08:26:15 RRSAgent has joined #tagmem 08:26:15 logging to http://www.w3.org/2014/09/29-tagmem-irc 08:26:23 Zakim has joined #tagmem 08:33:14 Will he be calling in? 08:33:36 Domenic and I can probably handle a TC39 update 08:33:59 Good to have Dave on the phone 08:34:11 ETA: 17m 08:34:34 Is there any ibuprofin or naproxen at the Telefonica HQ? 08:42:20 Sweet 08:42:25 I will need some :p 08:59:26 plinss has changed the topic to: WebRTC: https://purl-app.com/pphrqlxo agenda: http://www.w3.org/wiki/TAG/Planning/2014-09-F2F 09:04:17 plinss has changed the topic to: Skype: dappelquist – agenda: http://www.w3.org/wiki/TAG/Planning/2014-09-F2F 09:05:25 we are on skype now 09:05:31 Scribe: JeniT 09:05:33 please call me at “dappelquist” to join 09:05:40 ScribeNick: JeniT 09:06:39 Agenda: https://www.w3.org/wiki/TAG/Planning/2014-09-F2F 09:06:45 Chair: Dan Appelquist 09:07:51 Present: Dan, Dominic, Tim, Peter, Sergey, Mark, Yehuda, Yves (remote) 09:08:19 Regrets: Alex, Dave 09:13:20 Topic: http/2 update 09:13:52 mnot has joined #tagmem 09:13:58 twirl has joined #tagmem 09:14:07 mnot: WG last call ended a few weeks ago 09:14:14 … there are a few small-medium issues remaining 09:14:31 … should be closed in week or so 09:14:37 … IETF last call will take a couple of weeks 09:14:45 … RFC in Jan/Feb if all goes well 09:14:55 … large number of implementations (about 20) 09:15:26 … IE & ISS, Firefox very eager, Chrome is shipping, Akamai, nginx will implement, Varnish are rewriting their core 09:15:39 wycats: isn’t Varnish not compatible with caching? 09:15:56 mnot: it’s an application-specific cash, but http/2 doesn’t say anything about caching really 09:16:03 s/cash/cache 09:16:32 mnot: Apple, we don’t know, but probably they’ll implement 09:16:51 … the big question is Apache; Google has given them the modspdy code base 09:17:19 dka: the big question at the NY meeting the sense of urgency was about SPDY having such momentum 09:17:29 … and the fact that Apple was supporting SPDY 09:17:47 … leading to the question of whether there would be enough momentum to get off SPDY to http/2 09:18:05 mnot: we were a big confused by the Apple announcement 09:18:19 wycats: they’re doing it because there’s lots of SPDY that exists 09:18:33 mnot: Twitter have been very active, they’ve shipped very rapidly 09:19:04 … both Google & Microsoft have said that they’ll turn off SPDY support when http/2 comes through 09:19:16 … SPDY is really hacky, so they do want to get away from it 09:19:20 Related URL: http://http2.github.io 09:19:38 wycats: it would only affect super advanced sites in practice anyway 09:19:48 mnot: they’ve been versioning SPDY very rapidly 09:19:54 proof: DEPRECATION WORKS ON THE WEB! 09:20:05 … after RFC there are a few things more eg opportunistic encryption 09:20:17 … there are a group of mobile operator vendors talking about proxies 09:20:39 … lots of privacy & security concerns around that 09:20:46 wycats: http/2 doesn’t mandate SSL right? 09:21:06 mnot: it doesn’t, we decided to move on and not require it 09:21:21 … but the browsers are saying they’ll only support http/2 for SSL 09:21:30 wycats: we’ve talked about making it easier to get certs 09:21:39 mnot: there’s an active discussion in the community about that 09:22:04 timbl: what kinds of plans are there? 09:22:48 Domenic: Cloudflare have a blog post yesterday spelling out they’re giving free SSL/TLS 09:23:11 wycats: that’s great for Cloudflare customers 09:26:55 [off the record discussion] 09:27:38 timbl: I want to enable certificates signed by my family, people I trust 09:28:14 wycats: that restricts what content you can see, because other sites aren’t signed by those certificates 09:28:59 timbl: creating socially-signed certificates only as complicated as social network sites 09:29:29 … the existing tools are bad, but they could be redesigned 09:29:47 wycats: I don’t think this is a standards issue: I think the standards are there 09:30:02 … I think write it and see 09:30:36 timbl: I think it requires some redesign, some P2P-oriented protocols 09:30:48 wycats: I don’t think they should be designed up front 09:31:16 timbl: it would be nice for the TAG to be somewhere where we can imagine a different world 09:32:07 "role of the TAG" is a good discussion to have every time we have a new member 09:32:11 [pop] 09:35:33 dka: is there anything that the TAG can do to help http/2? 09:37:55 mnot: in the long run, the issue of the role of the network in communication is interesting 09:38:11 … comms between client/server is a 2 party problem not a 3 party problem 09:38:25 … we’ve pushed back around breaking encryption etc 09:38:49 dka: what timbl was saying about Verizon putting ads into pages sounds horrifying 09:39:50 mnot: there’s variability in cluefulness in mobile operators 09:41:11 … is it appropriate for the TAG to publish an opinion that says “X on the Internet sucks” 09:41:25 dka: it can be useful to publish a blog post or an official Finding 09:41:59 … we can more actively intervene to get people talking 09:42:33 wycats: in this case what they’re doing is against existing standards 09:42:48 dka: we can also use the relationship between GSMA and W3C 09:43:16 … when the issue is about getting information out there we can use that 09:43:41 mnot: in the IETF we have a position that writing words down has very little effect & regulation has little effect 09:43:52 … we’re moving towards enforcing what we believe technically 09:44:11 … eg if you think that connections should be end-to-end then use encryption & make it hard to break 09:44:17 … enforcement through technical means 09:44:27 … “standards & protocols & code is making law” 09:44:37 timbl: I think that’s a dangerous possible route 09:44:51 CF: https://github.com/w3ctag/secure-the-web 09:44:54 … it’s going towards an all-out battle of the robots, on who can out-design the other one 09:45:09 wycats: we can say what we want in the code protocols, but we have to persuade people too 09:45:38 mnot: it’s not that we’re making law by making code, but the way we write the protocols shapes the world 09:46:00 timbl: I think you need to start off with the principle/rule “your stuff shall not get interfered with” 09:46:12 … and if people break that “you’re banned” 09:46:45 … when you put in your fortress, when they find a way to break it, you need to have a paper trail 09:47:04 … you need to have a principle to point to 09:47:16 wycats: I think you need human beings talking to other human beings 09:47:22 … you have to get the people in the room 09:47:34 … most people aren’t acting maliciously, they’re just confused/misinformed 09:48:14 mnot: I don’t know, I think it’s a business decision, not confusion 09:48:28 timbl: it’s a huge income stream, it’s deliberate 09:48:42 wycats: opt-outs don't affect the income stream 09:48:50 wycats: this is why ads are ok with DNT opt-outs 09:48:58 dka: we talked about writing “Secure the Web” 09:49:03 … about crypto everywhere etc 09:49:12 … it’s out of date now, but we could update it 09:49:26 mnot: there are lots of people writing, we could throw our weight behind them 09:49:56 Domenic: there are things we can say around API design 09:50:15 wycats: we can talk about the browser as the platform, and security in the browser 09:50:36 e.g. PROPOSED RESOLUTION: privacy-centric capabilities in the browser should be exposed over SSL… 09:50:42 Domenic: our recommendation should say “browsers should tell the user when NX records are compromised” 09:52:13 wycats: there’s a way that user agents could surface the sniffing/spying more effectively 09:52:43 mnot: there are ways to tell the user when the CA isn’t one built in to the OS 09:53:48 … you get a different icon in the location bar if the CA isn’t one built in to the OS 09:53:51 … that’s a step forward 09:54:04 … the pushback is that users ignore that UX 09:54:17 … but there are users for whom it is important 09:54:33 wycats: Chrome makes it hard to click through now 09:54:50 … NXDOMAIN hijacking should be pretty easy to detect 09:55:10 mnot: easier than captive portal detection 09:55:34 we could standardize a domain like: iamhijacked.com :P 09:55:36 dka: is there an action we could take as the TAG? 09:56:30 SteveF has joined #tagmem 09:56:37 … should we be moving towards minimisation, only allowing privacy-infringing information passed through secure channels 09:58:27 mnot: we should definitely talk about privacy-sensitive features as the TAG 09:58:58 wycats: Alex has the idea that we could do more with hosted apps if we let them opt in to stricter security 09:59:23 dka: the balanced approach: to have access to the camera, I’ll give up something 09:59:30 wycats: eg not running third party scripts 09:59:46 dka: this runs into permissions, which we’ll discuss Tue afternoon 10:00:25 wycats: there’s a lot that’s already in the platform, there’s a social problem: we need to let people extend the platform 10:01:17 mnot: “prefer secure origins” is just about prefering HTTPS 10:01:57 dka: the thing about third-party ads is important 10:02:19 … people don’t want to go to HTTPS because it prevents them displaying the ads & limits their revenue 10:02:34 wycats: because if you opt into HTTPS you opt out of mixed content 10:02:44 dka: moving to HTTPS has major implications 10:03:21 Domenic: our position should be “privacy sensitive features”: these are things that have the ability to, if they’re man-in-the-middled, compromise people’s privacy 10:03:36 timbl: I worry that browser vendors are slapping on security constraints 10:03:52 sigh 10:03:54 … the mixed content thing that forces abandoning HTTPS or abandoning HTTP 10:04:26 … is there a model of the world in which we could access HTTP things from HTTPS pages, then fine 10:04:49 talking about UI and mixed-content, https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=838395 is not really helping 10:04:58 … but they way Chrome “refused” messages, I get the impression people are slapping on constraints on developers 10:05:16 wycats: there are features on the web that expose private information, and web browsers would like to avoid leaking that 10:05:25 … one large mechanism for leaks is plain text HTTP 10:05:48 … if you just serve the HTML page over HTTPS, there are many other things (like scripts) that can access that information 10:05:58 … they want to offer some assurance that the private information is private 10:06:20 timbl: as a result, they turned off the ability to read completely public data over HTTP 10:06:31 … an intermediate library can’t access it either 10:06:38 Domenic: it’s better not to give false positives on privacy 10:06:48 wycats: another common way of leakage is third party scripts 10:07:20 … the solution the Chrome guys used for mixed content is the same as for connecting to CNN, the ‘ad view’ tag 10:07:33 … a way of putting in content in a completely sandboxed way 10:07:53 timbl: that’s fine in HTML, but when I’m writing a web app, how can I tell Chrome that I want to access stuff that’s completely public 10:08:16 … it’s got a CORS-Origin: * because it’s accessable by everyone 10:08:37 wycats: the analogous thing for ‘ad tag’ is to have a sandboxed area that enables your script to access the data 10:09:08 timbl: no, we have to move towards either writing my code inside browser extensions, or have a way of users saying that they trust scripts from a particular location 10:09:16 this is not the correct group to have this discussion 10:09:18 unfortunately 10:11:53 wycats: the problem is not that we don’t trust authors, it’s that the authors don’t know what they’re putting in their pages 10:12:13 … you have to limit what the third-party script can do 10:12:43 … eg prevent a third-party script from getting your geolocation 10:13:03 dka: you can still fingerprint or do other things in that kind of environment 10:13:15 wycats: the script would have access to nothing except post message 10:13:25 … the environment that contains the script could still pass that information 10:13:43 … but the author that’s installing the script will have to be explicit about what it’s giving the script 10:13:50 dka: what’s the status of this work 10:14:15 wycats: iframe sandbox and CSP give you reasonably close to lock down, there’s also realms in Javascript, which could give you a just-Javascript context 10:14:29 … but timbl’s original point is correct: there isn’t a model for how you avoid leakage 10:14:46 it isn't coherent 10:14:53 people are just stabbing around trying to lock things down 10:15:02 but it's kind of random 10:15:16 and driven in large part by what you can get away with 10:17:01 [discussion that browser extensions, plugins, wifi etc insert scripts into pages the author never knew about] 10:17:31 Domenic: CSP is a pretty big hammer; it would be great if you could allow geolocation but not enable those to be passed to the third party scripts 10:17:42 wycats: the ad tag which the Chrome appstore does is the correct approach 10:17:56 Domenic: secure origins is a clear feature which we can recommend 10:18:16 tagging data in the engine... but it would require a huge change 10:18:23 mnot: the ‘prefer secure origins’ approach has consensus 10:18:45 dka: we have to address the way that impacts people who have ads in pages 10:19:04 would allow mixed content that didn't trigger a mixed content warning 10:21:25 dka: what’s the action? 10:21:40 mnot: we should ratify ‘prefer secure origins’ 10:22:28 wycats: a large number of geolocation-using sites would break with this policy 10:22:47 mnot: this is for new features, right? 10:22:52 Domenic: no 10:23:25 timbl: the resolution is that you should only be able to call features which are sensitive from HTTPS? 10:23:29 dka: yes 10:24:16 timbl: my point is if a developer wants to access something which is private, and therefore needs to use a secure page, it means that he can’t access public data 10:24:25 mnot: until it goes HTTPS 10:24:55 … if I’m relying on government data, I’d hope it was from the government 10:25:23 JeniT: GOV.UK is https, but that’s not the case for smaller organisations 10:25:48 dka: if I take the user’s location in script & make a request to https://gov.uk with my location in the query string, I can do that, right? 10:26:34 … there are still leakage possibilities 10:27:06 Domenic: in theory the browser could surface all the places that have access to your location, but if you allow that then it could be everyone 10:27:22 [NSA knows everything already] 10:27:32 s/that/the page to access http sites/ 10:28:06 dka: we could draft a statement that says “for new privacy-sensitive APIs, we want these to require secure origin” 10:28:52 wycats: “we support efforts by browser vendors…” 10:29:39 Draft recommendation here http://oksoclap.com/p/kCUkARlDtn 10:30:33 👍 10:31:12 https://hackpad.com/Untitled-RQucKs6BLTT 10:33:20 [drafting in oksoclap not hackpad] 10:35:15 [drafting in hackpad not oksoclap] 10:35:47 Zakim has left #tagmem 10:35:56 [drafting in oksoclap not hackpad] 10:36:38 [hackpad requires access to Google contacts, oksoclap isn’t https] 10:36:39 https://etherpad.mozilla.org/qPTpp2UKfa 10:37:01 [drafting in etherpad] 10:39:50 https://developer.chrome.com/apps/app_runtime 10:49:55 proposed resolution: https://etherpad.mozilla.org/qPTpp2UKfa 10:51:26 mnot: how should the TAG communicate? 10:51:48 Domenic: on EME they would have preferred us to file a bug rather than issuing an edict 10:52:50 wycats: when it’s more architectural, and there isn’t a spec, then a post etc would be more appropriate 10:53:07 mnot: just having it in the minutes doesn’t work 10:54:02 dka: we could put it on the blog, or on our GitHub-hosted home page 10:54:39 … like the http group did 10:55:08 mnot: have one place 10:56:07 … why not move the findings to github, and CNAME tag.w3.org to github 10:56:45 Domenic: we have lots of different kinds of things we publish: Findings, guides, short statements 10:57:04 mnot: TAG Findings are architectural: this is a short one but fits into that scope 10:58:24 see https://github.com/tc39/ecma262 10:59:45 [discussion on publication process] 11:05:10 Domenic & mnot propose to create a home page for the TAG onto a GitHub Pages page 11:05:44 dka: we could use w3ctag.org 11:06:01 … the W3C page would be static, only change when the membership of the TAG changes 11:09:49 timbl: w3.org should have a record of everything that we do 11:10:11 … we need to make sure we have the archive 11:10:47 mnot: for IETF we save all the state from GitHub, using API access to the issues as JSON 11:11:04 … we check the JSON into the repo it’s associated with 11:11:20 … if GitHub were to go down, we’d need to do some work to reconstruct it 11:12:19 dka: keeping the history, getting it archived on w3.org, is really important 11:12:43 … w3.org has the longer lifetime 11:14:46 timbl: I will talk to the sysadmins about the TAG having the subdomain tag.w3.org 11:16:56 PROPOSED RESOLUTION: We support efforts by browser vendors to restrict privacy-sensitive features to secure origins. This includes ones that have not historically been restricted as such, like geolocation or webcam access. 11:16:57 We also support investigation into ways of preventing these features from leaking to third-party scripts within a webpage (although the exact technology to do so is unclear as yet, probably involving some combination of CSP and/or something like