

Web Security Requirements: A Phishing Perspective

What is Usability? How are we failing?

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Carnegie Mellon




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The Phishing Problem

- ◆ It's easy to fake a page and collect user information



Overview

- ♦ What does it mean for security to be usable?
- ♦ What security features do we currently have?
- ♦ Why what we have has failed (or will fail)
- ♦ Where our group is looking
- ♦ Concluding Remarks



What is usable security?


- ♦ Any interactions with the user should be at a level understandable by said user
- ♦ Required user interaction (both input and attention) should be kept minimal
- ♦ Should be “hard” for a user to commit a serious mistake
- ♦ Should be usable from wherever the user may be (public cafe, mobile device)
- ♦ Should consider users' disabilities



Current Security Features

- ♦ The Lock
 - ♦ Ignored by many
 - ♦ Confusion as to what it means
 - ♦ Mis-used by websites (next slides) so as to diminish power
- ♦ RSA SecurID
- ♦ PassMark SiteSecure
- ♦ Various chrome extensions





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
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
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We've Failed The Lock

- ♦ We started with something ill-designed
- ♦ We made it worse by confusing the issue
“The lock means you're secure”
- ♦ We started using the indicator outside of its normal location, and now people look for it outside of its normal location.



RSA SecurID

- ♦ Moving beyond the browser to hardware assistance
- ♦ Usable at home or on the road
- ♦ ... but vulnerable to man in the middle attacks



Passmark SiteSecure

- ♦ Attempt at two-factor mutual authentication using properties of the computer as the second factor
- ♦ Enrollment process to 'sign up' a computer
- ♦ Once enrolled, user authenticates in part based on the computer they are using
- ♦ Bank authenticates itself by displaying a shared secret (picture)
- ♦ Enrollment process can be spoofed



Phishing Toolbars

- ♦ Overall, fail to protect users from high quality spoofs
- ♦ Users ignore indicators, as security is not their primary objective
- ♦ Pop-up warnings are slightly more effective, but overuse and false positives lead to the “just-click-ok” syndrome.

[1] M. Wu, R.C. Miller and S.L. Garfinkel, “Do security toolbars actually prevent phishing attacks?” in CHI (to appear), 2006. [Online]. Available: <http://www.simson.net/ref/2006/CHI-security-toolbar-final.pdf>



Where Our Group is Looking

- ♦ Heuristic Detection
 - ♦ Link Characteristics and HTML tricks
 - ♦ Header Information
 - ♦ Domain Age
 - ♦ “Inbox context”
- ♦ Collaborative Approaches
 - ♦ Leverage economies of scale
 - ♦ Publish warnings, or “vaccines” (think virus definitions)
 - ♦ Issues of trust in reporting, detecting misinformation



Where Our Group is Looking (2)

- ♦ Semantic Approaches
 - ♦ User's environment knows more about the user than the ISP does
 - ♦ Detect deviance from normal user behavior
 - ♦ Semantic approaches, including digital wallets or federated identity management systems
- ♦ Leveraging Out-Of-Band Communications
 - ♦ Salvaging PKI
 - ♦ Building on current relationship establishment procedures
 - ♦ Facilitating support technologies



Where Our Group is Looking (3)

- ◆ Understanding the Users: Interviews
 - ◆ People misunderstand many cues the browser provides:
 - ◆ Some are alarmed by 'warnings' that they are entering a secure site
 - ◆ Certificates, especially self-signed, and encryption are confusing to users: “I guess I'm not fully sure what 'encrypted' means.” - user
 - ◆ Some are highly affected by targeted attacks
 - ◆ Past “experience” doesn't necessarily help



Where Our Group is Looking (4)

- ♦ Educating the User
 - ♦ Providing training in the context of the user's inbox
 - ♦ Tailoring the training to the specific user's needs, adapting to strengths and weaknesses
 - ♦ Creating an educational game to teach anti-phishing skills



Concluding Remarks

- ♦ New solutions must take usability into account
- ♦ Security should be analyzed from a holistic perspective, including user analysis
 - ♦ What do we rely upon the user doing?
 - ♦ Can the user be tricked into doing a “bad” action at any stage?
- ♦ Expectations for user action should be minimal
- ♦ Active, positive indicators of problems



Questions?

- ♦ Thank you
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