SignedInfo
, or Manifest
. This element is typically
used for enveloping signatures where the object being
signed is to be included in the signature element. The digest is calculated
over the entire Object
element including start and end tags.
Note, if the application wishes to exclude the
<Object>
tags from the digest calculation the
Reference
must identify the actual data object (easy for XML
documents) or a transform must be used to remove the
Object
tags (likely where the data object is non-XML). Exclusion
of the object tags may be desired for cases where one wants the signature to
remain valid if the data object is moved from inside a signature to outside
the signature (or vice versa), or where the content of the Object
is an encoding of an original binary document and it is desired to extract and
decode so as to sign the original bitwise representation.
Schema Definition: <element name="Object" type="ds:ObjectType"/> <complexType name="ObjectType" mixed="true"> <sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> <attribute name="MimeType" type="string" use="optional"/> <attribute name="Encoding" type="anyURI" use="optional"/> </complexType>
This section describes the optional to implement
Manifest
and SignatureProperties
elements and describes the handling of XML processing instructions and
comments. With respect to the elements
Manifest
and SignatureProperties
this section
specifies syntax and little behavior -- it is left to the application. These
elements can appear anywhere the parent's content model permits; the
Signature
content model only permits them within Object
.
Manifest
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#Manifest"
(this can be used within a Reference
element to identify the referent's type)The Manifest
element provides a list of
Reference
s. The difference from the list in
SignedInfo
is that it is application defined which, if any, of
the digests are actually checked against the objects referenced and what to do
if the object is inaccessible or the digest compare fails. If a Manifest
is pointed to from SignedInfo
, the digest over the
Manifest
itself will be checked by the core signature validation
behavior. The digests within such a
Manifest
are checked at the application's discretion. If a
Manifest
is referenced from another
Manifest
, even the overall digest of this two level deep
Manifest
might not be checked.
Schema Definition: <element name="Manifest" type="ds:ManifestType"/> <complexType name="ManifestType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:Reference" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </complexType>
SignatureProperties
ElementType="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#SignatureProperties"
(this can be used within a Reference
element to identify the referent's type)Additional information items concerning the generation of the signature(s)
can be placed in a SignatureProperty
element (i.e., date/time stamp or the serial number of cryptographic hardware
used in signature generation).
Schema Definition: <element name="SignatureProperties" type="ds:SignaturePropertiesType"/> <complexType name="SignaturePropertiesType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:SignatureProperty" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </sequence> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </complexType> <element name="SignatureProperty" type="ds:SignaturePropertyType"/> <complexType name="SignaturePropertyType" mixed="true"> <choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> <!-- (1,1) elements from (1,unbounded) namespaces --> </choice> <attribute name="Target" type="anyURI" use="required"/> <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> </complexType>
No XML processing instructions (PIs) are used by this specification.
Note that PIs placed inside SignedInfo
by an application will
be signed unless the
CanonicalizationMethod
algorithm discards them. (This
is true for
any signed XML content.) All of the
CanonicalizationMethod
s identified within this specification
retain PIs. When a PI is part of content that is signed (e.g., within
SignedInfo
or referenced XML documents) any change to the PI will
obviously result in a signature failure.
XML comments are not used by this specification.
Note that unless CanonicalizationMethod
removes comments
within SignedInfo
or any other referenced XML (which [XML-C14N]
does), they will be signed. Consequently, if they are retained, a change to
the comment will cause a signature failure. Similarly, the XML signature over
any XML data will be sensitive to comment changes unless a comment-ignoring
canonicalization/transform method, such as the Canonical XML
[XML-C14N], is specified.
This section identifies algorithms used with the XML digital signature
specification. Entries contain the identifier to be used in Signature
elements, a reference to the formal specification, and definitions, where
applicable, for the representation of keys and the results of cryptographic
operations.
ECDSAwithSHA256
marked as "at risk". If issues about deployment of this feature are raised during Candidate Recommendation, the group may elect to make this feature optional.
Algorithms are identified by URIs that appear as an attribute to the
element that identifies the algorithms' role (DigestMethod
,
Transform
,
SignatureMethod
, or
CanonicalizationMethod
). All algorithms used herein take
parameters but in many cases the parameters are implicit. For example, a
SignatureMethod
is implicitly given two parameters: the keying info and
the output of
CanonicalizationMethod
. Explicit additional parameters to an
algorithm appear as content elements within the algorithm role element. Such
parameter elements have a descriptive element name, which is frequently
algorithm specific, and must be in the XML Signature namespace or an algorithm
specific namespace.
This specification defines a set of algorithms, their URIs, and requirements for implementation. Requirements are specified over implementation, not over requirements for signature use. Furthermore, the mechanism is extensible; alternative algorithms may be used by signature applications.
* The Enveloped Signature transform removes the
Signature
element from the calculation of the signature when the
signature is within the content that it is being signed. This may be
implemented via the XPath specification specified in 6.6.4: Enveloped Signature Transform; it
must have the same effect as that specified by the
XPath Transform.
When using transforms, we RECOMMEND selecting the least expressive choice that still accomplishes the needs of the use case at hand: Use of XPath filter 2.0 is recommended over use of XPath filter. Use of XPath filter is recommended over use of XSLT.
Note: Implementation requirements for the XPath transform may be downgraded to optional in a future version of this specification.
This specification defines several possible digest algorithms for the DigestMethod element, including required algorithm SHA-256. Use of SHA-256 is strongly recommended over SHA-1 because recent advances in cryptanalysis (see e.g. [SHA-1-Analysis]) have cast doubt on the long-term collision resistance of SHA-1. Therefore, SHA-1 support is required in this specification only for backwards-compatibility reasons.
Digest algorithms that are known not to be collision resistant should not be used in DigestMethod elements. For example, the MD5 message digest algorithm should not be used as specific collisions have been demonstrated for that algorithm.
Note: Use of SHA-256 is strongly recommended over SHA-1 because recent advances in cryptanalysis (see e.g. [SHA-1-Analysis], [SHA-1-Collisions] ) have cast doubt on the long-term collision resistance of SHA-1.
The SHA-1 algorithm [FIPS-186-3] takes no explicit parameters. An example of an SHA-1 DigestAlg element is:
<DigestMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
A SHA-1 digest is a 160-bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 encoding of this bit string viewed as a 20-octet octet stream. For example, the DigestValue element for the message digest:
A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
from Appendix A of the SHA-1 standard would be:
<DigestValue>qZk+NkcGgWq6PiVxeFDCbJzQ2J0=</DigestValue>
The SHA-256 algorithm [FIPS-180-3] takes no explicit parameters. A SHA-256 digest is a 256-bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 encoding of this bit string viewed as a 32-octet octet stream.
The SHA-384 algorithm [FIPS-180-3] takes no explicit parameters. A SHA-384 digest is a 384-bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 encoding of this bit string viewed as a 48-octet octet stream.
The SHA-512 algorithm [FIPS-180-3] takes no explicit parameters. A SHA-512 digest is a 512-bit string. The content of the DigestValue element shall be the base64 encoding of this bit string viewed as a 64-octet octet stream.
MAC algorithms take two implicit parameters, their keying material
determined from KeyInfo
and the octet stream output by
CanonicalizationMethod
. MACs and signature algorithms are
syntactically
identical but a MAC implies a shared secret key.
The HMAC
algorithm (RFC2104 [HMAC]) takes the output
(truncation) length in bits as a
parameter;
this specification REQUIRES that the truncation length be a multiple of 8
(i.e. fall on a byte boundary) because Base64 encoding operates on full bytes.
If the truncation parameter is not specified then all the bits of the hash are output.
Any signature with a truncation length that is less than half the output length of the underlying
hash algorithm must be deemed invalid.
An example of an HMAC SignatureMethod
element:
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"> <HMACOutputLength>128</HMACOutputLength> </SignatureMethod>
The output of the HMAC algorithm is ultimately the output (possibly
truncated) of the chosen digest algorithm. This value shall be base64 encoded
in the same straightforward fashion as the output of the digest algorithms.
Example: the SignatureValue
element for the HMAC-SHA1 digest
9294727A 3638BB1C 13F48EF8 158BFC9D
from the test vectors in [HMAC] would be
<SignatureValue>kpRyejY4uxwT9I74FYv8nQ==</SignatureValue>
Schema Definition: <simpleType name="HMACOutputLengthType"> <restriction base="integer"/> </simpleType>
Signature algorithms take two implicit parameters, their keying material
determined from KeyInfo
and the octet stream output by
CanonicalizationMethod
. Signature and MAC algorithms are syntactically
identical but a signature implies public key cryptography.
The DSA family of algorithms is defined in FIPS 186-3 [FIPS-186-3]. FIPS 186-3 defines DSA in terms of two security parameters L and N where L = |p|, N = |q|, p is the prime modulus, q is a prime divisor of (p-1). FIPS 186-3 defines four valid pairs of (L, N); they are: (1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256) and (3072, 256). The pair (1024, 160) corresponds to the algorithm DSAwithSHA1, which is identified in this specification by the URI http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1. The pairs (2048, 256) and (3072, 256) correspond to the algorithm DSAwithSHA256, which is identified in this specification by the URI http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#dsa-sha256. This specification does not use the (2048, 224) instance of DSA (which corresponds to DSAwithSHA224).
DSA takes no explicit
parameters; an example of a DSA
SignatureMethod
element is:
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmldsig11#dsa-sha256"/>
The output of the DSA algorithm consists of a pair of integers usually
referred by the pair (r, s). The signature value consists of the base64
encoding of the concatenation of two octet-streams that respectively result
from the octet-encoding of the values r and s in that order. Integer to
octet-stream conversion must be done according to the I2OSP operation defined
in the RFC 3447
[PKCS1] specification with a l
parameter equal to 20. For example, the SignatureValue
element for a DSA
signature (r
,
s
) with values specified in hexadecimal:
r = 8BAC1AB6 6410435C B7181F95 B16AB97C 92B341C0
s = 41E2345F 1F56DF24 58F426D1 55B4BA2D B6DCD8C8
from the example in Appendix 5 of the DSS standard would be
<SignatureValue>
i6watmQQQ1y3GB+VsWq5fJKzQcBB4jRfH1bfJFj0JtFVtLotttzYyA==</SignatureValue>
Per FIPS 186-3 [FIPS-186-3], the DSA security parameter L is defined to be 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits and the corresponding DSA q value is defined to be 160, 224/256 and 256 bits respectively. Special Publication SP 800-57 Part 1 [SP800-57], NIST recommends using at least at 2048-bit public keys for securing information beyond 2010 (and 3072-bit keys for securing information beyond 2030).
Since XML Signature 1.0 requires implementations to support DSA-based digital signatures, this XML Signature 1.1 revision REQUIRES signature verifiers to implement DSA only for keys of 1024 bits in order to guarantee interoperability with XML Signature 1.0 generators. XML Signature 1.1 implementations may but are not required to support DSA-based signature generation, and given the short key size and the SP800-57 guidelines, DSA with 1024-bit prime moduli should not be used for signatures that will be verified beyond 2010.
The expression "RSA algorithm" as used in this specification refers to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm described in RFC 3447 [PKCS1]. The RSA algorithm takes no explicit parameters. An example of an RSA SignatureMethod element is:
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
The SignatureValue
content for an RSA signature is the base64
[RFC2045] encoding of the octet string
computed as per RFC 3447
[PKCS1], section 8.2.1: Signature
generation for the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme].
Computation of the signature will require concatenation of the hash value and a constant string
determined by RFC 3447. Signature computation and verification does not require implementation of an
ASN.1 parser.
The resulting base64 [RFC2045] string is the value of the child text node of the SignatureValue element, e.g.
<SignatureValue> IWijxQjUrcXBYoCei4QxjWo9Kg8D3p9tlWoT4t0/gyTE96639In0FZFY2/rvP+/bMJ01EArmKZsR5VW3rwoPxw= </SignatureValue>
In Special Publication SP 800-57 Part 1 [SP800-57], NIST recommends using at least 2048-bit public keys for securing information beyond 2010 (and 3072-bit keys for securing information beyond 2030). All conforming implementations of XML Signature 1.1 must support RSA signature generation and verification with public keys at least 2048 bits in length. RSA public keys of 1024 bits or less should not be used for signatures that will be verified beyond 2010. XML Signature 1.1 implementations should use at least 2048-bit keys for all signatures, and should use at least 3072-bit keys for signatures that will be verified beyond 2030.
The ECDSA algorithm [FIPS-186-3] takes no explicit parameters. An example of a ECDSA
SignatureMethod
element is:
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256"/>
The output of the ECDSA algorithm consists of a pair of integers usually
referred by the pair (r, s). The signature value consists of the base64
encoding of the concatenation of two octet-streams that respectively result
from the octet-encoding of the values r and s in that order. Integer to
octet-stream conversion must be done according to the I2OSP operation defined
in the RFC 3447 [PKCS1] specification with the l
parameter equal to the size of the
base point order of the curve in bytes (e.g. 32 for the P-256 curve and 66 for
the P-521 curve).
This specification REQUIRES implementations to support the ECDSAwithSHA256 signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256 prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS-186-3] (and using the SHA-256 hash algorithm). It is further recommended that implementations also support ECDSA over the P-384 and P-521 prime curves; these curves are defined in Sections D.2.4 and D.2.5 of FIPS 186-3, respectively.
If canonicalization is performed over octets, the canonicalization algorithms take two implicit parameters: the content and its charset. The charset is derived according to the rules of the transport protocols and media types (e.g, [XML-MEDIA-TYPES] defines the media types for XML). This information is necessary to correctly sign and verify documents and often requires careful server side configuration.
Various canonicalization algorithms require conversion to [UTF-8]. The algorithms below understand at least [UTF-8] and [UTF-16] as input encodings. We RECOMMEND that externally specified algorithms do the same. Knowledge of other encodings is optional.
Various canonicalization algorithms transcode from a non-Unicode encoding to Unicode. The output of these algorithms will be in NFC [NFC]. This is because the XML processor used to prepare the XPath data model input is required (by the Data Model) to use Normalization Form C when converting an XML document to the UCS character domain from any encoding that is not UCS-based.
We RECOMMEND that externally specified canonicalization algorithms do the same. (Note, there can be ambiguities in converting existing charsets to Unicode, for an example see the XML Japanese Profile Note [XML-Japanese].)
This specification REQUIRES implementation of Canonical XML 1.0 [XML-C14N], Canonical XML 1.1 [XML-C14N11]] and Exclusive XML Canonicalization [XML-EXC-C14N]. We RECOMMEND that applications that generate signatures choose Canonical XML 1.1 [XML-C14N11] when inclusive canonicalization is desired.
Note: Canonical XML 1.0 [XML-C14N] and Canonical XML 1.1 [XML-C14N11] specify a standard serialization of XML that, when applied to a subdocument, includes the subdocument's ancestor context including all of the namespace declarations and some attributes in the 'xml:' namespace. However, some applications require a method which, to the extent practical, excludes unused ancestor context from a canonicalized subdocument. The Exclusive XML Canonicalization Recommendation [XML-EXC-C14N] may be used to address requirements resulting from scenarios where a subdocument is moved between contexts.
An example of an XML canonicalization element is:
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
The normative specification of Canonical XML1.0 is [XML-C14N]. The algorithm is capable of taking as input either an octet stream or an XPath node-set (or sufficiently functional alternative). The algorithm produces an octet stream as output. Canonical XML is easily parameterized (via an additional URI) to omit or retain comments.
The normative specification of Canonical XML 1.1 is [XML-C14N11]. The algorithm is capable of taking as input either an octet stream or an XPath node-set (or sufficiently functional alternative). The algorithm produces an octet stream as output. Canonical XML 1.1 is easily parameterized (via an additional URI) to omit or retain comments.
The normative specification of Exclusive XML Canonicalization 1.0 is [XML-EXC-C14N]].
Transform
AlgorithmsA Transform
algorithm has a single implicit parameter: an
octet stream from the Reference
or the output of an earlier
Transform
.
For implementation requirements, please see Algorithm Identifiers and Implementation Requirements. Application developers are strongly encouraged to support all transforms that are listed as recommended unless the application environment has resource constraints that would make such support impractical. Compliance with this recommendation will maximize application interoperability and libraries should be available to enable support of these transforms in applications without extensive development.
Any canonicalization algorithm that can be used for
CanonicalizationMethod
(such as those in
Canonicalization Algorithms (section
6.5)) can be used as a
Transform
.
The normative specification for base64 decoding transforms is [RFC2045].
The base64
Transform
element has no content. The input is decoded by the
algorithms. This transform is useful if an application needs to sign the raw
data associated with the encoded content of an element.
This transform accepts either an octet-stream or a node-set as input. If an octet-string is
given as input, then this octet-stream is processed directly. If an XPath node-set (or
sufficiently functional alternative) is given as input, then it is converted to an octet stream by
performing operations logically equivalent to 1) applying an XPath transform with expression
self::text()
, then 2) taking the string-value of the node-set. Thus, if an XML
element is identified by a shortname XPointer in the Reference
URI, and its content
consists solely of base64 encoded character data, then this transform automatically strips away
the start and end tags of the identified element and any of its descendant elements as well as any
descendant comments and processing instructions. The output of this transform is an octet
stream.
The normative specification for XPath expression evaluation is [XPATH].
The XPath expression to be evaluated appears as the character content of a
transform parameter child element named XPath
.
The input required by this transform is an XPath node-set or an octet-stream. Note that if the actual input is an XPath node-set resulting from a null URI or shortname XPointer dereference, then comment nodes will have been omitted. If the actual input is an octet stream, then the application must convert the octet stream to an XPath node-set suitable for use by Canonical XML with Comments. (A subsequent application of the required Canonical XML algorithm would strip away these comments.) In other words, the input node-set should be equivalent to the one that would be created by the following process:
(//. | //@* | //namespace::*)
The evaluation of this expression includes all of the document's nodes (including comments) in the node-set representing the octet stream.
The transform output is always an XPath node-set. The XPath expression
appearing in the XPath
parameter is evaluated once for each node
in the input node-set. The result is converted to a boolean. If the boolean is
true, then the node is included in the output node-set. If the boolean is
false, then the node is omitted from the output node-set.
Note: Even if the input node-set has had comments removed,
the comment nodes still exist in the underlying parse tree and can separate
text nodes. For example, the markup
<e>Hello, <!-- comment -->world!</e>
contains two text nodes.
Therefore, the expression self::text()[string()="Hello, world!"]
would fail. Should this problem arise in the application, it can be solved by
either canonicalizing the document before the XPath transform to physically
remove the comments or by matching the node based on the parent element's
string value (e.g. by using the expression
self::text()[string(parent::e)="Hello, world!"]
).
The primary purpose of this transform is to ensure that only specifically defined changes to the input XML document are permitted after the signature is affixed. This is done by omitting precisely those nodes that are allowed to change once the signature is affixed, and including all other input nodes in the output. It is the responsibility of the XPath expression author to include all nodes whose change could affect the interpretation of the transform output in the application context.
Note that the XML-Signature XPath Filter 2.0 Recommendation [XMLDSIG-XPATH-FILTER2] may be used for this purpose. That recommendation defines an XPath transform that permits the easy specification of subtree selection and omission that can be efficiently implemented.
An important scenario would be a document requiring two enveloped signatures. Each signature must omit itself from its own digest calculations, but it is also necessary to exclude the second signature element from the digest calculations of the first signature so that adding the second signature does not break the first signature.
The XPath transform establishes the following evaluation context for each node of the input node-set:
As a result of the context node setting, the XPath expressions
appearing in
this transform will be quite similar to those used in used in
[XSLT],
except that the size and position are always 1 to reflect the fact that the
transform is automatically visiting every node (in XSLT, one
recursively calls
the command apply-templates
to visit the nodes of the input
tree).
The function here()
is defined as
follows:
The here function returns a node-set containing the attribute or processing instruction node or the parent element of the text node that directly bears the XPath expression. This expression results in an error if the containing XPath expression does not appear in the same XML document against which the XPath expression is being evaluated.
As an example, consider creating an enveloped signature (a
Signature
element that is a descendant of an element being
signed). Although the signed content should not be changed after signing, the
elements within the Signature
element are changing (e.g. the digest value must be put inside the
DigestValue
and the SignatureValue
must be subsequently calculated). One way to prevent these changes from
invalidating the digest value in
DigestValue
is to add an XPath
Transform
that omits all Signature
elements and their descendants. For example,
<Document> ... <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <SignedInfo> ... <Reference URI=""> <Transforms> <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116"> <XPath xmlns:dsig="&dsig;"> not(ancestor-or-self::dsig:Signature) </XPath> </Transform> </Transforms> <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> <DigestValue></DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> <SignatureValue></SignatureValue> </Signature> ... </Document>
Due to the null Reference
URI in this example, the XPath
transform input node-set contains all nodes in the entire parse tree starting
at the root node (except the comment nodes). For each node in this node-set,
the node is included in the output node-set except if the node or one of its
ancestors has a tag of Signature
that is in the namespace given
by the replacement text for the entity
&dsig;
.
A more elegant solution uses the here function to omit only the
Signature
containing the XPath Transform, thus allowing enveloped
signatures to sign other signatures. In the example above, use the XPath
element:
<XPath xmlns:dsig="&dsig;"> count(ancestor-or-self::dsig:Signature | here()/ancestor::dsig:Signature[1]) > count(ancestor-or-self::dsig:Signature)</XPath>
Since the XPath equality operator converts node sets to string values
before comparison, we must instead use the XPath union operator (|). For each
node of the document, the predicate expression is true if and only if the
node-set containing the node and its Signature
element ancestors
does not include the enveloped Signature
element containing the
XPath expression (the union does not produce a larger set if the enveloped
Signature
element is in the node-set given by
ancestor-or-self::Signature
).
An enveloped signature transform T
removes the whole Signature
element containing
T from the digest calculation of the
Reference
element containing
T. The entire string of characters used by an XML
processor to match the Signature
with the XML production
element
is removed. The output of the transform is equivalent to the
output that would result from replacing T with an
XPath transform containing the following XPath
parameter element:
<XPath xmlns:dsig="&dsig;"> count(ancestor-or-self::dsig:Signature | here()/ancestor::dsig:Signature[1]) > count(ancestor-or-self::dsig:Signature)</XPath>
The input and output requirements of this transform are identical to those of the XPath transform, but may only be applied to a node-set from its parent XML document. Note that it is not necessary to use an XPath expression evaluator to create this transform. However, this transform must produce output in exactly the same manner as the XPath transform parameterized by the XPath expression above.
The normative specification for XSL Transformations is [XSLT].
Specification of a namespace-qualified stylesheet element, which must be the
sole child of the Transform
element, indicates that the specified
style sheet should be used. Whether this instantiates in-line processing of
local XSLT declarations within the resource is determined by the XSLT
processing model; the ordered application of multiple stylesheet may require
multiple
Transforms
. No special provision is made for the identification
of a remote stylesheet at a given URI because it can be communicated via an xsl:include
or xsl:import
within the
stylesheet
child of the Transform
.
This transform requires an octet stream as input.
The output of this transform is an octet stream. The processing rules for the XSL style sheet [XSL10] or transform element are stated in the XSLT specification [XSLT].
We RECOMMEND that XSLT transform authors use an output
method of xml
for XML and HTML. As XSLT implementations do not
produce consistent serializations of their output, we further RECOMMEND
inserting a transform after the XSLT transform to canonicalize the output.
These steps will help to ensure interoperability of the resulting signatures
among applications that support the XSLT transform. Note that if the output is
actually HTML, then the result of these steps is logically
equivalent [XHTML10].
Digital signatures only work if the verification calculations are performed on exactly the same bits as the signing calculations. If the surface representation of the signed data can change between signing and verification, then some way to standardize the changeable aspect must be used before signing and verification. For example, even for simple ASCII text there are at least three widely used line ending sequences. If it is possible for signed text to be modified from one line ending convention to another between the time of signing and signature verification, then the line endings need to be canonicalized to a standard form before signing and verification or the signatures will break.
XML is subject to surface representation changes and to processing which discards some surface information. For this reason, XML digital signatures have a provision for indicating canonicalization methods in the signature so that a verifier can use the same canonicalization as the signer.
Throughout this specification we distinguish between the canonicalization
of a Signature
element and other signed XML data objects. It is
possible for an isolated XML document to be treated as if it were binary data
so that no changes can occur. In that case, the digest of the document will
not change and it need not be canonicalized if it is signed and verified as
such. However, XML that is read and processed using standard XML parsing and
processing techniques is frequently changed such that some of its surface
representation information is lost or modified. In particular, this will occur
in many cases for the Signature
and enclosed
SignedInfo
elements since they, and possibly an encompassing XML
document, will be processed as XML.
Similarly, these considerations apply to
Manifest
, Object
, and
SignatureProperties
elements if those elements have been
digested, their DigestValue
is to be checked, and they are being
processed as XML.
The kinds of changes in XML that may need to be canonicalized can be divided into four categories. There are those related to the basic [XML10], as described in 7.1 below. There are those related to [DOM-LEVEL-1], [SAX], or similar processing as described in 7.2 below. Third, there is the possibility of coded character set conversion, such as between UTF-8 and UTF-16, both of which all [XML10] compliant processors are required to support, which is described in the paragraph immediately below. And, fourth, there are changes that related to namespace declaration and XML namespace attribute context as described in 7.3 below.
Any canonicalization algorithm should yield output in a specific fixed
coded character set. All canonicalization algorithms identified in this document use
UTF-8 (without a byte order mark (BOM)) and do not provide character
normalization. We RECOMMEND that signature applications create XML
content (Signature
elements and their descendants/content) in
Normalization Form C [NFC]
and check that any XML being consumed is in
that form as well; (if not, signatures may consequently fail to validate).
Additionally, none of these algorithms provide data type normalization.
Applications that normalize data types in varying formats (e.g.,
(true, false)
or (1,0)) may not be able to validate each other's signatures.
XML 1.0 [XML10]] defines an interface where a conformant application reading XML is given certain information from that XML and not other information. In particular,
Note that items (2), (4), and (5.3) depend on the presence of a schema, DTD
or similar declarations. The Signature
element type is laxly schema valid
[XMLSCHEMA-1][XMLSCHEMA-2], consequently external XML or even XML within the
same document as the signature may be (only) well-formed or from another
namespace (where permitted by the signature schema); the noted items may not
be present. Thus, a signature with such content will only be verifiable by
other signature applications if the following syntax constraints are observed
when generating any signed material including the
SignedInfo
element:
In addition to the canonicalization and syntax constraints discussed above, many XML applications use the Document Object Model [DOM-LEVEL-1] or the Simple API for XML [SAX]. DOM maps XML into a tree structure of nodes and typically assumes it will be used on an entire document with subsequent processing being done on this tree. SAX converts XML into a series of events such as a start tag, content, etc. In either case, many surface characteristics such as the ordering of attributes and insignificant white space within start/end tags is lost. In addition, namespace declarations are mapped over the nodes to which they apply, losing the namespace prefixes in the source text and, in most cases, losing where namespace declarations appeared in the original instance.
If an XML Signature is to be produced or verified on a system using the DOM or SAX processing, a canonical method is needed to serialize the relevant part of a DOM tree or sequence of SAX events. XML canonicalization specifications, such as [XML-C14N], are based only on information which is preserved by DOM and SAX. For an XML Signature to be verifiable by an implementation using DOM or SAX, not only must the XML 1.0 syntax constraints given in the previous section be followed but an appropriate XML canonicalization must be specified so that the verifier can re-serialize DOM/SAX mediated input into the same octet stream that was signed.
In [XPATH] and consequently the Canonical XML data model an element has namespace nodes that correspond to those declarations within the element and its ancestors:
"Note: An element E has namespace nodes that represent its namespace declarations as well as any namespace declarations made by its ancestors that have not been overridden in E's declarations, the default namespace if it is non-empty, and the declaration of the prefix
xml
." [XML-C14N]
When serializing a Signature
element or signed XML data that's
the child of other elements using these data models, that Signature
element and its children, may contain namespace declarations from its ancestor
context. In addition, the Canonical XML and Canonical XML with Comments
algorithms import all XML namespace attributes (such as
xml:lang
) from the nearest ancestor in which they are declared to
the apex node of canonicalized XML unless they are already declared at that
node. This may frustrate the intent of the signer to create a signature in one
context which remains valid in another. For example, given a signature which
is a child of B
and a grandchild of A
:
<A xmlns:n1="&foo;"> <B xmlns:n2="&bar;"> <Signature xmlns="&dsig;"> ... <Reference URI="#signme"/> ... </Signature> <C ID="signme" xmlns="&baz;"/> </B> </A>
when either the element B
or the signed element
C
is moved into a [SOAP12-PART1] envelope for transport:
<SOAP:Envelope xmlns:SOAP="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> ... <SOAP:Body> <B xmlns:n2="&bar;"> <Signature xmlns="&dsig;"> ... </Signature> <C ID="signme" xmlns="&baz;"/> </B> </SOAP:Body> </SOAP:Envelope>
The canonical form of the signature in this context will contain new
namespace declarations from the
SOAP:Envelope
context, invalidating the signature. Also, the
canonical form will lack namespace declarations it may have originally had
from element A
's context, also invalidating the signature. To
avoid these problems, the application may:
The XML Signature specification provides a very flexible digital signature mechanism. Implementers must give consideration to their application threat models and to the following factors. For additional security considerations in implementation and deployment of this specification, see [XMLDSIG-BESTPRACTICES].
A requirement of this specification is to permit signatures to "apply to a
part or totality of a XML document." (See
[XMLDSIG-REQUIREMENTS], section 3.1.3].) The
Transforms
mechanism meets this requirement by permitting one to
sign data derived from processing the content of the identified resource. For
instance, applications that wish to sign a form, but permit users to enter
limited field data without invalidating a previous signature on the form might
use [XPATH] to exclude those portions
the user needs to change. Transforms
may be arbitrarily specified
and may include encoding transforms, canonicalization instructions or even
XSLT transformations. Three cautions are raised with respect to this feature
in the following sections.
Note, core validation behavior does not confirm that the signed data was obtained by applying each step of the indicated transforms. (Though it does check that the digest of the resulting content matches that specified in the signature.) For example, some applications may be satisfied with verifying an XML signature over a cached copy of already transformed data. Other applications might require that content be freshly dereferenced and transformed.
First, obviously, signatures over a transformed document do not secure any information discarded by transforms: only what is signed is secure.
Note that the use of Canonical XML [XML-C14N] ensures that all internal entities
and XML namespaces are expanded within the content being signed. All entities
are replaced with their definitions and the canonical form explicitly
represents the namespace that an element would otherwise inherit. Applications
that do not canonicalize XML content (especially the
SignedInfo
element) should not use internal entities and should
represent the namespace explicitly within the content being signed since they
can not rely upon canonicalization to do this for them. Also, users concerned
with the integrity of the element type definitions associated with the XML
instance being signed may wish to sign those definitions as well (i.e., the
schema, DTD, or natural language description associated with the
namespace/identifier).
Second, an envelope containing signed information is not secured by the signature. For instance, when an encrypted envelope contains a signature, the signature does not protect the authenticity or integrity of unsigned envelope headers nor its ciphertext form, it only secures the plaintext actually signed.
Additionally, the signature secures any information introduced by the transform: only what is "seen" (that which is represented to the user via visual, auditory or other media) should be signed. If signing is intended to convey the judgment or consent of a user (an automated mechanism or person), then it is normally necessary to secure as exactly as practical the information that was presented to that user. Note that this can be accomplished by literally signing what was presented, such as the screen images shown a user. However, this may result in data which is difficult for subsequent software to manipulate. Instead, one can sign the data along with whatever filters, style sheets, client profile or other information that affects its presentation.
Just as a user should only sign what he or she "sees," persons and
automated mechanism that trust the validity of a transformed document on the
basis of a valid signature should operate over the data that was transformed
(including canonicalization) and signed, not the original pre-transformed
data. This recommendation applies to transforms specified within the signature
as well as those included as part of the document itself. For instance, if an
XML document includes an embedded style sheet [XSLT] it is the transformed document that should be represented to
the user and signed. To meet this recommendation where a document references
an external style sheet, the content of that external resource should also be
signed as via a signature Reference
otherwise the content of that
external content might change which alters the resulting document without
invalidating the signature.
Some applications might operate over the original or intermediary data but should be extremely careful about potential weaknesses introduced between the original and transformed data. This is a trust decision about the character and meaning of the transforms that an application needs to make with caution. Consider a canonicalization algorithm that normalizes character case (lower to upper) or character composition ('e and accent' to 'accented-e'). An adversary could introduce changes that are normalized and consequently inconsequential to signature validity but material to a DOM processor. For instance, by changing the case of a character one might influence the result of an XPath selection. A serious risk is introduced if that change is normalized for signature validation but the processor operates over the original data and returns a different result than intended.
As a result:
This specification uses public key signatures and keyed hash authentication codes. These have substantially different security models. Furthermore, it permits user specified algorithms which may have other models.
With public key signatures, any number of parties can hold the public key and verify signatures while only the parties with the private key can create signatures. The number of holders of the private key should be minimized and preferably be one. Confidence by verifiers in the public key they are using and its binding to the entity or capabilities represented by the corresponding private key is an important issue, usually addressed by certificate or online authority systems.
Keyed hash authentication codes, based on secret keys, are typically much more efficient in terms of the computational effort required but have the characteristic that all verifiers need to have possession of the same key as the signer. Thus any verifier can forge signatures.
This specification permits user provided signature algorithms and keying information designators. Such user provided algorithms may have different security models. For example, methods involving biometrics usually depend on a physical characteristic of the authorized user that can not be changed the way public or secret keys can be and may have other security model differences.
The strength of a particular signature depends on all links in the security chain. This includes the signature and digest algorithms used, the strength of the key generation [RANDOM] and the size of the key, the security of key and certificate authentication and distribution mechanisms, certificate chain validation policy, protection of cryptographic processing from hostile observation and tampering, etc.
Care must be exercised by applications in executing the various algorithms that may be specified in an XML signature and in the processing of any "executable content" that might be provided to such algorithms as parameters, such as XSLT transforms. The algorithms specified in this document will usually be implemented via a trusted library but even there perverse parameters might cause unacceptable processing or memory demand. Even more care may be warranted with application defined algorithms.
The security of an overall system will also depend on the security and integrity of its operating procedures, its personnel, and on the administrative enforcement of those procedures. All the factors listed in this section are important to the overall security of a system; however, most are beyond the scope of this specification.
This section is non-normative.
Non-normative RELAX NG schema [RELAXNG-SCHEMA] information is available in a separate document [XMLSEC-RELAXNG].Object
designates a specific XML element. Occasionally we refer to a data object as
a document or as a resource's content.
The term element content is used to describe the data between XML
start and end tags [XML10]. The term XML document is used to
describe data objects which conform to the XML specification [XML10].
Object
element is merely one type of digital data (or document) that
can be signed via a
Reference
.Signature
element type and its
children (including SignatureValue
) and the specified
algorithms.Signature
element, and can be identified via a
URI
or transform. Consequently, the signature is "detached"
from the content it signs. This definition typically applies to separate
data objects, but it also includes the instance where the Signature
and data object reside within the same XML document but are sibling
elements.Object
element of the signature itself. The
Object
(or its content) is identified via a
Reference
(via a URI
fragment identifier or
transform).SignatureValue
.SignedInfo
reference validation.
Reference
, matches its specified
DigestValue
.SignatureValue
matches the result of processing
SignedInfo
with
CanonicalizationMethod
and
SignatureMethod
as specified in Core Validation (section 3.2).Dated references below are to the latest known or appropriate edition of the referenced work. The referenced works may be subject to revision, and conformant implementations may follow, and are encouraged to investigate the appropriateness of following, some or all more recent editions or replacements of the works cited. It is in each case implementation-defined which editions are supported.