<weiler> jfontana: re: horz review: we talk to brad hill (webappsec) - hadn't heard anything from mike west - brad will ping them.
<weiler> ... we need version numbers of broswers w/ support in the transition doc.
<weiler> ... we have firefox's.
<weiler> @@: Chrome is aiming for 66.
<weiler> jeffh: mike jones in on a plane and on IRC only
<weiler> angelo: targetting next windows release; fall 2018 (sept?). no separate release for edge. "insider build" for edge sooner.
<selfissued> I am on a plane today so while I'm on the IRC, I can't be on the call.
<weiler> jfontana: we're looking at Feb for CR (discussed f2f in monterey)
<selfissued> Please put info you want me to be aware of or act on in the IRC.
<weiler> adam: is that getting CR started, or published?
<weiler> jfontana: I think that's published
<scribe> scribenick: elundberg
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/510
gmandyam: selfissued raised some
issues; I don't understand what he means
... he seems to think that sources like the FIDO MDS are not
reliable, which I don't know how to respond to
<selfissued> Let me look
<selfissued> It's not clear to me that the percentages data is authoritative or even actionable
gmandyam: for biometrics you get a certification for a third party lab because it's expensive
<selfissued> Why should this data not come out of a database lookup based on the device type, rather than be self-asserted in the protocol?
<selfissued> What's the business case for including this in the protocol?
apowers: in practice everything out there is self attested at this point
<selfissued> Yes, but why put this information in the protocol?
apowers: it's for RPs to make
risk assessments on
... and there's a lot of other signals that go with it in the
MDS
<weiler> supplementing... apowers: fido requiring 1/10000 FAR, 3% FRR, allows self-cert for lower FAR. this is the first time we're seeing this in private sector.
jeffh: I think this extension is for the RP to stipulate its requirements, not for the authenticator to communicate it to the RP
gmandyam: a certification will only certify you to a certain extent
jeffh: so selfissued's question is how does the client know whether an authenticator satisfies the requirements?
<selfissued> Do any of the authenticator vendors on the call think that if the RP sent values other than the defaults, that your authenticators would really be able to act on those values and fulfill them?
gmandyam: there's an authorative source: the MDS
jeffh: that's what we suggested
you mention in the PR
... are these performance data public?
gmandyam: yes, they are
<selfissued> If for instace, the RP requested that the false accept rate be 10 times less than the normal one, is this practically achievable?
<selfissued> Or is it just wishful thinking on the RPs part?
<selfissued> If just wishful thinking, we shouldn't have an API for expressing these wishes
jfontana: I think we should move the continued discussion to the list
<selfissued> Agreed
<jeffh> fontana: pls take further discussion of this to the PR & mailing list
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/623
<apowers> seems like it would be better to have a way of discovering available AAGUIDs and then looking up any information about them... otherwise you end up building a dozen extensions just to filter authenticators in a number of different ways
<selfissued> There's a lot that isn't clear about both what this is intended to do and why
jeffh: I'm handling #623
... I think mostly everything was taken care of
<selfissued> Are we discussing #623 now?
yes
jeffh: I need to look at emlun's comments from last night, too
<selfissued> I think what's in the PR is an improvement over what's in the current draft, and so should be merged
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/724
gmandyam: I've made as many
changes as possible
... there still seems to be objections which I don't
understand
... apparently this would imbalance the spec, but the
extensions are already imbalanced
<selfissued> My objections are just that the issue was to add CDDL to all the extensions whereas this PR only added it to one
gmandyam: I personally didn't want to do that because there's not very good procedure for writing these extensions
<selfissued> The will be a lot clearer after #765 is merged
<selfissued> They will be a lot clearer after #765 is merged
jcj_moz: as long as we have CDDL for all exts before next publish, I'm happy
<jcj_moz> ^^ that was jcj_moz
oops, sorry
<selfissued> I'd be OK if this was merge after #765 is - provided that someone takes ownership of finishing the CDDL job
jcj_moz: it is true that #765
will make things much more obvious, but I still think we should
have CDDL to lower the risk of incompatibilities
... I think we should merge them both
<selfissued> I agree that we want CDDL. I just want someone to sign up to write the CDDL for the other extensions.
jcj_moz: #765 is a much bigger change, so I agree with landing that first
<selfissued> Who wants to own doing that?
jfontana: ok, let's deal with #765 first
<jcj_moz> https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/760/files
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/760
jeffh: I think selfissued needs to respond to my recent replies to his comments
<jcj_moz> https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/762
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/762
jeffh: this is ready as far as I'm concerned
<selfissued> #760 shouldn't say platform-specific
jfontana: let's merge #762
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/765
<selfissued> Agreed on merging #762
<selfissued> I see three approvals on #765
jcj_moz: my counterpart implementing this said this is good, adam, kim [and others] said it's good, I think it's ready to go
<selfissued> Shall I merge?
jcj_moz: the upside for FF at least is I can implement this
@selfissued not decided just yet
jcj_moz: the downside to this is
that the browsers have to code the IDL for exts in, but in
practice we're going to do that anyway
... we lose the flexibility to let things go, but gain not
having to fight an IDL change
... it's no more work for us than we're already planning
<selfissued> Per the earlier discussion, there wasn't browser precedent for map of any
gmandyam: can you point to an
extension that defines its I/O with this properly?
... ok, I'm fine with merging
... I feel it'd be nice to say somewhere in sect 5 that authnr
exts are always a CBOR map
<selfissued> It already says that
jfontana: can we take that up for the PR milestone?
gmandyam: ok
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/133
<selfissued> Are we merging #765?
jfontana: yes
<jcj_moz> selfissued yes
<selfissued> OK - will do
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/133
gmandyam: this is addressed by PR #763
elundberg: #763 is replaced by #771
<selfissued> I just approved #771
gmandyam: I think we can merge
#771
... which will close #133
jfontana: objections?
<selfissued> Do it
jeffh: yes, I want to review first
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/204
<selfissued> It's really short jeff - you can probably do it during the call
jeffh: this is in my queue;
next
... I'll review #771 after the call
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/346
agl: we just closed #346 by merging #765
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/372
akshayku: I'll look at this today
<jeffh> @selfissued: btw, you had "partially fixes #nnn" text in pr #765 which likely closed those issues upon merge is that what you wanted ?
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/745
<selfissued> I'll look at the partially closes after the call and reopen those with comments that aren't fully addressed
agl: I think U2F self attestation
is impossible
... in practical reality, U2F devices don't do this
jeffh: so no-one's going to create any new U2F devices?
agl: even if they do, the U2F protocol doesn't have this capability
jeffh: self attestation is just
using the same private key in both the credential and the
attestation cert
... so I don't think we can assume noone will do this
<jeffh> call dropped for only me?
<jeffh> yep only me
agl: I think jcj_moz is talking about the FF soft key, where you make up a cert that does just that
jcj_moz: yes
agl: but is the pubkey in the cert the same as the credential key?
jzj_moz: yes
agl: but wouldn't you just define
the FF soft token to do that in a webauthn CBOR way?
... I do not believe this will ever be used outside FF, but if
that's enough to motivate jeffh to write this then sure
<selfissued> ;-)
jeffh: we could possibly solve this with just a note, what do you think jcj_moz?
jcj_moz: I think that's probably
sufficient
... we'll be following the spec, but the authenticator will no
longer be the source of the cert for non-direct attestation
agl: but that's not self
attestation, because you're signing with a different private
key
... with a soft token you could do that
... but in the anonymization case we're signing with a
different private key, so it's not self attestation
... I have no objections to doing this, but I expect it will
never be used
jeffh: so then the question is do we put anything in the spec or not
jfontana: let's get back to this later
jeffh: when we merged #765 we may
have inappropriately closed some issues
... there was some "partially closes #xyz" text in the PR text,
which may have inadvertently closed some issues we should keep
open
<jeffh> i.e. the two that were noted as "partially fixes #nnn"... ?
<selfissued> As I said, I'll look at the "partially closes" after the call and reopen with comments saying what remains, if anything does
elundberg: selfissued noted earlier that he'll go through this after the call
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/658
jeffh: #760 addresses this
... I'm working on it
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/694
agl: there's a PR for this; I
think it's ready to go, pending review
... elundberg and selfissued have approved
jeffh: I need to re-review
https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/746
jeffh: this is a relatively minor
editorial cleanup
... it's assigned to selfissued
<selfissued> I have an open question to JEff on #746. I don't know where new text should go and what it should say.
christiaanbrand: we had a handful
of authenticators, Edge, FF, Chrome
... it seems like we got most of the tests working
<selfissued> It would probably be better to assign #746 to Jeff since he seems to know what to do
christiaanbrand: spreadsheet
wasn't properly filled in
... I think there was only one spec issue, which I opened an
issue about
... I think it went really well
agl: what was the issue?
christiaanbrand: the one about packed attestation certs
<weiler> here was the issue: https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/768
christiaanbrand: we had a matrix with client, authnr, server, it wasn't filled in much so it's pretty sparse
<weiler> trackbot, end meeting
This is scribe.perl Revision: 1.152 of Date: 2017/02/06 11:04:15 Check for newer version at http://dev.w3.org/cvsweb/~checkout~/2002/scribe/ Guessing input format: Irssi_ISO8601_Log_Text_Format (score 1.00) Succeeded: s/jeffh/jcj_moz/ Default Present: weiler, elundberg, gmandyam, jfontana, Christiaan, Akshay, jeffh, jcj_moz, selfissued, wseltzer, agl Present: weiler elundberg gmandyam jfontana Christiaan Akshay jeffh jcj_moz selfissued wseltzer agl Found ScribeNick: elundberg Inferring Scribes: elundberg Agenda: https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webauthn/2018Jan/0379.html Found Date: 31 Jan 2018 People with action items: WARNING: IRC log location not specified! (You can ignore this warning if you do not want the generated minutes to contain a link to the original IRC log.)[End of scribe.perl diagnostic output]