W3C
Web Services Policy 1.5 - Primer
W3C Working Draft 10 August 2007
This version:
http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/WD-ws-policy-primer-20070810
Latest version:
http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-policy-primer
Previous version:
http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/WD-ws-policy-primer-20070605
Editors:
Asir S Vedamuthu, Microsoft Corporation
David Orchard, BEA Systems, Inc.
Frederick Hirsch, Nokia
Maryann Hondo, IBM Corporation
Prasad Yendluri, webMethods, Inc.
Toufic Boubez, Layer 7 Technologies
?mit Yal?inalp, SAP AG.
This document is also available in these non-normative formats: PDF, PostScript
, XML, and plain text.
Copyright ? 2007 W3C^? (MIT, ERCIM, Keio), All Rights Reserved. W3C liability,
trademark and document use rules apply.
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Abstract
Web Services Policy 1.5 - Primer is an introductory description of the Web
Services Policy language. This document describes the policy language features
using numerous examples. The associated Web Services Policy 1.5 - Framework and
Web Services Policy 1.5 - Attachment specifications provide the complete
normative description of the Web Services Policy language.
Status of this Document
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its
publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current W3C
publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in
the W3C technical reports index at http://www.w3.org/TR/.
This is an updated Working Draft of the Web Services Policy 1.5 - Primer
specification. This Working Draft was produced by the members of the Web
Services Policy Working Group, which is part of the W3C Web Services Activity.
The Working Group expects to advance this Working Draft to Working Group Note.
There are no open issues against this document, see Bugzilla.
A list of changes in this version of the document and a diff-marked version
against the previous version of this document are available. Major editorial
changes in this version of the document encompass updates of various
references.
Note that this Working Draft does not necessarily represent a consensus of the
Working Group. Discussion of this document takes place on the public
public-ws-policy@w3.org mailing list (public archive) and within Bugzilla.
Comments on this specification should be made following the Description for
Issues of the Working Group.
Publication as a Working Draft does not imply endorsement by the W3C
Membership. This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted
by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as
other than work in progress.
This document was produced by a group operating under the 5 February 2004 W3C
Patent Policy. The group does not expect this document to become a W3C
Recommendation. W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in
connection with the deliverables of the group; that page also includes
instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has actual knowledge of
a patent which the individual believes contains Essential Claim(s) must
disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Basic Concepts: Policy Expression
2.1 Web Services Policy
2.2 Simple Message
2.3 Secure Message
2.4 Other Assertions
2.5 Combining Policy Assertions
2.6 Optional Policy Assertion
2.7 Ignorable Policy Expressions
2.8 Marking Assertions both Optional and Ignorable
2.9 Nested Policy Expressions
2.10 Referencing Policy Expressions
2.11 Attaching Policy Expressions to WSDL
2.12 Policy Automates Web Services Interaction
3. Advanced Concepts: Policy Expression
3.1 Policy Expression
3.2 Normal Form for Policy Expressions
3.3 Policy Data Model
3.4 Compatible Policies
3.4.1 Strict and Lax Policy Intersection
3.5 Attaching Policy Expressions to WSDL
3.6 Policy Retrieval
3.7 Combine Policies
3.8 Extensibility and Versioning
3.8.1 Policy Language
3.8.2 Policy Expressions
3.8.3 Use of Ignorable attribute and an alternative Versioning Scenario
3.8.4 Use of Ignorable and Optional attributes
3.9 Parts of a Policy Assertion
4. Versioning Policy Language
4.1 Policy Framework
4.2 Policy Attachment
5. Conclusion
Appendices
A. Security Considerations
B. XML Namespaces
C. References
D. Acknowledgements (Non-Normative)
E. Changes in this Version of the Document (Non-Normative)
F. Web Services Policy 1.5 - Primer Change Log (Non-Normative)
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1. Introduction
This document, Web Services Policy 1.5 - Primer, provides an introductory
description of the Web Services Policy language and should be read alongside
the formal descriptions contained in the WS-Policy and WS-PolicyAttachment
specifications.
This document is:
* for policy expression authors who need to understand the syntax of the
language and understand how to build consistent policy expressions,
* for policy implementers whose software modules read and write policy
expressions and
* for policy assertion authors who need to know the features of the language
and understand the requirements for describing policy assertions.
This document assumes a basic understanding of XML 1.0, Namespaces in XML, WSDL
1.1 and SOAP.
Each major section of this document introduces the features of the policy
language and describes those features in the context of concrete examples.
2. Basic Concepts: Policy Expression covers the basic mechanisms of Web
Services Policy. It describes how to declare and combine capabilities and
requirements of a Web service as policy expressions, attach policy expressions
to WSDL constructs such as endpoint and message, and re-use policy expressions.
3. Advanced Concepts: Policy Expression this is the advanced section that
provides more in-depth materials for policy implementers and assertion authors.
It explains the basics of normalizing policy expressions, merging policies,
determining the compatibility (intersection) of policies, the policy data
model, the policy expression and the extensibility points built into the Web
Services Policy language.
4. Versioning Policy Language provides examples and best practices on
versioning of the policy language itself, mostly intended for policy
implementers.
The Web Services Policy 1.5 - Guidelines for Policy Assertion Authors
specification provides guidelines for designing policy assertions and
enumerates the minimum requirements for describing policy assertions in
specifications.
This is a non-normative document and does not provide a definitive
specification of the Web Services Policy language. B. XML Namespaces lists all
the namespaces that are used in this document. (XML elements without a
namespace prefix are from the Web Services Policy XML Namespace.)
2. Basic Concepts: Policy Expression
2.1 Web Services Policy
Web services are being successfully used for interoperable solutions across
various industries. One of the key reasons for interest and investment in Web
services is that they are well-suited to enable service-oriented systems.
XML-based technologies such as SOAP, XML Schema and WSDL provide a
broadly-adopted foundation on which to build interoperable Web services. The
WS-Policy and WS-PolicyAttachment specifications extend this foundation and
offer mechanisms to represent the capabilities and requirements of Web services
as Policies.
Service metadata is an expression of the visible aspects of a Web service, and
consists of a mixture of machine- and human-readable languages.
Machine-readable languages enable tooling. For example, tools that consume
service metadata can automatically generate client code to call the service.
Service metadata can describe different parts of a Web service and thus enable
different levels of tooling support.
First, service metadata can describe the format of the payloads that a Web
service sends and receives. Tools can use this metadata to automatically
generate and validate data sent to and from a Web service. The XML Schema
language is frequently used to describe the message interchange format within
the SOAP message construct, i.e. to represent SOAP Body children and SOAP
Header blocks.
Second, service metadata can describe the ?how? and ?where? a Web service
exchanges messages, i.e. how to represent the concrete message format, what
headers are used, the transmission protocol, the message exchange pattern and
the list of available endpoints. The Web Services Description Language is
currently the most common language for describing the ?how? and ?where? a Web
service exchanges messages. WSDL has extensibility points that can be used to
expand on the metadata for a Web service.
Third, service metadata can describe the capabilities and requirements of a Web
service, i.e. representing whether and how a message must be secured, whether
and how a message must be delivered reliably, whether a message must flow a
transaction, etc. Exposing this class of metadata about the capabilities and
requirements of a Web service enables tools to generate code modules for
engaging these behaviors. Tools can use this metadata to check the
compatibility of requesters and providers. Web Services Policy can be used to
represent the capabilities and requirements of a Web service.
Web Services Policy is a machine-readable language for representing the
capabilities and requirements of a Web service. These are called ?policies?.
Web Services Policy offers mechanisms to represent consistent combinations of
capabilities and requirements, to determine the compatibility of policies, to
name and reference policies and to associate policies with Web service metadata
constructs such as service, endpoint and operation. Web Services Policy is a
simple language that has four elements - Policy, All, ExactlyOne and
PolicyReference - and one attribute - wsp:Optional.
2.2 Simple Message
Let us start by considering a SOAP Message in the example below.
Example 2-1. SOAP Message
http://x.example.com/realquote
http://x.example.com/GetRealQuote
?
This message uses message addressing headers. The wsa:To and wsa:Action header
blocks identify the destination and the semantics implied by this message
respectively. (The prefix wsa is used here to denote the Web Services
Addressing XML Namespace. B. XML Namespaces lists all the namespaces and
prefixes that are used in this document.)
Let us look at a fictitious scenario used in this document to illustrate the
features of the policy language. A Web service developer is building a client
application that retrieves real time stock quote information from Company-X,
Ltd. Company-X supplies real time data using Web services. The developer has
Company-X?s advertised WSDL description of these Web services. Company-X
requires the use of addressing headers for messaging. Just the WSDL description
is not sufficient for the developer to enable the interaction between her
client and these Web services. WSDL constructs do not indicate requirements
such as the use of addressing.
(The example companies, organizations, products, domain names, e-mail
addresses, logos, people, places, and events depicted herein are fictitious. No
association with any real company, organization, product, domain name, email
address, logo, person, places, or events is intended or should be inferred.)
Providers have the option to convey requirements, such as the use of
addressing, through word-of-mouth and documentation ? as they always have. To
interact successfully with this service, the developer may have to read any
related documentation, call someone at Company-X to understand the service
metadata, or look at sample SOAP messages and infer such requirements or
behaviors.
Web Services Policy is a machine-readable language for representing these Web
service capabilities and requirements as policies. Policy makes it possible for
providers to represent such capabilities and requirements in a machine-readable
form. For example, Company-X may augment the service WSDL description with a
policy that requires the use of addressing. The client application developer
can use a policy-aware client that understands this policy and engages
addressing automatically.
How does Company-X use policy to represent the use of addressing? The example
below illustrates a policy expression that requires the use of addressing.
Example 2-2. Policy Expression
?
The policy expression in the above example consists of a Policy main element
and a child element wsam:Addressing. Child elements of the Policy element are
policy assertions. Company-X attaches the above policy expression to a WSDL
binding description.
Example 2-3. Policy Expression Attached to Binding
?
?
Policies can also be attached to WSDL using references (See 2.10 Referencing
Policy Expressions.)
The wsam:Addressing element is a policy assertion. (The prefix wsam is used
here to denote the Web Services Addressing ? Metadata XML Namespace.) This
assertion identifies the use of Web Services Addressing information headers. A
policy-aware client can recognize this policy assertion, engage addressing
automatically, and use headers such as wsa:To and wsa:Action in SOAP Envelopes.
It is important to understand the association between the SOAP message and
policy expression in the above example. As you can see by careful examination
of the message, there is no reference to any policy expression. Just as WSDL
does not require a message to reference WSDL constructs (such as port, binding
and portType), Web Services Policy does not require a message to reference a
policy expression though the policy expression describes the message.
2.3 Secure Message
In addition to requiring the use of addressing, Company-X requires the use of
transport-level security for protecting messages.
Example 2-4. Secure Message
2006-01-19T02:49:53.914Z
2006-01-19T02:54:53.914Z
http://x.example.com/quote
http://x.example.com/GetRealQuote
?
The SOAP message in the example above includes security timestamps that express
creation and expiration times of this message. Company-X requires the use of
security timestamps and transport-level security - such as HTTPS ? for
protecting messages. (The prefixes wss and wsu are used here to denote the Web
Services Security and Utility namespaces.)
Similar to the use of addressing, Company-X indicates the use of
transport-level security using a policy expression. The example below
illustrates a policy expression that requires the use of addressing and
transport-level security for securing messages.
Example 2-5. Addressing and Security Policy Expression
?
?
The sp:TransportBinding element is a policy assertion. (The prefix sp is used
here to denote the Web Services Security Policy XML Namespace.) This assertion
identifies the use of transport-level security ? such as HTTPS - for protecting
messages. Policy-aware clients can recognize this policy assertion, engage
transport-level security for protecting messages and include security
timestamps in SOAP Envelopes.
The client application developer can use a policy-aware client that recognizes
this policy expression and engages both addressing and transport-level security
automatically.
For the moment, let us set aside the contents of the sp:TransportBinding policy
assertion and consider its details in a later section.
2.4 Other Assertions
Thus far, we explored how Company-X uses policy expressions and assertions for
representing behaviors that must be engaged for a Web service interaction. What
is a policy assertion? What role does it play? In brief, a policy assertion is
a piece of service metadata, and it identifies a domain (such as messaging,
security, reliability and transaction) specific behavior that is a requirement.
Company-X uses a policy assertion to convey a condition under which they offer
a Web service. A policy-aware client can recognize policy assertions and engage
these behaviors automatically.
Providers, like Company-X, have the option to combine behaviors for an
interaction from domains such as messaging, security, reliability and
transactions. Using policy assertions, providers can represent these behaviors
in a machine-readable form. Web service developers can use policy-aware clients
that recognize these assertions and engage these behaviors automatically.
Who defines policy assertions? Where are they? Policy assertions are defined by
Web services developers, product designers, protocol authors and users. Like
XML Schema libraries, policy assertions are a growing collection. Several WS-*
protocol specifications and applications define policy assertions:
* Web Services Security Policy [WS-SecurityPolicy]
* Web Services Reliable Messaging Policy [Web Services Reliable Messaging
Policy Assertion]
* Web Services Atomic Transaction [Web Services Atomic Transaction]
* Web Services Business Activity Framework [Web Services Business Activity
Framework]
* Devices Profile for Web Services [Devices Profile for Web Services]
* ?
2.5 Combining Policy Assertions
Policy assertions can be combined in different ways to express consistent
combinations of behaviors (capabilities and requirements). There are three
policy operators for combining policy assertions: Policy, All and ExactlyOne
(the Policy operator is a synonym for All).
Let us consider the All operator first. The policy expression in the example
below requires the use of addressing and transport-level security. There are
two policy assertions. These assertions are combined using the All operator.
Combining policy assertions using the Policy or All operator means that all the
behaviors represented by these assertions are required.
Example 2-6. Addressing and Security Policy Expression
?
?
In addition to requiring the use of addressing, Company-X allows either the use
of transport- or message-level security for protecting messages. Web Services
Policy language can indicate this choice of behaviors in a machine-readable
form. To indicate the use of message-level security for protecting messages,
Company-X uses the sp:AsymmetricBinding policy assertion (see the example
below).
Example 2-7. Asymmetric Binding Security Policy Assertion
?
The sp:AsymmetricBinding element is a policy assertion. (The prefix sp is used
here to denote the Web Services Security Policy namespace.) This assertion
identifies the use of message-level security ? such as WS-Security 1.0 - for
protecting messages. Policy-aware clients can recognize this policy assertion,
engage message-level security for protecting messages and use headers such as
wss:Security in SOAP Envelopes.
To allow the use of either transport- or message-level security, Company-X uses
the ExactlyOne policy operator. Policy assertions combined using the ExactlyOne
operator requires exactly one of the behaviors represented by the assertions.
The policy expression in the example below requires the use of either
transport- or message-level security for protecting messages.
Example 2-8. Transport- or Message-Level Security Policy Expression
?
?
Company-X requires the use of addressing and requires the use of either
transport- or message-level security for protecting messages. They represent
this combination using the All and ExactlyOne operators. Policy operators can
be mixed to represent different combinations of behaviors (capabilities and
requirements). The policy expression in the example below requires the use of
addressing and one of transport- or message-level security for protecting
messages.
Example 2-9. Addressing and Transport- OR Message-Level Security Policy
Expression
?
?
?
Using this policy expression, Company-X gives the choice of mechanisms for
protecting messages to clients (or requesters).
2.6 Optional Policy Assertion
Through a customer survey program, Company-X learns that a significant number
of their customers prefer to use the Optimized MIME Serialization (as defined
in the MTOM specification) for sending and receiving messages. Company-X adds
optional support for the Optimized MIME Serialization and expresses this
optional behavior in a machine-readable form.
To indicate the use of optimization using the Optimized MIME Serialization,
Company-X uses the mtom:OptimizedMimeSerialization policy assertion (see the
example below).
Example 2-10. Optimized MIME Serialization Policy Assertion
The mtom:OptimizedMimeSerialization element is a policy assertion. (The prefix
mtom is used here to denote the Optimized MIME Serialization Policy namespace.)
This assertion identifies the use of MIME Multipart/Related serialization as
required for request and response messages. Policy-aware clients can recognize
this policy assertion and engage Optimized MIME Serialization for messages. The
semantics of this assertion are reflected in messages: they use an optimized
wire format (MIME Multipart/Related serialization).
Like Company-X?s optional support for Optimized MIME Serialization, there are
behaviors that may be engaged (in contrast to must be engaged) for a Web
service interaction. A service provider will not fault if these behaviors are
not engaged. Policy assertions can be marked optional to represent behaviors
that may be engaged for an interaction. A policy assertion is marked as
optional using the wsp:Optional attribute. Optional assertions represent the
capabilities of the service provider as opposed to the requirements of the
service provider.
In the example below, the Optimized MIME Serialization policy assertion is
marked optional. This policy expression allows the use of optimization and
requires the use of addressing and one of transport- or message-level security.
If a client sends an optimized (MTOM) message, this will be indicated by
characteristics associated by using such an optimized message, including a wire
format that is a Multipart/Related message and a content-type header of
"application/xop+xml" for the outer package. In this case, the response message
will also be optimized, also having a Multipart/Related message and
content-type header of "application/xop+xml". Note that when optimized messages
are used, the Multipart/Related message can have a single part containing the
primary SOAP envelope.
Example 2-11. Optional MIME Serialization, Addressing and Transport- OR
Message-Level Security Policy Expression
?
?
?
Company-X is able to meet their customer needs by adding optional support for
the Optimized MIME Serialization. Optional support is outlined in section 3.4
Web Services Policy 1.5 - Framework and detailed in section 4.5.2, Web Services
Policy 1.5 - Guidelines for Policy Assertion Authors, specifically for
Optimized MIME Serialization. An optional policy assertion represents a
behavior that may be engaged. When a policy assertion is absent from a policy
vocabulary (See section 3.2, Web Services Policy 1.5 - Framework), a
policy-aware client should not conclude anything (other than ?no claims?) about
the absence of that policy assertion. See section 2.11 Attaching Policy
Expressions to WSDL on the absence of policy expressions.
2.7 Ignorable Policy Expressions
Suppose Company-X decides that it will log SOAP messages sent and received in
an exchange. This behavior has no direct impact on the messages sent on the
wire, and does not affect interoperability. Some parties might have a concern
about such logging and might decide not to interact with Company-X knowing that
such logging is performed. To address this concern, Company-X includes a
Logging assertion in its policy to enable such parties to be aware of logging.
By marking the Logging assertion with the wsp:Ignorable attribute with a value
of "true" Company-X indicates that a requester may choose to either ignore such
assertions or to consider them as part of policy intersection. An assertion
that may be ignored for policy intersection is called an ignorable assertion.
The wsp:Ignorable attribute allows providers to clearly indicate which policy
assertions indicate behaviors that don?t manifest on the wire and may not be of
concern to a requester when determining policy compatibility. Using the
wsp:Optional attribute would be incorrect in this scenario, since it would
indicate that the behavior would not occur if the alternative without the
assertion were selected.
Example 2-12. Ignorable Logging Policy Assertion
(The log: prefix is used here to denote a hypothetical example namespace for
this example logging policy assertion.)
The attribute wsp:Ignorable is of type xs:boolean. Omitting this attribute is
semantically equivalent to including it with a value of "false".
The use of the wsp:Ignorable attribute has no impact on normalization.
Assertions marked with the wsp:Ignorable attribute remain marked with the
wsp:Ignorable attribute after normalization. Please note that the impact of the
ignorable attribute is at the discretion of policy consumers through selection
of "lax" or "strict" mode (See 3.4.1 Strict and Lax Policy Intersection).
Therefore ignorable assertions may have an effect on determining compatibility
of provider and consumer policies.
2.8 Marking Assertions both Optional and Ignorable
As described in the sections above and in Section 3.4.1 Strict and Lax Policy
Intersection, the WS-Policy 1.5 specification defines two attributes that can
be used to mark an assertion: wsp:Optional and wsp:Ignorable.
The WS-Policy Framework allows a policy assertion to be marked with both
"optional" and "Ignorable" attributes simultaneously. The presence of
"@wsp:optional=true" on an assertion is a syntactic compact form for two
alternatives in normal form, one with the assertion and the other without the
assertion. Hence syntactically marking an assertion "A" with both the
@wsp:Optional and @wsp:Ignorable with the value of "true" for both, is
equivalent to two alternatives; one where the assertion A exists with
@wsp:Ignorable=true and the second where the assertion A does not exist.
2.9 Nested Policy Expressions
In the previous sections, we considered two security policy assertions. In this
section, let us look at one of the security policy assertions in a little more
detail.
As you would expect, securing messages is a complex usage scenario. Company-X
uses the sp:TransportBinding policy assertion to indicate the use of
transport-level security for protecting messages. Just indicating the use of
transport-level security for protecting messages is not sufficient. To
successfully interact with Company-X?s Web services, the developer must also
know what transport token to use, what particular secure transport to use, what
specific algorithm suite to use for performing cryptographic operations, etc.
The sp:TransportBinding policy assertion can represent these dependent
behaviors. In this section, let us look at how to capture these dependent
behaviors in a machine-readable form.
A policy assertion ? like the sp:TransportBinding - identifies a visible domain
specific behavior that is a requirement. Given an assertion, there may be other
dependent behaviors that need to be enumerated for a Web Service interaction.
In the case of the sp:TransportBinding policy assertion, Company-X needs to
identify the use of a transport token, a secure transport, an algorithm suite
for performing cryptographic operations, etc. A nested policy expression can be
used to enumerate such dependent behaviors.
What is a nested policy expression? A nested policy expression is a policy
expression that is a child element of a policy assertion element. A nested
policy expression further qualifies the behavior of its parent policy
assertion.
In the example below, the child Policy element is a nested policy expression
and further qualifies the behavior of the sp:TransportBinding policy assertion.
The sp:TransportToken is a nested policy assertion of the sp:TransportBinding
policy assertion. The sp:TransportToken assertion requires the use of a
specific transport token and further qualifies the behavior of the
sp:TransportBinding policy assertion (which already requires the use of
transport-level security for protecting messages).
Example 2-13. Transport Security Policy Assertion
?
The sp:AlgorithmSuite is a nested policy assertion of the sp:TransportBinding
policy assertion. The sp:AlgorithmSuite assertion requires the use of the
algorithm suite identified by its nested policy assertion (sp:Basic256Rsa15 in
the example above) and further qualifies the behavior of the
sp:TransportBinding policy assertion.
Setting aside the details of using transport-level security, Web service
developers can use a policy-aware client that recognizes this policy assertion
and engages transport-level security and its dependent behaviors automatically.
That is, the complexity of security usage is absorbed by a policy-aware client
and hidden from these Web service developers.
In another example, WS-Security Policy defines a sp:HttpToken assertion to
contain three possible nested elements, sp:HttpBasicAuthentication,
sp:HttpDigestAuthentication and sp:RequireClientCertificate. When the HttpToken
is used with an empty nested policy in a policy expression by a provider, it
will indicate that none of the dependent behaviors namely authentication or
client certificate is required. A non-anonymous client who requires
authentication or client certificate will not be able to use this provider
solely on the basis of policy intersection algorithm alone.
Example 2-14. Empty Nested Assertion
2.10 Referencing Policy Expressions
Company-X has numerous Web service offerings that provide different kinds of
real-time quotes and book information on securities such as GetRealQuote,
GetRealQuotes and GetExtendedRealQuote. To accommodate the diversity of
Company-X?s customers, Company-X supports multiple WSDL bindings for these Web
services. Company-X provides consistent ways to interact with their services
and wants to represent these capabilities and requirements consistently across
all of their offerings without duplicating policy expressions multiple times.
How? It is simple - a policy expression can be named and referenced for re-use.
Section 2.2 Simple Message, showed how a policy expression can be attached
directly to a binding inline. A single policy expression may be used in several
parts of a WSDL document. In this case it is desirable to use references to the
policy expression rather than to directly inline the policy expression.
A policy expression may be identified by an IRI and referenced for re-use as a
standalone policy or within another policy expression. There are three
mechanisms to identify a policy expression: the wsu:Id xml:id and Name
attributes. A PolicyReference element can be used to reference a policy
expression identified using either of these mechanisms.
Example 2-15. Common Policy Expression
?
In the example above, the wsu:Id attribute is used to identify a policy
expression. The value of the wsu:Id attribute is an XML ID. The relative IRI
for referencing this policy expression (within the same document) is #common.
If the policy document IRI is http://x.example.com/policy.xml then the absolute
IRI for referencing this policy expression is http://x.example.com/policy.xml#
common. (The absolute IRI is formed by combining the document IRI, # and the
value of the wsu:Id attribute.)
In addition to the Example 2-12, Company-X could have used either the xml:id or
wsu:Id. An example of the use of xml:id similar to that of wsu:Id is shown in
Example 2-13.
Example 2-16. Common Policy Expression [xml:id]
?
Conditions and constraints on the use of the |xml:id| attribute in conjunction
with Canonical XML 1.0 are specified in Appendix C of XML ID and are further
detailed in C14N 1.0 Note. Significant care is suggested in the use of xml:id.
Note:
Note: Canonical XML 1.1 [C14N11] is intended to address the issues that occur
with Canonical XML 1.0 with regards to xml:id. The W3C XML Security
Specifications Maintenance WG has been chartered to address how to integrate
Canonical XML 1.1 with XML Security, including XML Signature [SecSpecMaintWG]
(See http://www.w3.org/2007/xmlsec/.)
For re-use, a PolicyReference element can be used to reference a policy
expression as a standalone policy or within another policy expression. The
example below is a policy expression that re-uses the common policy expression
above.
Example 2-17. PolicyReference to Common Policy Expression
For referencing a policy expression within the same XML document, Company-X
uses the wsu:Id attribute for identifying a policy expression and an IRI to
this ID value for referencing this policy expression using a PolicyReference
element.
The example below is a policy expression that re-uses the common policy
expression within another policy expression. This policy expression requires
the use of addressing, one of transport- or message-level security for
protecting messages and allows the use of optimization.
Example 2-18. Secure Policy Expression
?
?
The Name attribute is an alternate mechanism to identify a policy expression.
The value of the Name attribute is an absolute IRI and is independent of the
location of the XML document where the identified policy expression resides in.
As such, referencing a policy expression using the Name attribute relies on
additional out of band information. In the example below, the Name attribute
identifies the policy expression. The IRI of this policy expression is http://
x.example.com/policy/common.
Example 2-19. Common Policy Expression
?
The example below is a policy expression that re-uses the common policy
expression above.
Example 2-20. PolicyReference to Common Policy Expression
As policy expressions are composed from other policy expressions and assertions
from different domains are used in a policy expression, complex expressions
will emerge. Naming parts of complex expressions for reuse and building more
complex policies through referencing enables building more complicated policy
scenerios easily. This approach enables the association of additional policy
subjects to identified policy expressions. It also promotes manageability of
the expressions as they are uniquely identified and allows profiles for common
scenerios to be developed. Note that when a named expression has assertions
that contains parametrized expressions, care must be given to ensure that the
parameterized content is statically available to enable reuse.
2.11 Attaching Policy Expressions to WSDL
A majority of Company-X?s customers use WSDL for building their client
applications. Company-X leverages this usage by attaching policy expressions to
the WSDL binding descriptions.
In the example below, the SecureBinding WSDL binding description defines a
binding for an interface that provides real-time quotes and book information on
securities. (The prefixes wsdl and tns are used here to denote the Web Services
Description language XML namespace and target namespace of this WSDL document.)
To require the use of security for these offerings, Company-X attaches the
secure policy expression in the previous section to this binding description.
The WSDL binding element is a common policy attachment point. The secure policy
expression attached to the SecureBinding WSDL binding description applies to
any message exchange associated with any port that supports this binding
description. This includes all the message exchanges described by operations in
the RealTimeDataInterface.
Example 2-21. Secure Policy Expression Attached to WSDL Binding
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In addition to providing real-time quotes and book information on securities,
Company-X provides other kinds of data through Web services such as quotes
delayed by 20 minutes and security symbols through Web services (for example
GetDelayedQuote, GetDelayedQuotes, GetSymbol and GetSymbols). Company-X does
not require the use of security for these services, but requires the use of
addressing and allows the use of optimization.
Example 2-22. Open Policy Expression Attached to WSDL Binding
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In the example above, the OpenBinding WSDL binding description defines a
binding for an interface that provides other kinds of data such as quotes
delayed by 20 minutes and security symbols. To require the use of addressing
and allow the use of optimization, Company-X attaches the common policy
expression in the previous section to this binding description. As we have seen
in the SecureBinding case, the common policy expression attached to the
OpenBinding WSDL binding description applies to any message exchange associated
with any port that supports this binding description. This includes all the
message exchanges described by operations in the DelayedDataInterface.
As mentioned earlier, providers have the option to convey requirements, such as
the use of addressing or security, through word-of-mouth and documentation ? as
they always have. The absence of policy expressions, for example, in a WSDL
document does not indicate anything about the capabilities and requirements of
a service. The service may have capabilities and requirements that can be
expressed as policy expressions, such as the use of addressing, security and
optimization. Or, the service may not have such capabilities and requirements.
A policy aware client should not conclude anything about the absence of policy
expressions.
Service providers, like Company-X, can preserve and leverage their investments
in WSDL and represent the capabilities and requirements of a Web service as
policies. A WSDL document may specify varying behaviors across Web service
endpoints. Web service developers can use a policy-aware client that recognizes
these policy expressions in WSDL documents and engages behaviors automatically
for each of these endpoints. Any complexity of varying behaviors across Web
service endpoints is absorbed by a policy-aware client or tool and hidden from
these Web service developers.
2.12 Policy Automates Web Services Interaction
As you have seen, Web Services Policy is a simple language that has four
elements - Policy, All, ExactlyOne and PolicyReference - and one attribute -
wsp:Optional. In practice, service providers, like Company-X, use policy
expressions to represent combinations of capabilities and requirements. Web
service developers use policy-aware clients that understand policy expressions
and engage the behaviors represented by providers automatically. A sizable
amount of complexity is absorbed by policy-aware clients (or tools) and is
invisible to these Web service developers.
Web Services Policy extends the foundation on which to build interoperable Web
services, hides complexity from developers and automates Web service
interactions.
3. Advanced Concepts: Policy Expression
In 2. Basic Concepts: Policy Expression, we covered the basics of Web Services
Policy language. This is the advanced section that provides more in-depth
materials for Web Services Policy implementers and assertion authors. This
section covers the following topics:
* What is a policy expression?
* What is the normal form of a policy expression and how to normalize policy
expressions?
* What is the policy data model?
* How to select a compatible policy alternative?
* How to attach policy expressions to WSDL constructs?
* How to combine policies?
* What are the extensibility points?
* What are the parts of a policy assertion?
3.1 Policy Expression
A policy expression is the XML representation and interoperable form of a Web
Services Policy. A policy expression consists of a Policy wrapper element and a
variety of child and descendant elements. Child and descendent elements from
the policy language are Policy, All, ExactlyOne and PolicyReference. Other
child elements of Policy, All and ExactlyOne are policy assertions. (The Policy
element plays two roles: wrapper element and operator.) Policy assertions can
contain a nested policy expression. Policy assertions can also be marked
optional to represent behaviors that may be engaged (capabilities) for an
interaction. The optional marker is the wsp:Optional attribute which is placed
on a policy assertion element.
Let us take a closer look at Company-X?s policy expression (see below) from the
previous section.
Example 3-1. Company-X?s Secure Policy Expression
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The Policy element is the wrapper element. The All and ExactlyOne elements are
the policy operators. All other child elements of the All and ExactlyOne
elements are policy assertions from domains such as messaging, addressing,
security, reliability and transactions.
3.2 Normal Form for Policy Expressions
Web Services Policy language defines two forms of policy expressions: compact
and normal form. Up to this point, we have used the compact form. The compact
form is less verbose than the normal form. The compact form is useful for
authoring policy expressions. The normal form is an intuitive representation of
the policy data model. We will look into the policy data model in the next
section.
The normal form uses a subset of constructs used in the compact form and
follows a simple outline for its XML representation:
Example 3-2. Normal Form for Policy Expressions
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The normal form consists of a Policy wrapper element and has one child
ExactlyOne element. This ExactlyOne element has zero or more All child
elements. Each of these All elements has zero or more policy assertions. The
PolicyReference element and wsp:Optional attribute are not used in the normal
form. And, a nested policy expression in the normal form has at most one policy
alternative.
The normal form represents a policy as a collection of policy alternatives and
a policy alternative as a collection of policy assertions in a straight-forward
manner.
The example below is a policy expression in the normal form. This expression
contains two policy alternatives: one that requires the use of transport-level
security and the other that requires the use of message-level security for
protecting messages.
Example 3-3. Transport- or Message-Level Security Policy Expression in Normal
Form
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A policy expression in the compact form can be converted to the normal form.
Web Services Policy language describes the algorithm for this conversion.
Let us re-consider Company-X?s policy expression (see the example below).
Company-X requires the use of addressing and either transport- or message-level
security and allows the use of optimization. This policy expression is in the
compact form and has four policy alternatives for requesters:
1. Requires the use of addressing and transport-level security
2. Requires the use of addressing and message-level security
3. Requires the use of optimization, addressing and transport-level security
and
4. Requires the use of optimization, addressing and message-level security.
Example 3-4. Company-X?s Secure Policy Expression in Compact Form
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Let us look at the normal form for this policy expression. The example below is
Company-X?s policy expression in the normal form. As you can see, the compact
form is less verbose than the normal form. The normal form represents a policy
as a collection of policy alternatives. Each of the All operators is a policy
alternative. There are four policy alternatives in the normal form. These
alternatives map to bullets (a) through (d) above.
Example 3-5. Company-X?s Policy Expression in Normal Form
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The wsp:Optional attribute, nested policy expression and PolicyReference
element are converted to their corresponding normal form. The wsp:Optional
attribute converts to two alternatives, one with and the other without the
assertion. A policy alternative containing an assertion with a nested policy
expression that has multiple policy alternatives converts to multiple policy
alternatives where the assertion contains a nested policy expression that has
at most one policy alternative.
The PolicyReference element is replaced with its referenced policy expression.
See section 3.6 Policy Retrieval for more details on how to retrieve referenced
policy expressions.
3.3 Policy Data Model
In the previous section, we considered the normal form for policy expressions.
As we discussed, the normal form represents a policy as a collection of policy
alternatives. In this section, let us look at the policy data model.
Company-X uses a policy to convey the conditions for an interaction.
Policy-aware clients, like the one used by the developer in our example (as
explained earlier in 2. Basic Concepts: Policy Expression), view policy as an
unordered collection of zero or more policy alternatives. A policy alternative
is an unordered collection of zero or more policy assertions. A policy
alternative represents a collection of behaviors or requirements or conditions
for an interaction. In simple words, each policy alternative represents a set
of conditions for an interaction. The diagram below describes the policy data
model.
WS-Policy Data Model
Figure 3-1. WS-Policy Data Model
A policy-aware client uses a policy to determine whether one of these policy
alternatives (i.e. the conditions for an interaction) can be met in order to
interact with the associated Web Service. Such clients may choose any of these
policy alternatives and must choose exactly one of them for a successful Web
service interaction. Clients may choose a different policy alternative for a
subsequent interaction. It is important to understand that a policy is a useful
piece of metadata in machine-readable form that enables tooling, yet is not
required for a successful Web service interaction. Why? Web service developers
could use the documentation, talk to the service providers, or look at message
traces to infer these conditions for an interaction. Developers continue to
have these options, as they always had.
As we discussed, a policy assertion identifies a domain specific behavior or
requirement or condition. A policy assertion has a QName that identifies its
behavior or requirement or condition. In the XML representation, the QName of
the assertion element is the QName of the policy assertion. A policy assertion
may contain assertion parameters and a nested policy.
The assertion parameters are the opaque payload of an assertion. Parameters
carry additional useful pieces of information necessary for engaging the
behavior described by an assertion. In the XML representation, the child
elements and attributes of an assertion excluding the child elements and
attributes from the WS-Policy language XML namespace name, are the assertion
parameters. For example @wsp:Optional and @wsp:Ignorable are not assertion
parameters.
We considered nested policy expressions in the context of a security usage
scenario. Let us look at its shape in the policy data model. A nested policy
expression is a policy expression that is a child element of an assertion. In
the normal form, a nested policy expression has at most one policy alternative.
The policy alternative in a nested policy expression represents a collection of
associated or dependent behaviors, requirements or conditions that qualify its
parent policy assertion.
A policy-aware client supports a policy assertion if the client engages the
behavior or requirement or condition indicated by the assertion. A policy-aware
client supports a policy alternative if the client engages the behaviors
represented by all the assertions in the alternative. A policy-aware client
supports a policy if the client engages the behaviors represented by at least
one of the policy alternatives.
In the previous section, we saw how the normal form of a policy expression
represents a policy as a collection of policy alternatives. By policy language
design, the normal form of a policy expression directly maps to the policy data
model:
* Each child element of Policy/ExactlyOne/All maps to a policy assertion.
* Each Policy/ExactlyOne/All element and policy assertions which correspond
to its children map to a policy alternative.
* The Policy/ExactlyOne element maps to a collection of policy alternatives.
* The Policy wrapper element and policy alternatives which correspond to the
Policy/ExactlyOne element map to a policy.
The diagram below describes this mapping from the normal form of a policy
expression to the policy data model.
Mapping from Normal Form to Policy Data Model
Figure 3-2. Mapping from Normal Form to Policy Data Model
3.4 Compatible Policies
A provider, like Company-X, and a requester, like the policy-aware client used
in our example, may represent their capabilities and requirements for an
interaction as policies and want to limit their message exchanges to mutually
compatible policies. Web Services Policy defines an intersection mechanism for
selecting compatible policy alternatives when there are two or more policies.
The example below is a copy of Company-X?s policy expression (from 3.2 Normal
Form for Policy Expressions). As we saw before, Company-X offers four policy
alternatives. Of them, one of the policy alternatives requires the use of
addressing and transport-level security.
Example 3-6. Company-X?s Policy Expression
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The client application developer's organization requires the use of addressing
and transport-level security for any interaction with Company-X?s Web services.
The developer represents these behaviors using a policy expression illustrated
in the example below in normal form. This policy expression contains one policy
alternative that requires the use of addressing and transport-level security.
Example 3-7. The Client Application's Policy Expression in Normal Form
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The developer lets her policy-aware client select a compatible policy
alternative in Company-X?s policy. How does this client select a compatible
policy alternative? It is simple ? it uses the policy intersection. That is,
the policy-aware client uses these two policy expressions (the client?s and
Company-X?s) and the policy intersection to select a compatible policy
alternative for this interaction. Let us look at the details of policy
intersection.
For two policy assertions to be compatible they must have the same QName. And,
if either assertion has a nested policy, both assertions must have a nested
policy and the nested policies must be compatible. For example, policy
assertions (c2) and (t1) have the same QName, sp:TransportBinding. For this
discussion, let us assume that these two assertions have compatible nested
policies. These two assertions are compatible because they have the same QName
and their nested policies are compatible.
Two policy alternatives are compatible if each policy assertion in one
alternative is compatible with a policy assertion in the other and vice-versa.
For example, policy assertions (c1) and (c2) in Company-X?s policy alternative
are compatible with policy assertions (t2) and (t1) in the client?s policy
alternative. Company-X?s policy alternative (a) and the client?s policy
alternative are compatible because assertions in these two alternatives are
compatible.
Two policies are compatible if a policy alternative in one is compatible with a
policy alternative in the other. For example, Company-X?s policy alternative
(a) is compatible with the client?s policy alternative. Company-X?s policy and
the client?s policy are compatible because one of Company-X?s policy
alternative is compatible with the client?s policy alternative.
For this interaction, the developer?s policy-aware client can use policy
alternative (a) to satisfy Company-X?s conditions or requirements.
Similarly, policy intersection can be used to check if providers expose
endpoints that conform to a standard policy. For example, a major retailer
might require all their supplier endpoints to be compatible with an agreed upon
policy.
3.4.1 Strict and Lax Policy Intersection
The previous sections outlined how the normal-form of a policy expression
relate to the policy data model and how the compatibility of requester and
provider policies may be determined. This section outlines how ignorable
assertions may impact the process of determining compatibility.
In order to determine compatibility of its policy expression with a provider
policy expression, a requester may use either a "lax" or "strict" mode of the
intersection algorithm.
In the strict intersection mode two policy alternatives are compatible when
each assertion in one is compatible with an assertion in the other, and vice
versa. For this to be possible they must share the same policy alternative
vocabulary. The strict intersection mode is the mode of intersection discussed
in the previous sections of this document.
When using the strict intersection mode all assertions are part of the policy
alternative vocabulary, including those marked with wsp:Ignorable. Thus the
wsp:Ignorable attribute does not impact the intersection result even when its
attribute value is ?true?.
If a requester wishes to ignore ignorable assertions in a provider's policy,
then the requester should use the lax intersection mode. In the lax
intersection mode all ignorable assertions (i.e. with the value "true" for the
wsp:Ignorable attribute) are to be ignored by the intersection algorithm. Thus
in the lax intersection mode two policy alternatives are compatible when each
non-ignorable assertion in one is compatible with an assertion in the other,
and vice versa. For this to be possible the two policy alternatives must share
a policy alternative vocabulary for all ?non-ignorable? assertions.
Regardless of the chosen intersection mode, ignorable assertions do not express
any wire-level requirements on the behavior of consumers - in other words, a
consumer could choose to ignore any such assertions that end up in the
resulting policy after intersection, with no adverse effects on runtime
interactions.
Domain-specific processing could take advantage of any information from the
policy data model, such as the ignorable property of a policy assertion.
A requester can decide how to process a provider's policy to determine if and
how the requester will interact with the provider. The requester can have its
own policy that expresses its own capabilities and requirements, and can make
one or more attempts at policy intersection in order to determine a compatible
alternative and/or isolate the cause of an empty intersection result. The
requester can use and analyze the result(s) of policy intersection to select a
compatible alternative or trigger other domain-specific processing options. For
example, a requester can at first attempt strict mode intersection, and then
lax mode as another choice, if the previous attempt returns an empty
intersection result.
3.5 Attaching Policy Expressions to WSDL
In 2. Basic Concepts: Policy Expression, we looked into how Company-X attached
their policy expressions to the WSDL binding element. In addition to the WSDL
binding element, a policy expression can be attached to other WSDL elements
such as service, port, operation and message. These elements are the WSDL
policy attachment points in a WSDL document.
The WSDL attachment points are partitioned (as illustrated below) into four
policy subjects: message, operation, endpoint and service. When attached,
capabilities and requirements represented by a policy expression apply to a
message exchange or message associated with (or described by) a policy subject.
Policy Subjects and Effective Policy in WSDL
Figure 3-3. Policy Subjects and Effective Policy in WSDL
The WSDL service element represents the service policy subject. Policy
expressions associated with a service policy subject apply to any message
exchange using any of the endpoints offered by that service.
The WSDL port, binding and portType elements collectively represent the
endpoint policy subject. Policy expressions associated with an endpoint policy
subject apply to any message exchange made using that endpoint.
The WSDL binding/operation and portType/operation elements collectively
represent the operation policy subject. Policy expressions associated with an
operation policy subject apply to the message exchange defined by that
operation.
The WSDL binding/operation/input, portType/operation/input, and message element
collectively represent the message policy subject for the input message. The
WSDL binding/operation/output, portType/operation/output, and message element
collectively represent the message policy subject for the output message. The
WSDL binding/operation/fault, portType/operation/fault, and message element
collectively represent the message policy subject for the fault message. Policy
expressions associated with a message policy subject apply only to that
message.
In the example below, the policy expression is attached to an endpoint policy
subject.
Example 3-8. Company-X?s Policy Expression Attached to WSDL binding Element
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If multiple policy expressions are attached to WSDL elements that collectively
represent a policy subject then the effective policy of these policy
expressions applies. The effective policy is the combination of the policy
expressions that are attached to the same policy subject. For example, the
effective policy of an endpoint policy subject is the combination of policy
expressions attached to a WSDL port element, policy expressions attached to the
binding element referenced by this port, and policy expressions attached to the
portType element that is supported by this port. Let us consider how to combine
policy expressions in the next section.
Most of the policy assertions are designated for the endpoint, operation or
message policy subject. The commonly used WSDL attachment points are:
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Policy | Commonly used attachment point (s) |
| Subject | |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Endpoint | binding element |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Operation | binding/operation element |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Message | binding/operation/input and binding/operation/output |
| | elements |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
3.6 Policy Retrieval
Just as other service metadata languages, Web Services Policy does not mandate
any specific policy retrieval mechanism. Any combination of any retrieval
mechanisms in any order may be used for referencing policy expressions. Example
retrieval mechanisms are:
* Do nothing. A policy expression with the referenced IRI is already known to
be available in a local cache or chip (embedded systems).
* Use the referenced IRI and retrieve an existing policy expression from the
containing XML document: a policy element with an XML ID.
* Use the referenced IRI and retrieve a policy expression from some policy
repository (local or remote) or catalog. Policy tools may use any protocols
(say Web Services Metadata Exchange) for such metadata retrieval. These
protocols may require additional out of band information.
* Attempt to resolve the referenced IRI on the Web. This may resolve to a
policy element or a resource that contains a policy element.
If the referenced policy expression is in the same XML document as the
reference, then the policy expression should be identified using the wsu:Id|
xml:id (XML ID) attribute and referenced using an IRI reference to this XML ID
value.
WSDL 1.1 [WSDL 1.1] section 2.1 and WSDL 2.0 [WSDL 2.0 Core Language] chapter 4
allow to import or include WSDL documents into another WSDL document with the
wsdl11:import, wsdl20:import, and wsdl20:include statements. The importing and
imported WSDL documents constitute separate XML documents each. If e.g. the
importing WSDL document references a policy in the imported WSDL document, the
rules for policy references between separate XML documents apply as described
in 2.10 Referencing Policy Expressions.
3.7 Combine Policies
Multiple policy expressions may be attached to WSDL constructs. Let us consider
how Company-X could have used multiple policy expressions in a WSDL document.
In the example below, there are two policy expressions #common2 and #secure2
attached to the SecureBinding WSDL binding and RealTimeDataPort WSDL port
descriptions.
Example 3-9. Multiple Policy Expressions Attached to Endpoint Policy Subject
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As we discussed before, the WSDL port, binding and portType elements
collectively represent the endpoint policy subject. In the example above, the #
common2 and #secure2 policy expressions attached to the SecureBinding WSDL
binding and RealTimeDataPort WSDL port descriptions collectively apply to any
message exchange associated with the RealTimeDataPort WSDL port.
As in the example above, multiple policy expressions may be attached to Web
service constructs that collectively represent a single policy subject. When
there are multiple policy expressions attached to the same policy subject then
the effective policy or combination of these policy expressions apply to the
associated policy subject.
The effective policy is the combination of two or more policy expressions
attached to the same policy subject. The combination of two policy expressions,
also known as the merged policy expression, is a new policy expression that
combines these two policy expressions using the All policy operator.
The policy expression below is the combination of the two policy expressions
attached to the SecureBinding WSDL binding and RealTimeDataPort WSDL port
descriptions. The #common2 policy expression has two policy alternatives. The #
secure2 policy expression has two policy alternatives. The combination of these
two policies is equivalent to Company-X?s secure policy in 2. Basic Concepts:
Policy Expression and has four policy alternatives. In other words, the
combination of two policies is the cross product of alternatives in these two
policies.
Example 3-10. Effective Policy of the Endpoint Policy Subject in the Previous
Example
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Of course, the above policy expression can be normalized. There are four policy
alternatives in the normal form. As we have seen in the policy data model, a
policy is an unordered collection of policy alternatives. That is, the order of
policy alternatives is insignificant. Therefore, the order of combining these
policy expressions is insignificant.
3.8 Extensibility and Versioning
3.8.1 Policy Language
Web Services Policy language is an extensible language by design. The Policy,
ExactlyOne, All and wsp:PolicyReference elements are extensible. The Policy
element allows child element and attribute extensibility, while the ExactlyOne
and All elements allow child element extensibility. The PolicyReference child
element allows element and attribute extensibility. Extensions must not use the
policy language XML namespace name. A consuming processor processes known
attributes and elements, ignores unknown attributes and treats unknown children
of the Policy, ExactlyOne, All elements as policy assertions. The child
elements of wsp:PolicyReference are ignored.
The PolicyReference element allows element and attribute extensibility.
3.8.2 Policy Expressions
Services that use the Web Services Policy language for policy expression enable
simple versioning practices that allow requesters to continue the use of older
policy alternatives in a backward compatible manner. This versioning practice
allows service providers, like Company-X, to deploy new behaviors using
additional (or new) policy assertions without breaking compatibility with
clients that rely on any older policy alternatives. We use examples below to
illustrate how versioning might be done.
The example below represents a Company-X version 1 policy expression. This
expression requires the use of addressing and transport-level security for
protecting messages.
Example 3-11. Company-X?s Version 1 Policy Expression
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Over time, Company-X adds support for advanced behaviors: requiring the use of
addressing and message-level security for protecting messages. They would like
to add this advanced support without breaking compatibility with requesters
that rely on addressing and transport-level security. The example below is
Company-X?s version 2 policy expression. In this version, Company-X adds a new
policy alternative that requires the use of addressing and message-level
security. The clients that rely on addressing and transport-level security may
continue to interact with Company-X?s using the old policy alternative. Of
course, these clients have the option to migrate from using old policy
alternatives to new policy alternatives.
Example 3-12. Company-X?s Version 2 Policy Expression
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When Company-X added support for advanced behaviors, they spent time to plan
for the continued support for existing clients, the smooth migration from using
current to advanced behaviors, and the switch to use only the advanced
behaviors in the near future (i.e. sun-setting current behaviors). In this
versioning scenario, a policy expression with multiple alternatives was used to
represent current and advanced behaviors in a non-disruptive manner: no
immediate changes to existing clients are required and these clients can
smoothly migrate to new functionality when they choose to. This level of
versioning support in a policy expression enables the same class of versioning
best practices built into WSDL constructs such as service, port and binding.
Let us look at tooling for unknown policy assertions. As service providers,
like Company-X, incrementally deploy advanced behaviors, some requesters may
not recognize these new policy assertions. As discussed before, these
requesters may continue to interact using old policy alternatives. New policy
assertions will emerge to represent new behaviors and slowly become part of
everyday interoperable interaction between requesters and providers. For
example, most tools use a practical tolerant strategy to process new or
unrecognized policy assertions. These tools consume such unrecognized
assertions and designate these for user intervention. As you would recognize,
there is nothing new in this practice. This is similar to how a proxy generator
that generates code from WSDL creates code for all the known WSDL constructs
and allows Web service developers to fill in code for custom or unknown
constructs in the WSDL.
3.8.3 Use of Ignorable attribute and an alternative Versioning Scenario
One potential use of the wsp:Ignorable attribute is to mark versioning related
information by creating a new policy assertion within a policy expression. The
new assertion is added to the original policy expression and then the service
can update the assertion parameter values when the service expires.
One scenario that illustrates this is a service which will support a particular
version of a service until a certain point in time. After that time, the
service will not be supported. In this scenario, the expiry date and time of
the service would be a new policy assertion [see Guidelines section 4] that the
service provider defines . This hypothetical EndOfLife policy assertion is then
included in the original policy expression, but it could be marked as
ignorable. The service, in this case, wants to inform the consumers it does
have an expiry time, and so it is useful to convey this information from the
beginning to help smooth the versioning process.
Company-X could specify that one policy alternative will expire at a certain
point in time using the hypothetical ignorable Company-X expiry assertion. The
example below shows how Company-X can create a new version 2 policy expression
with a second hypothetical ignorable EndOfLife Assertion with a different date
and time.
Example 3-13. Company-X's Version 2 Policy Expression with hypothetical
ignorable EndOfLife Assertion
Mar-31-2008
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Mar-31-2999
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In this variant of the versioning scenario, the use of ignorable allows
versioning related information to be conveyed and used where understood.
In a scenario such as this, CompanyX is acting as both a policy assertion
author and a policy expression author. As a policy expression author, when an
assertion type is tagged as ignorable information, the use of strict or lax
mode and presence or absence of the assertion type in the first version are
important decisions.
3.8.4 Use of Ignorable and Optional attributes
If Company-X knows about the hypothetical EndOfLife Policy assertion, it may or
may not mark that assertion with wsp:Optional="true" in the first version. If
it does include the assertion, marks the assertion with wsp:Ignorable="true"
and wsp:Optional="false", then a client that:
* does not know about the assertion and using lax intersection will produce
an intersection.
* does not know about the assertion and using strict intersection will not
produce an intersection.
* does know about the assertion and using strict or lax intersection will
produce an intersection.
If it does include the assertion, marks the assertion with wsp:Ignorable="true"
and wsp:Optional="true", then a client that:
* does or does not know about the assertion and using lax or strict
intersection will produce an intersection.
The following table summarizes the requester assertion knowledge and
intersection mode on the left vs provider ignorable and optional on the top
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Requester \|Required|Required and Ignorable |Optional|Optional and Ignorable |
|Provider | |(for intersection) | |(for intersection) |
|-----------+--------+-----------------------+--------+-----------------------|
|does not |No |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|know, lax | | | | |
|-----------+--------+-----------------------+--------+-----------------------|
|does not | | | | |
|know, |No |No |Yes |Yes |
|strict | | | | |
|-----------+--------+-----------------------+--------+-----------------------|
|does know, |Yes |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|lax | | | | |
|-----------+--------+-----------------------+--------+-----------------------|
|does know, |Yes |Yes |Yes |Yes |
|strict | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
If Company-X adds the hypothetical EndOfLife policy assertion type to a
subsequent Alternative and does not mark the assertion with wsp:Optional=
"true", then after the policy expression has been deployed/used the same
algorithm holds true, notably that a client using strict mode that does not
understand the assertion will not intersect with the alternative. If CompanyX
adds the hypothetical EndOfLife policy assertion with an ignorable attribute
and does mark the assertion with wsp:Optional="true", then clients using strict
mode who do not understand the hypothetical EndOfLife assertion with the
ignorable information will still be compatible with the alternative that does
not contain the hypothetical EndOfLife policy assertion as per the intersection
rules. When wsp:Ignorable="true" is used, clients that are unaware of the
hypothetical EndOfLife assertion may make more requests for expired services.
This could result in servers generating Faults if the request is received after
the expiry date. .
If Company-X knows about the hypothetical EndOfLife Policy assertion, it can
guarantee that clients that know or don't know about the hypothetical EndOfLife
Policy Assertion can intersect under any mode by marking the assertion with
wsp:Optional="true". Clients that know about the hypothetical EndOfLife Policy
assertion and performing strict intersection can guarantee interaction with
services that know or don't know about the hypothetical EndOfLife Policy
assertion by marking the assertion with wsp:Optional="true". Clients that know
about the hypothetical EndOfLife Policy assertion and performing lax
intersection can guarantee interaction with services that know or don't know
about the hypothetical EndOfLife Policy assertion by marking the assertion with
wsp:Optional="true" or marking it with wsp:Ignorable="true".
Because the actual value of the date/time may not be known when the policy
expression is first created, a value that is roughly infinitely in the future
is used. A subsequent policy alternative could refine the value and domain
specific processing of the assertion can differentiate the value. The advantage
of adding the end of life information through a domain specific assertion is
that some clients will have a machine processable way of knowing when the
alternative will no longer be supported by evaluating the policy assertions in
a policy expression. Without this information in a policy expression, the
information must be conveyed in some other way or it will not be conveyed at
all. This can usefully smooth the transition between versions of a service.
The disadvantage of adding the end of life information through a domain
specific assertion is that clients need to understand the semantics of the
hypothetical EndOfLife assertion in order to know whether a particular
alternative is still valid. For example, a client that doesn?t know what the
parameter ?Mar-31-2008? means, will not know that the service is no longer
available on April 1, and may send messages to this service in April, and if
the service enforces ?end of life?, these messages may fail.
3.9 Parts of a Policy Assertion
As we discussed, a policy assertion identifies a domain specific behavior or
requirement or condition. A policy assertion has a QName that identifies its
behavior or requirement or condition. A policy assertion may contain assertion
parameters and a nested policy.
Let us look at the anatomy of a policy assertion from the security domain. The
policy expression in the diagram below uses the sp:IssuedToken policy
assertion. This assertion illustrates the use of assertion parameters and
nested policy.
sp:IssuedToken Policy Assertion
Figure 3-4. sp:IssuedToken Policy Assertion
The sp:IssuedToken element is a policy assertion that identifies the use of a
security token ? such as SAML token - issued by a third party for protecting
messages. A policy assertion is an XML element. The QName of this element
represents the behavior identified by this policy assertion.
The sp:IssuedToken policy assertion has three parameters: @sp:IncludeToken,
sp:Issuer and sp:RequestSecurityTokenTemplate.
The sp:IncludeToken attribute is a parameter that contains information on
whether a security token should be included in messages or an external
reference to the key of this security token should be used. The sp:Issuer
parameter is an endpoint reference to a security token issuer. The
sp:RequestSecurityTokenTemplate parameter contains the necessary information to
request a security token from the specified issuer. Parameters are the opaque
payload of a Policy Assertion, carry useful information for engaging the
behavior described by an assertion and are preserved through policy processing
such as normalize, merge and intersection. requesters may use policy
intersection to select a compatible policy alternative for an interaction.
Assertion parameters do not affect the outcome of policy intersection.
For the sp:Issuer policy assertion parameter, the assertion author uses the
natural XML structural relationships (the child elements and attributes) and
encodes the relationship between an assertion and its parameters in a machine
readable form. Assertion parameters may be represented as child XML elements or
attributes of an assertion. The policy language allows assertion authors to
strongly tie the relationship between an assertion and its parameters using the
natural XML structural relationships.
The sp:IssuedToken policy assertion has a nested policy expression. The
sp:RequireInternalReference element is a nested policy assertion of the
sp:IssuedToken policy assertion. The sp:RequireInternalReference assertion
requires the use of an internal reference for referencing the issued token. A
nested policy assertion further qualifies a dependent behavior of its parent
policy assertion. As mentioned earlier, requesters may use policy intersection
to select a compatible policy alternative for an interaction. Nested policy
assertions affect the outcome of policy intersection.
The sp:IssuedToken security policy assertion identifies a visible domain
specific behavior: the use of a security token ? such as SAML token - issued by
a third party for protecting messages. This behavior is relevant to a Web
service interaction. For the sake of discussion, let us assume that Company-X
requires the use of a SAML token issued by a third party. Service providers,
like Company-X, must convey this usage and all the necessary information to
obtain this security token for Web service developers. This is a key piece of
metadata for a successful interaction with Company-X?s Web services.
4. Versioning Policy Language
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Editorial note | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|The WG is contemplating moving some or all of this material into a |
|non-normative appendix of the framework or attachment document. User feedback|
|is solicited |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Over time, the Policy WG or third parties can version or extend the Policy
Language with new or modified constructs. These constructs may be compatible or
incompatible with previous versions. Some of the possible new constructs that
have been mentioned previously are: new operators, operator cardinality, policy
identification, compact syntax, Policy Inclusion, security, referencing,
attachment points, alternative priority, effective dating, negotiation.
WS-Policy provides extensibility points on 6 elements with a combination of
attribute and/or element extensibility. The possible extensibility points are:
1. Policy: element from ##other namespace and any attribute
2. PolicyReference: any attribute and any element
3. ExactlyOne, All: element from ##other namespace, no attribute extensibility
4. PolicyAttachment: element from ##other namespace and any attribute
5. AppliesTo: any element and any attribute
4.1 Policy Framework
WS-Policy Framework 1.5 specifies that any child element that is not known
inside a Policy, ExactlyOne or All will be treated as an assertion. The default
value for wsp:Optional="false". After normalization, such an element will be
inside an ExactlyOne/All operator.
Let us show an example with a hypothetical new operator that is a Choice with a
minOccurs and a maxOccurs attributes, ala XSD:Choice, in a new namespace. We
use the wsp16 prefix to indicate a hypothetical Policy Language 1.6 that is
intended to be compatible with Policy Language 1.5:
Example 4-1. Policy containing 1.5 and 1.6 Policies.
...
...
The normalization rule for wsp:Optional="false" would be applied to the
wsp16:Choice, yielding the following expression:
Example 4-2. Normalized Policy containing 1.5 and 1.6 Policies
...
...
Alternatively, the wsp:Optional could be set to "true" on the choice, as in:
Example 4-3. Policy containing explicit wsp:Optional="true"
...
The normalized form will be:
Example 4-4. Normalized policy
...
Because the wsp16:Choice alternative isn't understood in either normalized
form, it will not be chosen as one of the alternatives and will effectively be
ignored. Policy intersection may be more difficult with such compatible
extensions. For example, the previous will "look" like it has a wsp16:Choice
typed assertion. To determine intersection with a Policy that does not have the
wsp16:Choice type assertion, domain specific processing would have to be done.
However, there is an alternative that does not have the wsp16:Choice, so
intersection would yield the expected result.
Note: it is possible to add new names to the existing namespace, such as:
Example 4-5. Policy containing 1.5 and 1.6 Policies all in the 1.5 namespace
...
...
Notice that using a new namespace can result in backwards and forwards
compatibility if normalization results in an optional alternative.
Best practice: insert new elements in an optional alternative or mark with
wsp:Optional="true".
Incompatible versions of the Policy language may be indicated by a new
namespace name for at least the new and/or incompatible elements or attributes.
Imagine that the Choice operator is required by a future version of Policy,
then there will be a new namespace for the Policy element. We use the wsp20
prefix to indicate a hypothetical Policy Language 2.0 that is intended to be
incompatible with Policy Language 1.5:
Example 4-6. Policy containing 2.0 only Policies.
...
...
The new Policy operator could be embedded inside an existing Policy element:
Example 4-7. Policy containing 2.0 (incompatible with 1.5) Policies embedded in
wsp 1.5 Policy.
...
...
This will be treated as an Assertion for normalization and intersection
computation. This will result in only one alternative that requires the
wsp20:Choice, the intended behaviour for incompatible changes.
Best practice: use a new namespace for new incompatible construct and insert
inside either: new Policy element OR existing All for future incompatible
policy extensions.
A future version of WS-Policy could support the current operators in the
existing namespace, such as:
Example 4-8. Policy containing 1.5 operator in 2.0 Policy
...
...
It is difficult to predict whether this functionality would be useful. The
future version of WS-Policy doesn't appear to be precluded from doing this.
4.2 Policy Attachment
Policy attachment provides WSDL 1.1 and UDDI attachment points. It appears that
exchange of Policy will be in the context of WSDL or UDDI. WRT WSDL, the policy
model is an extension of the WSDL definition. As such, it is likely that future
versions of Policy will be exchanged as multiple Policy expressions within a
WSDL. One alternative is that there would be a separate WSDL for each version
of Policy. The problem of how to specify and query for compound documents is
very difficult, so it is more likely that each version of Policy will be
exchanged within a WSDL.
We show an example of a new version of policy that allows QName reference to
Policies in the PolicyReference:
Example 4-9. WSDL containing 1.5 and 2.0 (compatible with 2.0) Policy
References.
....
...
The PolicyReference element is element or attribute extensible. One example of
an addition is a list of backup URIs for the PolicyReference:
Example 4-10. WSDL containing 1.5 and 2.0 (compatible with 2.0) Policy
References.
....
...
The policy framework specification says that any unknown attributes are
ignored. A Policy 1.5 processor will not understand the wsp16:alternateURI
attribute, it will be ignored. A Policy 1.6 processor will understand the
alternate URIs so it won't be ignored.
PolicyAttachment and AppliesTo also have extensibility points. We choose not to
illustrate these at this time.
5. Conclusion
Service providers use Web Services Policy to represent combinations of
behaviors (capabilities and requirements). Web service developers use
policy-aware clients that understand policy expressions and engage the
behaviors represented by providers automatically. These behaviors may include
security, reliability, transaction, message optimization, etc. Web Services
Policy is a simple language, hides complexity from developers, automates Web
service interactions, and enables secure, reliable and transacted Web Services.
A. Security Considerations
Security considerations are discussed in the Web Services Policy Framework
document.
B. XML Namespaces
The table below lists XML Namespaces that are used in this document. The choice
of any namespace prefix is arbitrary and not semantically significant.
Table B-1. Prefixes and XML Namespaces used in this specification.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | XML Namespace | Specifications |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| mtom | http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/ | [WS-MTOMPolicy] |
| | policy/optimizedmimeserialization | |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| soap | http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope | [SOAP 1.2 Messaging |
| | | Framework] |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| sp | http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ | [WS-SecurityPolicy] |
| | ws-securitypolicy/200702 | |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| wsa | http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing | [WS-Addressing Core] |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| wsam | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/addressing/ | [WS-Addressing |
| | metadata | Metadata] |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| wsdl | http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/ | [WSDL 1.1] |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| | | [Web Services Policy |
| wsp | http://www.w3.org/ns/ws-policy | Framework, Web |
| | | Services Policy |
| | | Attachment] |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| wss | http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/ | [WS-Security 2004] |
| | oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd | |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| wst | http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust | [WS-Trust] |
|--------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------|
| wsu | http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/ | [WS-Security 2004] |
| | oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd | |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
C. References
[C14N 1.0 Note]
Known Issues with Canonical XML 1.0 (C14N/1.0), J. Kahan and K. Lanz,
Editors. World Wide Web Consortium, 17 August 2006. Available at http://
www.w3.org/2006/04/c14n-note/c14n-note.html.>
[MTOM]
SOAP Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism, M. Gudgin, N. Mendelsohn,
M. Nottingham and H. Ruellan, Editors. World Wide Web Consortium, 25
January 2005. This version of the SOAP Message Transmission Optimization
Mechanism Recommendation is http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/
REC-soap12-mtom-20050125/. The latest version of SOAP Message Transmission
Optimization Mechanism is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-mtom/.
[WS-MTOMPolicy]
MTOM Serialization Policy Assertion (WS-MTOMPolicy), C. Ferris, et al,
Authors. International Business Machines Corporation and Microsoft
Corporation, Inc., September 2006. Available at http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/
ws/2004/09/policy/optimizedmimeserialization/
[SOAP 1.1]
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.1, D. Box, et al, Editors. World
Wide Web Consortium, 8 May 2000. Available at http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/
NOTE-SOAP-20000508/.
[SOAP 1.2 Messaging Framework]
SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework, M. Gudgin, M. Hadley, N.
Mendelsohn, J-J. Moreau, H. Frystyk Nielsen, Editors. World Wide Web
Consortium, 24 June 2003. This version of the SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1:
Messaging Framework Recommendation is http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/
REC-soap12-part1-20030624/. The latest version of SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1:
Messaging Framework is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part1/.
[SecSpecMaintWG]
XML Security Specifications Maintenance Working Group , See http://
www.w3.org/2007/xmlsec.
[WS-Addressing Core]
Web Services Addressing 1.0 - Core, M. Gudgin, M. Hadley, and T. Rogers,
Editors. World Wide Web Consortium, 9 May 2006. This version of the Web
Services Addressing 1.0 - Core Recommendation is http://www.w3.org/TR/2006/
REC-ws-addr-core-20060509/. The latest version of Web Services Addressing
1.0 - Core is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-addr-core.
[WS-Addressing Metadata]
Web Services Addressing 1.0 - Metadata, M. Gudgin, M. Hadley, T. Rogers and
?. Yal?inalp, Editors. World Wide Web Consortium, 31 July 2007. This is a
work in progress. This version of the Web Services Addressing 1.0 -
Metadata is http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/PR-ws-addr-metadata-20070731/. The
latest version of Web Services Addressing 1.0 - Metadata is available at
http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-addr-metadata.
[Web Services Atomic Transaction]
Web Services Atomic Transaction, L. P. Cabrera, et al, Authors. Arjuna
Technologies, Inc., BEA Systems, Inc., Hitachi Software, Inc., IONA
Technologies, Inc., International Business Machines Corporation, and
Microsoft Corporation, February 2005. Available at http://
schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/10/wsat/.
[Web Services Business Activity Framework]
Web Services Business Activity Framework, L. P. Cabrera, et al, Authors.
Arjuna Technologies, Inc., BEA Systems, Inc., Hitachi Software, Inc., IONA
Technologies, Inc., International Business Machines Corporation, and
Microsoft Corporation, February 2005. Available at http://
schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/10/wsba/.
[Devices Profile for Web Services]
Devices Profile for Web Services, S. Chan, et al, Authors. Intel
Corporation, Lexmark, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, and Richo Software,
Inc., February 2006. Available at http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2006/02/
devprof/.
[WS-MetadataExchange]
Web Services Metadata Exchange (WS-MetadataExchange), K. Ballinger, et al,
Authors. BEA Systems Inc., Computer Associates International, Inc.,
International Business Machines Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Inc.,
SAP AG, Sun Microsystems, and webMethods, August 2006. Available at http://
schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/mex/
[Web Services Policy Framework]
Web Services Policy 1.5 - Framework, A. S. Vedamuthu, D. Orchard, F.
Hirsch, M. Hondo, P. Yendluri, T. Boubez and ?. Yal?inalp, Editors. World
Wide Web Consortium, 6 July 2007. This version of the Web Services Policy
1.5 - Framework specification is at http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/
PR-ws-policy-20070706/. The latest version of Web Services Policy 1.5 -
Framework is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-policy/.
[Web Services Policy Attachment]
Web Services Policy 1.5 - Attachment, A. S. Vedamuthu, D. Orchard, F.
Hirsch, M. Hondo, P. Yendluri, T. Boubez and ?. Yal?inalp, Editors. World
Wide Web Consortium, 6 July 2007. This version of the Web Services Policy
1.5 - Attachment specification is at http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/
PR-ws-policy-attach-20070706/. The latest version of Web Services Policy
1.5 - Attachment is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-policy-attach/.
[Web Services Reliable Messaging Policy Assertion]
Web Services Reliable Messaging Policy Assertion (WS-RM Policy) Version 1.1
, D. David, A. Kamarkar, G. Pilz, and ?. Yal?inalp, Editors. Organization
for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards, OASIS Standard, 14
June 2007. This version available at http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrmp
/200702/wsrmp-1.1-spec-os-01.pdf.
[WSDL 1.1]
Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 1.1, E. Christensen, et al,
Authors. World Wide Web Consortium, March 2001. Available at http://
www.w3.org/TR/2001/NOTE-wsdl-20010315.
[WSDL 2.0 Core Language]
Web Services Description Language (WSDL) Version 2.0 Part 1: Core Language,
R. Chinnici, J. J. Moreau, A. Ryman, S. Weerawarana, Editors. World Wide
Web Consortium, 26 June 2007. This version of the WSDL 2.0 specification is
http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/REC-wsdl20-20070626/. The latest version of WSDL
2.0 is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl20.
[WS-Security 2004]
Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.0, A. Nadalin, C. Kaler, P.
Hallam-Baker and R. Monzillo, Editors. Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Standards, March 2004. Available at http://
docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/
oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0.pdf.
[WS-SecurityPolicy]
WS-SecurityPolicy v1.0, A. Nadalin, M. Gudgin, A. Barbir, and H. Granqvist,
Editors. Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information
Standards, 8 December 2005. Available at http://www.oasis-open.org/
committees/download.php/15979/oasis-wssx-ws-securitypolicy-1.0.pdf.
[WS-Trust]
Web Services Trust Language (WS-Trust), S. Anderson, et al, Authors.
Actional Corporation, BEA Systems, Inc., Computer Associates International,
Inc., International Business Machines Corporation, Layer 7 Technologies,
Microsoft Corporation, Oblix Inc., OpenNetwork Technologies Inc., Ping
Identity Corporation, Reactivity Inc., RSA Security Inc., and VeriSign
Inc., February 2005. Available at http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/
trust.
[XML ID]
xml:id Version 1.0, J. Marsh, D. Veillard and N. Walsh, Editors. World Wide
Web Consortium, 9 September 2005. This version of the xml:id Version 1.0
Recommendation is http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xml-id-20050909/. The
latest version of xml:id Version 1.0 is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/
xml-id/.
[C14N11]
Canonical XML 1.1, J. Boyer and G. Marcy Authors. W3C Candidate
Recommendation, 21 June 2007. This is a work in progress. This version is
available at http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/CR-xml-c14n11-20070621. The latest
version of Canonical XML 1.1 is available at http://www.w3.org/TR//
xml-c14n11/.
[XOP]
XML-binary Optimized Packaging, M. Gudgin, N. Mendelsohn, M. Nottingham and
H. Ruellan, Editors. World Wide Web Consortium, 25 January 2005. This
version of the XML-binary Optimized Packaging Recommendation is http://
www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xop10-20050125/. The latest version of XML-binary
Optimized Packaging is available at http://www.w3.org/TR/xop10/.
D. Acknowledgements (Non-Normative)
This document is the work of the W3C Web Services Policy Working Group.
Members of the Working Group are (at the time of writing, and by alphabetical
order): Dimitar Angelov (SAP AG), Abbie Barbir (Nortel Networks), Charlton
Barreto (Adobe Systems Inc.), Sergey Beryozkin (IONA Technologies, Inc.),
Vladislav Bezrukov (SAP AG), Toufic Boubez (Layer 7 Technologies), Symon Chang
(BEA Systems, Inc.), Paul Cotton (Microsoft Corporation), Glen Daniels
(Progress Software), Doug Davis (IBM Corporation), Jacques Durand (Fujitsu
Limited), Ruchith Fernando (WSO2), Christopher Ferris (IBM Corporation),
William Henry (IONA Technologies, Inc.), Frederick Hirsch (Nokia), Maryann
Hondo (IBM Corporation), Ondrej Hrebicek (Microsoft Corporation), Steve Jones
(Layer 7 Technologies), Tom Jordahl (Adobe Systems Inc.), Paul Knight (Nortel
Networks), Philippe Le H?garet (W3C/MIT), Mark Little (JBoss Inc.), Mohammad
Makarechian (Microsoft Corporation), Ashok Malhotra (Oracle Corporation),
Jonathan Marsh (WSO2), Monica Martin (Sun Microsystems, Inc.), Arnaud Meyniel
(Axway Software), Jeff Mischkinsky (Oracle Corporation), Dale Moberg (Axway
Software), Anthony Nadalin (IBM Corporation), David Orchard (BEA Systems,
Inc.), Sanjay Patil (SAP AG), Manjula Peiris (WSO2), Fabian Ritzmann (Sun
Microsystems, Inc.), Daniel Roth (Microsoft Corporation), Tom Rutt (Fujitsu
Limited), Sanka Samaranayake (WSO2), Felix Sasaki (W3C/Keio), Yakov Sverdlov
(CA), Asir Vedamuthu (Microsoft Corporation), Sanjiva Weerawarana (WSO2), ?mit
Yal?inalp (SAP AG), Prasad Yendluri (webMethods, Inc.).
Previous members of the Working Group were: Jeffrey Crump, Jong Lee, Bob
Natale, Eugene Osovetsky, Bijan Parsia, Skip Snow, Seumas Soltysik, Mark
Temple-Raston.
The people who have contributed to discussions on public-ws-policy@w3.org are
also gratefully acknowledged.
E. Changes in this Version of the Document (Non-Normative)
A list of major editorial changes since the Working Draft dated 05 June, 2007
is below:
* Updated references - [C14N11], [Web Services Reliable Messaging Policy
Assertion] and [WS-Addressing Metadata].
F. Web Services Policy 1.5 - Primer Change Log (Non-Normative)
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Date |Author| Description |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20060816|ASV |Created first draft per action item 2 from the Austin F2F. |
| | |This draft is based on a contribution from Microsoft. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20060829|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 3561: replaced URI with |
| | |IRI. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20060919|DBO |Implemented the action 26 to add versioning material to |
| | |primer. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20060924|TIB |Implemented the editorial action 35 to move the Security |
| | |Considerations section to the Framework document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |Implemented the editorial action 36 to insert a reference to |
|20060924|TIB |the Security Considerations section from the Framework |
| | |document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20060926|PY |Made a first pass at the changes to address issues reported |
| | |by Paul Cotton. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20060928|PY |Completed making remaining changes to address issues reported|
| | |by Paul Cotton. Fixing up the Acknowledgements is pending |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061020|PY |Implemented resolution for Issue 3827. Editors Action Item |
| | |56. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061027|TIB |Implemented resolution for Issue 3815. Editors Action Item |
| | |55. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061101|TIB |Implemented resolution for Issue 3815. Editors Action Item |
| | |68. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061101|PY |Implemented the resolution for Issue 3791. Editors Action |
| | |Item 67. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061121|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 3809. Editors Action |
| | |Item 79. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061121|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 3966. Editors Action |
| | |Item 81. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061125|ASV |Reset Section E. Changes in this Version of the Document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |Implemented the resolution for issue 3792. Editors Action |
| | |Item 80: moved Sections 4.2 Parts of a Policy Assertion and |
|20061125|ASV |4.4.8 Versioning Policy Language into Section 3. Advanced |
| | |Concepts: Policy Expression; moved Section 4 Advanced |
| | |Concepts II: Policy Assertion Design into the Guidelines |
| | |document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061127|ASV |Added Frederick and Umit to the list of editors. Editors' |
| | |action 86. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |Implemented the resolution for issue 3952 as outlined (with |
|20061207|FJH |editorial correction replacing "for as" with "as"), Editors' |
| | |action 92. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20061213|TIB |Implemented the resolution for issue 3965 as outlined. |
| | |Editors' action 94. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070104|MH |Implemented the resolution for issue 4069 as outlined. |
| | |Editors' action 110. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070108|ASV |Reset Section E. Changes in this Version of the Document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070118|FJH |Implemented the resolution for issue 4041 resolution |
| | |corresponding to Editors' action 143. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070122|PY |Completed action item: 118 Resolution for issue 4141 |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070122|PY |Completed action item: 127 Resolution for issue 4197 |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070131|FJH |Implemented resolution for issue 4270 as Resolved on 31 |
| | |January 2007, closing editors action 151. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070313|FJH |Applied resolution to issue 4379 with minor editorial |
| | |revision (editors action 181). Updated references order. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070314|FJH |Applied resolution to issue 4263 (editors action 195). |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070315|PY |Applied the resolution to issue 4339 (editors action 194). |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070315|PY |Applied the resolution to issue 4262 (editors action 201). |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070315|FJH |Applied resolution to issue 4255 (editors action 192). |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070315|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 4288. Editors' action |
| | |196. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070315|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 3979. Editors' action |
| | |198. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070315|FJH |Applied resolution to issue 4253 (editors action 191). |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070319|MH |Implemented the resolution for issue 4213 as outlined. |
| | |Editors' action 189. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070319|PY |Implemented the resolution for issue 4103 as outlined. |
| | |Editors' action 193. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070320|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 4300. Editors' action |
| | |190. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070321|ASV |Updated section E. Changes in this Version of the Document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070321|ASV |Formatted the example in 3.8.3 Use of Ignorable attribute and|
| | |an alternative Versioning Scenario. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |Deleted residual text in 4. Versioning Policy Language; s/The|
| | |possible extensibility points with their current |
|20070322|ASV |extensibility - including some outstanding issues related to |
| | |extensibility - are:/The possible extensibility points are:/ |
| | |; s/PolicyReference: any attribute and a proposal to add any |
| | |element/PolicyReference: any attribute and any element/. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070426|PY |Editorial changes to align with the OASIS WS-SecurityPolicy |
| | |specification. For issue 4318. Editors' action 244. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070430|TIB |Editorial changes for issue 4393. Editors' action 239. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070501|ASV |Reset Section E. Changes in this Version of the Document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070502|TIB |Further changes for issue 4393. Editors' action 239. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070502|DBO |Finished changes for issue 4414. Editors' action 239. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070524|DBO |Finished changes for issue 4559. Editors' action 281, and |
| | |issue 4375. Editors' action 282 |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070718|FJH |Updated the C14N11 reference [C14N11] for issue 4851. |
| | |Editors' action 337. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |Updated Web Services Reliable Messaging Policy reference [Web|
|20070718|FJH |Services Reliable Messaging Policy Assertion] and |
| | |WS-Addressing Metadata reference [WS-Addressing Metadata]. |
| | |Editors' action 331. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070727|ASV |Fixed a typo in Section 3.4 Compatible Policies. Editors' |
| | |action 349. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070727|ASV |Implemented the resolution for issue 4857. Editors' action |
| | |350. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070727|ASV |Updated Section E. Changes in this Version of the Document. |
|--------+------+-------------------------------------------------------------|
|20070806|FS |Updated references for draft publication. |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+