15:54:36 RRSAgent has joined #wpwg-spc 15:54:36 logging to https://www.w3.org/2021/05/31-wpwg-spc-irc 15:54:56 Meeting: SPC Task Force 15:54:58 Chair: Ian 15:55:08 Agenda: https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-payments-wg/2021May/0022.html 15:55:12 Scribe: Ian 15:55:51 agenda+ prioritization of use cases 15:55:54 agenda+ next meeting 15:57:47 present+ 16:00:09 present+ Anne_Pouillard 16:00:40 present+ Rolf_Lindemann 16:01:18 present+ Jean-Carlo_Emer 16:01:26 Rolf has joined #wpwg-spc 16:02:21 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2021/05/31-wpwg-spc-minutes.html Ian 16:02:26 https://github.com/w3c/secure-payment-confirmation/blob/gh-pages/scope.md 16:03:31 https://github.com/w3c/secure-payment-confirmation/blob/gh-pages/scope.md#user-stories 16:05:12 Enrollment of multiple instruments with one authentication 16:05:13 Do we already cover the ability to use the underlying credential for traditional authentication? 16:05:30 https://github.com/w3c/secure-payment-confirmation/blob/gh-pages/requirements.md#fido-considerations 16:05:37 FIDO credentials should be "enhanceable" to SPC Credentials. 16:05:37 SPC credentials should also usable as ordinary FIDO credentials. See issue 39. 16:06:01 jcemer has joined #wpwg-spc 16:06:34 In-transaction enrollment, later authentication same merchant 16:08:40 IJ: can you optimize the UX to enroll+authenticate/sign 16:10:16 Rolf: Technically what you expect is after registration of credential. ID&V steps often prone to fishing. So registration time has a different security characteristics 16:12:22 ...session binding assurance level not really known at this point 16:12:39 ...how do you know it's the "same session". Cookie? stronger than that? 16:13:04 ...binding assurance level might be relevant for this one 16:14:44 https://www.digital.govt.nz/standards-and-guidance/identification-management/identification-management-standards/binding-assurance-standard/ 16:16:04 Authentication with out-of-band authenticator 16:16:21 Anne_ has joined #wpwg-spc 16:16:23 Rolf: Best thing would be to be able to send transaction details to the out-of-band authenticator 16:16:44 ...Level 1 extension for transaction confirmation technically is this kind of approach 16:16:52 ...the concept is the same even if not same data as SPC 16:17:02 ...it doesn't matter how you send the data, but would be great if you could do so 16:17:09 ...what we do today is that the browser displays the transaction text 16:17:26 ...the browser has a privileged position (since it can talk to the authenticator), this is the security that we are leveraging 16:17:36 ..if you send the transaction text to the authenticator it would be even higher security level 16:18:23 ...the browser should be able to *understand* whether the text will be displayed by the authenticator 16:19:01 ...the browser needs to be able to say "Check your smartphone" in the dialog...that at least needs to be discussed 16:19:41 ...I can send push notification that launches an app that talks to a server to trigger SPC 16:20:11 ...you can trigger it through out-of-band mechanisms like QR codes 16:20:19 q+ 16:20:35 Jean-Carlo: In this case, would be still know user verification was formed? 16:20:42 Rolf: Yes, you get an assertion from the authenticator. 16:20:56 ...suppose I'm on desktop without a registered platform authenticator 16:21:03 ..it might know that I have a smartphone that supports SPC 16:21:21 ...so it could send push notification to app or OS or browser on my smartphone to trigger spc on my device 16:21:38 ...the browser on my phone would ask for confirmation which would generate the signed assertion 16:22:18 ...we might not need to standardize the out-of-band behavior (since different on each platform) 16:24:17 IJ: What are security requirements for shipping to the phone? 16:24:33 Rolf: Merchant has the data (currency, credential ID) 16:24:56 ..if SPC returns null, the merchant's JS can tell the merchant server. 16:26:24 ...ideally, if my PC browser is synced to my phone, then the BROWSER might know I have an SPC credential on my Android device. In which case the display can be shipped to my phone where I can sign it. 16:26:33 ...that would be a browser vendor decision 16:28:04 ...multiple channels to ship the display info to another authenticator: CABLE, known authenticator since same vendor 16:29:18 ...CABLE-connected is still considered "Roaming" 16:29:28 caBLE - cloud assisted BLE 16:34:15 zakim, close this item 16:34:15 I do not know what agendum had been taken up, Ian 16:34:22 zakim, take up item 2 16:34:22 agendum 2 -- next meeting -- taken up [from Ian] 16:34:38 7 June 16:34:42 No meeting 14 June 16:34:45 RRSAGENT, make minutes 16:34:45 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2021/05/31-wpwg-spc-minutes.html Ian 16:34:51 RRSAGENT, set logs public 22:52:08 jeffh has joined #wpwg-spc